1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdio.h>
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
12 #include "internal/refcount.h"
13 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
14 #include <openssl/objects.h>
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/x509.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
19 #include "crypto/x509.h"
20 #include "x509_local.h"
21
X509_set_version(X509 * x,long version)22 int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version)
23 {
24 if (x == NULL)
25 return 0;
26 if (version == X509_get_version(x))
27 return 1; /* avoid needless modification even re-allocation */
28 if (version == X509_VERSION_1) {
29 ASN1_INTEGER_free(x->cert_info.version);
30 x->cert_info.version = NULL;
31 x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
32 return 1;
33 }
34 if (x->cert_info.version == NULL) {
35 if ((x->cert_info.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
36 return 0;
37 }
38 if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->cert_info.version, version))
39 return 0;
40 x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
41 return 1;
42 }
43
X509_set_serialNumber(X509 * x,ASN1_INTEGER * serial)44 int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
45 {
46 ASN1_INTEGER *in;
47
48 if (x == NULL)
49 return 0;
50 in = &x->cert_info.serialNumber;
51 if (in != serial)
52 return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial);
53 x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
54 return 1;
55 }
56
X509_set_issuer_name(X509 * x,const X509_NAME * name)57 int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, const X509_NAME *name)
58 {
59 if (x == NULL || !X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.issuer, name))
60 return 0;
61 x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
62 return 1;
63 }
64
X509_set_subject_name(X509 * x,const X509_NAME * name)65 int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, const X509_NAME *name)
66 {
67 if (x == NULL || !X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.subject, name))
68 return 0;
69 x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
70 return 1;
71 }
72
ossl_x509_set1_time(int * modified,ASN1_TIME ** ptm,const ASN1_TIME * tm)73 int ossl_x509_set1_time(int *modified, ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
74 {
75 ASN1_TIME *new;
76
77 if (*ptm == tm)
78 return 1;
79 new = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm);
80 if (tm != NULL && new == NULL)
81 return 0;
82 ASN1_TIME_free(*ptm);
83 *ptm = new;
84 if (modified != NULL)
85 *modified = 1;
86 return 1;
87 }
88
X509_set1_notBefore(X509 * x,const ASN1_TIME * tm)89 int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
90 {
91 if (x == NULL || tm == NULL)
92 return 0;
93 return ossl_x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.enc.modified,
94 &x->cert_info.validity.notBefore, tm);
95 }
96
X509_set1_notAfter(X509 * x,const ASN1_TIME * tm)97 int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
98 {
99 if (x == NULL || tm == NULL)
100 return 0;
101 return ossl_x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.enc.modified,
102 &x->cert_info.validity.notAfter, tm);
103 }
104
X509_set_pubkey(X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pkey)105 int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
106 {
107 if (x == NULL)
108 return 0;
109 if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->cert_info.key), pkey))
110 return 0;
111 x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
112 return 1;
113 }
114
X509_up_ref(X509 * x)115 int X509_up_ref(X509 *x)
116 {
117 int i;
118
119 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&x->references, &i) <= 0)
120 return 0;
121
122 REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509", x);
123 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
124 return i > 1;
125 }
126
X509_get_version(const X509 * x)127 long X509_get_version(const X509 *x)
128 {
129 return ASN1_INTEGER_get(x->cert_info.version);
130 }
131
X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 * x)132 const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x)
133 {
134 return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
135 }
136
X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 * x)137 const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x)
138 {
139 return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
140 }
141
X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 * x)142 ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x)
143 {
144 return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
145 }
146
X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 * x)147 ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x)
148 {
149 return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
150 }
151
X509_get_signature_type(const X509 * x)152 int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x)
153 {
154 return EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm));
155 }
156
X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 * x)157 X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x)
