1 /*
2 * Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 /*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
17
18 #include <stdio.h>
19 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/evp.h>
25 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
26 #include <openssl/cms.h>
27 #include "crypto/evp.h"
28 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
29 #include "rsa_local.h"
30
31 /* RSA pkey context structure */
32
33 typedef struct {
34 /* Key gen parameters */
35 int nbits;
36 BIGNUM *pub_exp;
37 int primes;
38 /* Keygen callback info */
39 int gentmp[2];
40 /* RSA padding mode */
41 int pad_mode;
42 /* message digest */
43 const EVP_MD *md;
44 /* message digest for MGF1 */
45 const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
46 /* PSS salt length */
47 int saltlen;
48 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
49 int min_saltlen;
50 /* Temp buffer */
51 unsigned char *tbuf;
52 /* OAEP label */
53 unsigned char *oaep_label;
54 size_t oaep_labellen;
55 } RSA_PKEY_CTX;
56
57 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
58 #define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
59
pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx)60 static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
61 {
62 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
63
64 if (rctx == NULL)
65 return 0;
66 rctx->nbits = 2048;
67 rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
68 if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
69 rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
70 else
71 rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
72 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
73 rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
74 rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
75 ctx->data = rctx;
76 ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
77 ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
78
79 return 1;
80 }
81
pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX * dst,const EVP_PKEY_CTX * src)82 static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
83 {
84 RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
85
86 if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
87 return 0;
88 sctx = src->data;
89 dctx = dst->data;
90 dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
91 if (sctx->pub_exp) {
92 dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
93 if (!dctx->pub_exp)
94 return 0;
95 }
96 dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
97 dctx->md = sctx->md;
98 dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
99 dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
100 if (sctx->oaep_label) {
101 OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
102 dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
103 if (!dctx->oaep_label)
104 return 0;
105 dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
106 }
107 return 1;
108 }
109
setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX * ctx,EVP_PKEY_CTX * pk)110 static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
111 {
112 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
113 return 1;
114 if ((ctx->tbuf =
115 OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL) {
116 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
117 return 0;
118 }
119 return 1;
120 }
121
pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx)122 static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
123 {
124 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
125 if (rctx) {
126 BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
127 OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
128 OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
129 OPENSSL_free(rctx);
130 }
131 }
132
pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,unsigned char * sig,size_t * siglen,const unsigned char * tbs,size_t tbslen)133 static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
134 size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
135 size_t tbslen)
136 {
137 int ret;
138 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
139 /*
140 * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
141 * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
142 * be reflected back in the "original" key.
143 */
144 RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
145
146 if (rctx->md) {
147 if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
148 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
149 return -1;
150 }
151
152 if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
153 unsigned int sltmp;
154 if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
155 return -1;
156 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
157
158 if (ret <= 0)
159 return ret;
160 ret = sltmp;
161 } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
162 if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
163 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
164 return -1;
165 }
166 if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
167 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
168 return -1;
169 }
170 memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
171 rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md));
172 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
173 sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
174 } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
175 unsigned int sltmp;
176 ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
177 tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
178 if (ret <= 0)
179 return ret;
180 ret = sltmp;
181 } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
182 if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
183 return -1;
184 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
185 rctx->tbuf, tbs,
186 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
187 rctx->saltlen))
188 return -1;
189 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
190 sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
191 } else {
192 return -1;
193 }
194 } else {
195 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
196 }
197 if (ret < 0)
198 return ret;
199 *siglen = ret;
200 return 1;
201 }
202
pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,unsigned char * rout,size_t * routlen,const unsigned char * sig,size_t siglen)203 static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
204 unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
205 const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
206 {
207 int ret;
208 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
209 /*
210 * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
211 * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
212 * be reflected back in the "original" key.
213 */
214 RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
215
216 if (rctx->md) {
217 if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
218 if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
219 return -1;
220 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa,
221 RSA_X931_PADDING);
222 if (ret < 1)
223 return 0;
224 ret--;
225 if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md))) {
226 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
227 return 0;
228 }
229 if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
230 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
231 return 0;
232 }
233 if (rout)
234 memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
235 } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
236 size_t sltmp;
237 ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
238 NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
239 sig, siglen, rsa);
240 if (ret <= 0)
241 return 0;
242 ret = sltmp;
243 } else {
244 return -1;
245 }
246 } else {
247 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
248 }
249 if (ret < 0)
250 return ret;
251 *routlen = ret;
252 return 1;
253 }
254
pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,const unsigned char * sig,size_t siglen,const unsigned char * tbs,size_t tbslen)255 static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
256 const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
257 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
258 {
259 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
260 /*
261 * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
262 * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
263 * be reflected back in the "original" key.
