1 /*
2 * Copyright 2020-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 /*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16 #include <string.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
18 #include <openssl/params.h>
19 #include <openssl/err.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
22 # include <openssl/x509.h>
23 # include "crypto/asn1.h"
24 #endif
25 #include "internal/sizes.h"
26 #include "internal/param_build_set.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "rsa_local.h"
29
30 /*
31 * The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support
32 * for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider
33 * implementations alike.
34 */
35
DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)36 DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
37
38 static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers,
39 const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[])
40 {
41 const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
42 int i;
43
44 if (numbers == NULL)
45 return 0;
46
47 for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++) {
48 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]);
49 if (p != NULL) {
50 BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
51
52 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp))
53 return 0;
54 if (sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) {
55 BN_clear_free(tmp);
56 return 0;
57 }
58 }
59 }
60
61 return 1;
62 }
63
ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA * rsa,const OSSL_PARAM params[],int include_private)64 int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
65 {
66 const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL;
67 const OSSL_PARAM *param_p, *param_q = NULL;
68 const OSSL_PARAM *param_derive = NULL;
69 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
70 STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL;
71 int is_private = 0;
72 int derive_from_pq = 0;
73 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
74
75 if (rsa == NULL)
76 return 0;
77
78 param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N);
79 param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E);
80
81 if ((param_n == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
82 || (param_e == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))) {
83 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
84 goto err;
85 }
86
87 if (include_private) {
88
89 param_derive = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
90 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ);
91 if ((param_derive != NULL)
92 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_derive, &derive_from_pq))
93 goto err;
94
95 param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
96 if (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)) {
97 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
98 goto err;
99 }
100
101 if (derive_from_pq) {
102 ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
103 if (ctx == NULL)
104 goto err;
105
106 /* we need at minimum p, q */
107 param_p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1);
108 param_q = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2);
109 if ((param_p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_p, &p))
110 || (param_q == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_q, &q))) {
111 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
112 goto err;
113 }
114
115 }
116 }
117
118 is_private = (d != NULL);
119
120 if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d))
121 goto err;
122 n = e = d = NULL;
123
124 if (is_private) {
125 if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
126 ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names)
127 || !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
128 ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names)
129 || !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
130 ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names))
131 goto err;
132
133 if (derive_from_pq && sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) == 0
134 && sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) == 0) {
135 /*
136 * If we want to use crt to derive our exponents/coefficients, we
137 * need to have at least 2 factors
138 */
139 if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) < 2) {
140 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
141 goto err;
142 }
143
144 /*
145 * if we have more than two factors, n and d must also have
146 * been provided
147 */
148 if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) > 2
149 && (param_n == NULL || param_d == NULL)) {
150 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
151 goto err;
152 }
153
154 /* build our exponents and coefficients here */
155 if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) == 2) {
156 /* for 2 factors we can use the sp800 functions to do this */
157 if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0),
158 sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1))) {
159 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
160 goto err;
161 }
162 /*
163 * once consumed by RSA_set0_factors, pop those off the stack
164 * so we don't free them below
165 */
166 sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
167 sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
168
169 /*
170 * Note: Because we only have 2 factors here, there will be no
171 * additional pinfo fields to hold additional factors, and
172 * since we set our key and 2 factors above we can skip
173 * the call to ossl_rsa_set0_all_params
174 */
175 if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa,
176 RSA_bits(rsa),
177 NULL, ctx)) {
178 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
179 goto err;
180 }
181 } else {
182 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
183 /*
184 * in the multiprime case we have to generate exps/coeffs here
185 * for each additional prime
186 */
187 if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, RSA_bits(rsa),
188 sk_BIGNUM_num(factors),
189 rsa->e, factors, exps,
190 coeffs)) {
191 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
192 goto err;
193 }
194
195 /*
196 * Now we should have all our factors, exponents and
197 * coefficients
198 */
199 if (!ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) {
200 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
201 goto err;
202 }
203
204 #else
205 /* multiprime case is disallowed in FIPS mode, raise an error */
206 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
207 goto err;
208 #endif
209 }
210
211 } else {
212 /*
213 * It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d
214 * but only if we're not using derive_from_pq
215 */
216 if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
217 && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs))
218 goto err;
219 }
220 /* sanity check to ensure we used everything in our stacks */
221 if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
222 || sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) != 0
223 || sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) != 0) {
224 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