158 {
159 return x->cert_info.key;
160 }
161
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION)162 const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x)
163 {
164 return x->cert_info.extensions;
165 }
166
X509_get0_uids(const X509 * x,const ASN1_BIT_STRING ** piuid,const ASN1_BIT_STRING ** psuid)167 void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid,
168 const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid)
169 {
170 if (piuid != NULL)
171 *piuid = x->cert_info.issuerUID;
172 if (psuid != NULL)
173 *psuid = x->cert_info.subjectUID;
174 }
175
X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 * x)176 const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x)
177 {
178 return &x->cert_info.signature;
179 }
180
X509_SIG_INFO_get(const X509_SIG_INFO * siginf,int * mdnid,int * pknid,int * secbits,uint32_t * flags)181 int X509_SIG_INFO_get(const X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, int *mdnid, int *pknid,
182 int *secbits, uint32_t *flags)
183 {
184 if (mdnid != NULL)
185 *mdnid = siginf->mdnid;
186 if (pknid != NULL)
187 *pknid = siginf->pknid;
188 if (secbits != NULL)
189 *secbits = siginf->secbits;
190 if (flags != NULL)
191 *flags = siginf->flags;
192 return (siginf->flags & X509_SIG_INFO_VALID) != 0;
193 }
194
X509_SIG_INFO_set(X509_SIG_INFO * siginf,int mdnid,int pknid,int secbits,uint32_t flags)195 void X509_SIG_INFO_set(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, int mdnid, int pknid,
196 int secbits, uint32_t flags)
197 {
198 siginf->mdnid = mdnid;
199 siginf->pknid = pknid;
200 siginf->secbits = secbits;
201 siginf->flags = flags;
202 }
203
X509_get_signature_info(X509 * x,int * mdnid,int * pknid,int * secbits,uint32_t * flags)204 int X509_get_signature_info(X509 *x, int *mdnid, int *pknid, int *secbits,
205 uint32_t *flags)
206 {
207 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
208 return X509_SIG_INFO_get(&x->siginf, mdnid, pknid, secbits, flags);
209 }
210
211 /* Modify *siginf according to alg and sig. Return 1 on success, else 0. */
x509_sig_info_init(X509_SIG_INFO * siginf,const X509_ALGOR * alg,const ASN1_STRING * sig,const EVP_PKEY * pubkey)212 static int x509_sig_info_init(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
213 const ASN1_STRING *sig, const EVP_PKEY *pubkey)
214 {
215 int pknid, mdnid, md_size;
216 const EVP_MD *md;
217 const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
218
219 siginf->mdnid = NID_undef;
220 siginf->pknid = NID_undef;
221 siginf->secbits = -1;
222 siginf->flags = 0;
223 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid)
224 || pknid == NID_undef) {
225 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_SIGID_ALGS);
226 return 0;
227 }
228 siginf->mdnid = mdnid;
229 siginf->pknid = pknid;
230
231 switch (mdnid) {
232 case NID_undef:
233 /* If we have one, use a custom handler for this algorithm */
234 ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(NULL, pknid);
235 if (ameth != NULL && ameth->siginf_set != NULL
236 && ameth->siginf_set(siginf, alg, sig))
237 break;
238 if (pubkey != NULL) {
239 int secbits;
240
241 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pubkey);
242 if (secbits != 0) {
243 siginf->secbits = secbits;
244 break;
245 }
246 }
247 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ERROR_USING_SIGINF_SET);
248 return 0;
249 /*
250 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
251 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1.
252 * The real values don't really matter as long as they're lower than 80,
253 * which is our security level 1.
254 */
255 case NID_sha1:
256 /*
257 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack
258 * for SHA1 at2^63.4
259 */
260 siginf->secbits = 63;
261 break;
262 case NID_md5:
263 /*
264 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
265 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
266 */
267 siginf->secbits = 39;
268 break;
269 case NID_id_GostR3411_94:
270 /*
271 * There is a collision attack on GOST R 34.11-94 at 2^105, see
272 * https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-540-85174-5_10
273 */
274 siginf->secbits = 105;
275 break;
276 default:
277 /* Security bits: half number of bits in digest */
278 if ((md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) == NULL) {
279 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ERROR_GETTING_MD_BY_NID);
280 return 0;
281 }
282 md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
283 if (md_size <= 0)
284 return 0;
285 siginf->secbits = md_size * 4;
286 break;
287 }
288 switch (mdnid) {
289 case NID_sha1:
290 case NID_sha256:
291 case NID_sha384:
292 case NID_sha512:
293 siginf->flags |= X509_SIG_INFO_TLS;
294 }
295 siginf->flags |= X509_SIG_INFO_VALID;
296 return 1;
297 }
298
299 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure */
ossl_x509_init_sig_info(X509 * x)300 int ossl_x509_init_sig_info(X509 *x)
301 {
302 return x509_sig_info_init(&x->siginf, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature,
303 X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key));
304 }
305