264 */
265 RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
266 size_t rslen;
267
268 if (rctx->md) {
269 if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
270 return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
271 sig, siglen, rsa);
272 if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
273 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
274 return -1;
275 }
276 if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
277 if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
278 return 0;
279 } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
280 int ret;
281 if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
282 return -1;
283 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
284 rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
285 if (ret <= 0)
286 return 0;
287 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
288 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
289 rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
290 if (ret <= 0)
291 return 0;
292 return 1;
293 } else {
294 return -1;
295 }
296 } else {
297 if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
298 return -1;
299 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
300 rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
301 if (rslen == 0)
302 return 0;
303 }
304
305 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
306 return 0;
307
308 return 1;
309
310 }
311
pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,unsigned char * out,size_t * outlen,const unsigned char * in,size_t inlen)312 static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
313 unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
314 const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
315 {
316 int ret;
317 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
318 /*
319 * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
320 * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
321 * be reflected back in the "original" key.
322 */
323 RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
324
325 if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
326 int klen = RSA_size(rsa);
327 if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
328 return -1;
329 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
330 in, inlen,
331 rctx->oaep_label,
332 rctx->oaep_labellen,
333 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
334 return -1;
335 ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
336 } else {
337 ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
338 }
339 if (ret < 0)
340 return ret;
341 *outlen = ret;
342 return 1;
343 }
344
pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,unsigned char * out,size_t * outlen,const unsigned char * in,size_t inlen)345 static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
346 unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
347 const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
348 {
349 int ret;
350 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
351 /*
352 * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
353 * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
354 * be reflected back in the "original" key.
355 */
356 RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
357
358 if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
359 if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
360 return -1;
361 ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
362 if (ret <= 0)
363 return ret;
364 ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
365 ret, ret,
366 rctx->oaep_label,
367 rctx->oaep_labellen,
368 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
369 } else {
370 ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
371 }
372 *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
373 ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
374 return ret;
375 }
376
check_padding_md(const EVP_MD * md,int padding)377 static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
378 {
379 int mdnid;
380
381 if (!md)
382 return 1;
383
384 mdnid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
385
386 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
387 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
388 return 0;
389 }
390
391 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
392 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
393 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
394 return 0;
395 }
396 } else {
397 switch (mdnid) {
398 /* List of all supported RSA digests */
399 case NID_sha1:
400 case NID_sha224:
401 case NID_sha256:
402 case NID_sha384:
403 case NID_sha512:
404 case NID_sha512_224:
405 case NID_sha512_256:
406 case NID_md5:
407 case NID_md5_sha1:
408 case NID_md2:
409 case NID_md4:
410 case NID_mdc2:
411 case NID_ripemd160:
412 case NID_sha3_224:
413 case NID_sha3_256:
414 case NID_sha3_384:
415 case NID_sha3_512:
416 return 1;
417
418 default:
419 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
420 return 0;
421
422 }
423 }
424
425 return 1;
426 }
427
pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,int type,int p1,void * p2)428 static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
429 {
430 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
431
432 switch (type) {
433 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
434 if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
435 if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
436 return 0;
437 if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
438 if (!(ctx->operation &
439 (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
440 goto bad_pad;
441 if (!rctx->md)
442 rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
443 } else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
444 goto bad_pad;
445 }
446 if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
447 if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
448 goto bad_pad;
449 if (!rctx->md)
450 rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
451 }
452 rctx->pad_mode = p1;
453 return 1;
454 }
455 bad_pad:
456 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
457 return -2;
458
459 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
460 *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
461 return 1;
462
463 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
464 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
465 if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
466 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
467 return -2;
468 }
469 if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
470 *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
471 } else {
472 if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
473 return -2;
474 if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
475 if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
476 && ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
477 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
478 return -2;
479 }
480 if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
481 && rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md))
482 || (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
483 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
484 return 0;
485 }
486 }
487 rctx->saltlen = p1;
488 }
489 return 1;
490
491 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
492 if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
493 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
494 return -2;
495 }
496 rctx->nbits = p1;
497 return 1;
498
499 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
500 if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
501 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
502 return -2;
503 }
504 BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
505 rctx->pub_exp = p2;
506 return 1;
507
508 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
509 if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
510 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
511 return -2;
512 }
513 rctx->primes = p1;
514 return 1;
515
516 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
517 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
518 if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
519 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
520 return -2;
521 }
522 if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
523 *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
524 else
525 rctx->md = p2;
526 return 1;
527
528 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
529 if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
530 return 0;
531 if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
532 if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
533 return 1;
534 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
535 return 0;
536 }
537 rctx->md = p2;
538 return 1;
539
540 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
541 *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
542 return 1;
543
544 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
545 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
546 if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
547 && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
548 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
549 return -2;
550 }
551 if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
552 if (rctx->mgf1md)
553 *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
554 else
555 *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
556 } else {
557 if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
558 if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
559 return 1;
560 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
561 return 0;
562 }
563 rctx->mgf1md = p2;
564 }
565 return 1;
566
567 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
568 if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
569 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
570 return -2;
571 }