225 "There are %d, %d, %d elements left on our factors, exps, coeffs stacks\n",
226 sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), sk_BIGNUM_num(exps),
227 sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs));
228 goto err;
229 }
230 }
231
232 if (!ossl_rsa_check_factors(rsa)) {
233 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR,
234 "RSA factors/exponents are too big for for n-modulus\n");
235 goto err;
236 }
237
238 BN_clear_free(p);
239 BN_clear_free(q);
240 sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
241 sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
242 sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
243 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
244 return 1;
245
246 err:
247 BN_free(n);
248 BN_free(e);
249 BN_free(d);
250 sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free);
251 sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_clear_free);
252 sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_clear_free);
253 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
254 return 0;
255 }
256
DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const,BIGNUM)257 DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
258
259 int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[],
260 int include_private)
261 {
262 int ret = 0;
263 const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
264 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
265 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
266 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
267
268 if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
269 goto err;
270
271 RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
272 ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs);
273
274 if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n)
275 || !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e))
276 goto err;
277
278 /* Check private key data integrity */
279 if (include_private && rsa_d != NULL) {
280
281 if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D,
282 rsa_d)
283 || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
284 ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names,
285 factors)
286 || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
287 ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps)
288 || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
289 ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names,
290 coeffs))
291 goto err;
292 }
293
294 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
295 /* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */
296 if (bld == NULL)
297 ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params);
298 #endif
299 ret = 1;
300 err:
301 sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors);
302 sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps);
303 sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs);
304 return ret;
305 }
306
ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 * pss,OSSL_PARAM_BLD * bld,OSSL_PARAM params[])307 int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss,
308 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[])
309 {
310 if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
311 int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
312 int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss);
313 int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
314 int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
315 int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL);
316 int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
317 int default_maskgenhashalg_nid =
318 ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL);
319 const char *mdname =
320 (hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid
321 ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid));
322 const char *mgfname =
323 (maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid
324 ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid));
325 const char *mgf1mdname =
326 (maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid
327 ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid));
328 const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST;
329 const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC;
330 const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST;
331 const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN;
332
333 /*
334 * To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient,
335 * we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even
336 * if it has a default value; saltlen.
337 */
338 if ((mdname != NULL
339 && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname))
340 || (mgfname != NULL
341 && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
342 key_mgf, mgfname))
343 || (mgf1mdname != NULL
344 && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
345 key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname))
346 || (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen)))
347 return 0;
348 }
349 return 1;
350 }
351
ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 * pss_params,int * defaults_set,const OSSL_PARAM params[],OSSL_LIB_CTX * libctx)352 int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params,
353 int *defaults_set,
354 const OSSL_PARAM params[],
355 OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
356 {
357 const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen;
358 const OSSL_PARAM *param_propq;
359 const char *propq = NULL;
360 EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
361 int saltlen;
362 int ret = 0;
363
364 if (pss_params == NULL)
365 return 0;
366 param_propq =
367 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS);
368 param_md =
369 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST);
370 param_mgf =
371 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC);
372 param_mgf1md =
373 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST);
374 param_saltlen =
375 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN);
376
377 if (param_propq != NULL) {
378 if (param_propq->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
379 propq = param_propq->data;
380 }
381 /*
382 * If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some
383 * restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each
384 * parameter override their specific restriction data.
385 */
386 if (!*defaults_set
387 && (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL
388 || param_saltlen != NULL)) {
389 if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params))
390 return 0;
391 *defaults_set = 1;
392 }
393
394 if (param_mgf != NULL) {
395 int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
396 const char *mgfname = NULL;
397
398 if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
399 mgfname = param_mgf->data;
400 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname))
401 return 0;
402
403 if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(param_mgf->data,
404 ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0)
405 return 0;
406 }
407
408 /*
409 * We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the
410 * exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below.
