xref: /openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c (revision da1c088f)
1 /*
2  * Copyright 2007-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3  * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
4  * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
5  *
6  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
7  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
8  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10  */
11 
12 #include "cmp_local.h"
13 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
14 
15 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
16 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
17 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
18 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
19 #include <openssl/err.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
21 
22 /*
23  * This function is also used by the internal verify_PBMAC() in cmp_vfy.c.
24  *
25  * Calculate protection for |msg| according to |msg->header->protectionAlg|
26  * using the credentials, library context, and property criteria in the ctx.
27  * Unless |msg->header->protectionAlg| is PasswordBasedMAC,
28  * its value is completed according to |ctx->pkey| and |ctx->digest|,
29  * where the latter irrelevant in the case of Edwards curves.
30  *
31  * returns ASN1_BIT_STRING representing the protection on success, else NULL
32  */
ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX * ctx,const OSSL_CMP_MSG * msg)33 ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
34                                           const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
35 {
36     ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
37     OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
38     const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
39     const void *ppval = NULL;
40     int pptype = 0;
41 
42     if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
43         return NULL;
44 
45     /* construct data to be signed */
46     prot_part.header = msg->header;
47     prot_part.body = msg->body;
48 
49     if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
50         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
51         return NULL;
52     }
53     X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
54 
55     if (OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
56         int len;
57         size_t prot_part_der_len;
58         unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
59         size_t sig_len;
60         unsigned char *protection = NULL;
61         OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
62         ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
63         const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
64 
65         if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
66             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PBM_SECRET);
67             return NULL;
68         }
69         if (ppval == NULL) {
70             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
71             return NULL;
72         }
73 
74         len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
75         if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
76             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
77             goto end;
78         }
79         prot_part_der_len = (size_t)len;
80 
81         pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
82         pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
83         pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
84         if (pbm == NULL) {
85             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
86             goto end;
87         }
88 
89         if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq,
90                                pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
91                                ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length,
92                                &protection, &sig_len))
93             goto end;
94 
95         if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
96             goto end;
97         /* OpenSSL by default encodes all bit strings as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
98         ossl_asn1_string_set_bits_left(prot, 0);
99         if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
100             ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
101             prot = NULL;
102         }
103     end:
104         OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
105         OPENSSL_free(protection);
106         OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
107         return prot;
108     } else {
109         const EVP_MD *md = ctx->digest;
110         char name[80] = "";
111 
112         if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
113             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP,
114                       CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
115             return NULL;
116         }
117         if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name(ctx->pkey, name, sizeof(name)) > 0
118             && strcmp(name, "UNDEF") == 0) /* at least for Ed25519, Ed448 */
119             md = NULL;
120 
121         if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
122             return NULL;
123         if (ASN1_item_sign_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART),
124                               msg->header->protectionAlg, /* sets X509_ALGOR */
125                               NULL, prot, &prot_part, NULL, ctx->pkey, md,
126                               ctx->libctx, ctx->propq))
127             return prot;
128         ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
129         return NULL;
130     }
131 }
132 
133 /* ctx is not const just because ctx->chain may get adapted */
ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX * ctx,OSSL_CMP_MSG * msg)134 int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
135 {
136     if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
137         return 0;
138 
139     /* Add first ctx->cert and its chain if using signature-based protection */
140     if (!ctx->unprotectedSend && ctx->secretValue == NULL
141             && ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
142         int prepend = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
143             | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS;
144 
145         /* if not yet done try to build chain using available untrusted certs */
146         if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
147             ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
148                            "trying to build chain for own CMP signer cert");
149             ctx->chain = X509_build_chain(ctx->cert, ctx->untrusted, NULL, 0,
150                                           ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
151             if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
152                 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
153                                "success building chain for own CMP signer cert");
154             } else {
155                 /* dump errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
156                 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
157                 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
158                               "could not build chain for own CMP signer cert");
159             }
160         }
161         if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
162             if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->chain, prepend))
163                 return 0;
164         } else {
165             /* make sure that at least our own signer cert is included first */
166             if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, prepend))
167                 return 0;
168             ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "fallback: adding just own CMP signer cert");
169         }
170     }
171 
172     /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
173     if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut,
174                                  X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP))
175         return 0;
176 
177     /* in case extraCerts are empty list avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
178     if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
179         sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
180         msg->extraCerts = NULL;
181     }
182     return 1;
183 }
184 
185 /*
186  * Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
187  * the pbm settings in the context
188  */
pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX * ctx)189 static X509_ALGOR *pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
190 {
191     OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
192     unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
193     int pbm_der_len;
194     ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
195     X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
196 
197     if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
198         return NULL;
199 
200     pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->pbm_slen,
201                              EVP_MD_get_type(ctx->pbm_owf), ctx->pbm_itercnt,
202                              ctx->pbm_mac);
203     pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
204     if (pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
205         goto err;
206     if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
207         goto err;
208     if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
209         goto err;
210     alg = ossl_X509_ALGOR_from_nid(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC,
211                                    V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
212  err:
213     if (alg == NULL)
214         ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
215     OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
216     OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
217     return alg;
218 }
219 
set_senderKID(const OSSL_CMP_CTX * ctx,OSSL_CMP_MSG * msg,const ASN1_OCTET_STRING * id)220 static int set_senderKID(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
221                          const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id)
222 {
223     if (id == NULL)
224         id = ctx->referenceValue; /* standard for PBM, fallback for sig-based */
225     return id == NULL || ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, id);
226 }
227 
228 /* ctx is not const just because ctx->chain may get adapted */
ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX * ctx,OSSL_CMP_MSG * msg)229 int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
230 {
231     if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
232         return 0;
233 
234     /*
235      * For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection.
236      * Does not remove any pre-existing extraCerts.
237      */
238     X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg);
239     msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL;
240     ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection);
241     msg->protection = NULL;
242 
243     if (ctx->unprotectedSend) {
244         if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
245             goto err;
246     } else if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
247         /* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
248         if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
249             goto err;
250         if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
251             goto err;
252 
253         /*
254          * will add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
255          * while not needed to validate the protection certificate,
256          * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases
257          */
258     } else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
259         /* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client cert and key given */
260 
261         /* make sure that key and certificate match */
262         if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) {
263             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
264             goto err;
265         }
266 
267         if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
268             goto err;
269         /* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the cert according to 5.1.1 */
270         if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert)))
271             goto err;
272 
273         /*
274          * will add ctx->cert followed, if possible, by its chain built
275          * from ctx->untrusted, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
276          */
277     } else {
278         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP,
279                   CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
280         goto err;
281     }
282     if (!ctx->unprotectedSend
283         /* protect according to msg->header->protectionAlg partly set above */
284             && ((msg->protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL))
285         goto err;
286 
287     /*
288      * For signature-based protection add ctx->cert followed by its chain.
289      * Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut;
290      * even if not needed to validate the protection
291      * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases.
292      */
293     if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
294         goto err;
295 
296     /*
297      * As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
298      * to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
299      * the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
300      */
301     if (!(ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
302           && msg->header->senderKID == NULL))
303         return 1;
304     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
305 
306  err:
307     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
308     return 0;
309 }
310