572 OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
573 if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
574 rctx->oaep_label = p2;
575 rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
576 } else {
577 rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
578 rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
579 }
580 return 1;
581
582 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
583 if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
584 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
585 return -2;
586 }
587 *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
588 return rctx->oaep_labellen;
589
590 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
591 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
593 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
594 #endif
595 return 1;
596
597 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
598 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
600 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
601 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
602 #endif
603 if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
604 return 1;
605 /* fall through */
606 case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
607 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
608 return -2;
609
610 default:
611 return -2;
612
613 }
614 }
615
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,const char * type,const char * value)616 static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
617 const char *type, const char *value)
618 {
619 if (value == NULL) {
620 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
621 return 0;
622 }
623 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
624 int pm;
625
626 if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
627 pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
628 } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
629 pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
630 } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
631 pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
632 } else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
633 pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
634 } else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
635 pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
636 } else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
637 pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
638 } else {
639 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
640 return -2;
641 }
642 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
643 }
644
645 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
646 int saltlen;
647
648 if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
649 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
650 else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
651 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
652 else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
653 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
654 else
655 saltlen = atoi(value);
656 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
657 }
658
659 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
660 int nbits = atoi(value);
661
662 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
663 }
664
665 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
666 int ret;
667
668 BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
669 if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
670 return 0;
671 ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
672 BN_free(pubexp);
673 return ret;
674 }
675
676 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
677 int nprimes = atoi(value);
678
679 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
680 }
681
682 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
683 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
684 EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
685 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
686
687 if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
688
689 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
690 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
691 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
692
693 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
694 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
695 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
696
697 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
698 int saltlen = atoi(value);
699
700 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
701 }
702 }
703
704 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
705 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
706 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
707
708 if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
709 unsigned char *lab;
710 long lablen;
711 int ret;
712
713 lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
714 if (!lab)
715 return 0;
716 ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
717 if (ret <= 0)
718 OPENSSL_free(lab);
719 return ret;
720 }
721
722 return -2;
723 }
724
725 /* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
rsa_set_pss_param(RSA * rsa,EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx)726 static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
727 {
728 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
729
730 if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
731 return 1;
732 /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
733 if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
734 return 1;
735 rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
736 rctx->saltlen == -2
737 ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
738 if (rsa->pss == NULL)
739 return 0;
740 return 1;
741 }
742
pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx,EVP_PKEY * pkey)743 static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
744 {
745 RSA *rsa = NULL;
746 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
747 BN_GENCB *pcb;
748 int ret;
749
750 if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
751 rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
752 if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
753 return 0;
754 }
755 rsa = RSA_new();
756 if (rsa == NULL)
757 return 0;
758 if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
759 pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
760 if (pcb == NULL) {
761 RSA_free(rsa);
762 return 0;
763 }
764 evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
765 } else {
766 pcb = NULL;
767 }
768 ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
769 rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
770 BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
771 if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
772 RSA_free(rsa);
773 return 0;
774 }
775 if (ret > 0)
776 EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
777 else
778 RSA_free(rsa);
779 return ret;
780 }
781
782 static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
783 EVP_PKEY_RSA,
784 EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
785 pkey_rsa_init,
786 pkey_rsa_copy,
787 pkey_rsa_cleanup,
788
789 0, 0,
790
791 0,
792 pkey_rsa_keygen,
793
794 0,
795 pkey_rsa_sign,
796
797 0,
798 pkey_rsa_verify,
799
800 0,
801 pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
802
803 0, 0, 0, 0,
804
805 0,
806 pkey_rsa_encrypt,
807
808 0,
809 pkey_rsa_decrypt,
810
811 0, 0,
812
813 pkey_rsa_ctrl,
814 pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
815 };
816
ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void)817 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void)
818 {
819 return &rsa_pkey_meth;
820 }
821
822 /*
823 * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
824 * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
825 */
826
pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx)827 static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
828 {
829 const RSA *rsa;
830 RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
831 const EVP_MD *md;
832 const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
833 int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
834
835 /* Should never happen */
836 if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
837 return 0;
838 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
839 /* If no restrictions just return */
840 if (rsa->pss == NULL)
841 return 1;
842 /* Get and check parameters */
843 if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
844 return 0;
845
846 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
847 max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(md);
848 if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
849 max_saltlen--;
850 if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
851 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
852 return 0;
853 }
854
855 rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
856
857 /*
858 * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
859 * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
860 */
861
862 rctx->md = md;
863 rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
864 rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
865
866 return 1;
867 }
868
869 static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
870 EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
871 EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
872 pkey_rsa_init,
873 pkey_rsa_copy,
874 pkey_rsa_cleanup,
875
876 0, 0,
877
878 0,
879 pkey_rsa_keygen,
880
881 pkey_pss_init,
882 pkey_rsa_sign,
883
884 pkey_pss_init,
885 pkey_rsa_verify,
886
887 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
888
889 pkey_rsa_ctrl,
890 pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
891 };
892
ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void)893 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void)
894 {
895 return &rsa_pss_pkey_meth;
896 }
897