411 */
412
413 if (param_md != NULL) {
414 const char *mdname = NULL;
415
416 if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
417 mdname = param_md->data;
418 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname))
419 goto err;
420
421 if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL
422 || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params,
423 ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md)))
424 goto err;
425 }
426
427 if (param_mgf1md != NULL) {
428 const char *mgf1mdname = NULL;
429
430 if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
431 mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data;
432 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname))
433 goto err;
434
435 if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL
436 || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(
437 pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md)))
438 goto err;
439 }
440
441 if (param_saltlen != NULL) {
442 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen)
443 || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen))
444 goto err;
445 }
446
447 ret = 1;
448
449 err:
450 EVP_MD_free(md);
451 EVP_MD_free(mgf1md);
452 return ret;
453 }
454
ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA * rsa)455 int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa)
456 {
457 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
458 if (rsa->engine != NULL || RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
459 return 1;
460 #endif
461 return 0;
462 }
463
rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM ** out,const BIGNUM * f)464 static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f)
465 {
466 if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL)
467 return 0;
468 return 1;
469 }
470
ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA * rsa,int selection)471 RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection)
472 {
473 RSA *dupkey = NULL;
474 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
475 int pnum, i;
476 #endif
477
478 /* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */
479 if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa))
480 return NULL;
481
482 if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL)
483 return NULL;
484
485 /* public key */
486 if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
487 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n))
488 goto err;
489 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e))
490 goto err;
491 }
492
493 if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) {
494
495 /* private key */
496 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d))
497 goto err;
498
499 /* factors and crt params */
500 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p))
501 goto err;
502 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q))
503 goto err;
504 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1))
505 goto err;
506 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1))
507 goto err;
508 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp))
509 goto err;
510 }
511
512 dupkey->version = rsa->version;
513 dupkey->flags = rsa->flags;
514 /* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */
515 dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params;
516
517 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
518 /* multiprime */
519 if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0
520 && (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) {
521 dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
522 if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL)
523 goto err;
524 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
525 const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
526 RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL;
527
528 if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL)
529 goto err;
530 /* push first so cleanup in error case works */
531 (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo);
532
533 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
534 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r))
535 goto err;
536 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d))
537 goto err;
538 if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t))
539 goto err;
540 }
541 if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey))
542 goto err;
543 }
544
545 if (rsa->pss != NULL) {
546 dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss);
547 if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL
548 && dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) {
549 dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
550 if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL)
551 goto err;
552 }
553 }
554 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA,
555 &dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data))
556 goto err;
557 #endif
558
559 return dupkey;
560
561 err:
562 RSA_free(dupkey);
563 return NULL;
564 }
565
566 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR * alg)567 RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
568 {
569 RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
570
571 pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
572 alg->parameter);
573
574 if (pss == NULL)
575 return NULL;
576
577 if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) {
578 pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
579 if (pss->maskHash == NULL) {
580 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
581 return NULL;
582 }
583 }
584
585 return pss;
586 }
587
ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA * rsa)588 static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa)
589 {
590 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL;
591 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL;
592
593 if (rsa != NULL
594 && (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL
595 && (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) {
596 const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
597 int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField;
598 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
599
600 /*
601 * We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just
602 * want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible
603 * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test
604 * a bad situation.
605 *
606 * Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will
607 * be checked, eventually.
608 */
609 if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md,
610 &saltlen, &trailerField))
611 return 0;
612 md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
613 mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md);
614 if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
615 || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid)
616 || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params,
617 mgf1md_nid)
618 || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
619 || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params,
620 trailerField))
621 return 0;
622 *pss = pss_params;
623 }
624 return 1;
625 }
626
ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS * pss,const EVP_MD ** pmd,const EVP_MD ** pmgf1md,int * psaltlen,int * ptrailerField)627 int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
628 const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md,
629 int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField)
630 {
631 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
632
633 /* Get the defaults from the ONE place */
634 (void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params);
635
636 if (pss == NULL)
637 return 0;
638 *pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
639 if (*pmd == NULL)
640 return 0;
641 *pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash);
642 if (*pmgf1md == NULL)
643 return 0;
644 if (pss->saltLength)
645 *psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
646 else
647 *psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params);
648 if (pss->trailerField)
649 *ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField);
650 else
651 *ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params);
652
653 return 1;
654 }
655
ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA * rsa,const X509_ALGOR * alg)656 int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
657 {
658 RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
659 const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid;
660 const void *algp;
661 int algptype;
662
663 X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg);
664 if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
665 return 1;
666 if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)
667 return 1;
668 if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
669 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
670 return 0;
671 }
672 if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL
673 || !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) {
674 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
675 return 0;
676 }
677 if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa))
678 return 0;
679 return 1;
680 }
681
ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO * p8inf,OSSL_LIB_CTX * libctx,const char * propq)682 RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
683 OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
684 {
685 const unsigned char *p;
686 RSA *rsa;
687 int pklen;
688 const X509_ALGOR *alg;
689
690 if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf))
691 return 0;
692 rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen);
693 if (rsa == NULL) {
694 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
695 return NULL;
696 }
697 if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
698 RSA_free(rsa);
699 return NULL;
700 }
701
702 RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
703 switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) {
704 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
705 RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
706 break;
707 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
708 RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
709 break;
710 default:
711 /* Leave the type bits zero */
712 break;
713 }
714
715 return rsa;
716 }
717 #endif
718
