Copyright year updates


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Release: yes

Add RSA Signature restrictions for X9.31 padding in the FIPS provider.

In FIPS 140-3, RSA Signing with X9.31 padding is not approved,
but verification is allowed for legacy purposes. An

Add RSA Signature restrictions for X9.31 padding in the FIPS provider.

In FIPS 140-3, RSA Signing with X9.31 padding is not approved,
but verification is allowed for legacy purposes. An indicator has been added
for RSA signing with X9.31 padding.

A strict restriction on the size of the RSA modulus has been added
i.e. It must be 1024 + 256 * s (which is part of the ANSI X9.31 spec).

Added implementation comments to the X9.31 padding code

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24021)

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Check range of RSA plaintext and ciphertext when using no padding.

Fixes #24051

RSA with 'no padding' corresponds to RSAEP/RSADP.
The code was not checking the lower bounds.

Check range of RSA plaintext and ciphertext when using no padding.

Fixes #24051

RSA with 'no padding' corresponds to RSAEP/RSADP.
The code was not checking the lower bounds.
The bounds are specified in SP800-56Br2, section 7.1.1.1 and 7.1.2.1
Note that RFC8017 expresses the range in a sentence using the word
between, and there is some ambiguity in this.
The upper bounds have change to match the definition in SP800.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24061)

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Copyright year updates


Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes

Fix typos found by codespell

Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(M

Fix typos found by codespell

Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)

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Optimise locking in rsa_get_blinding()

We optimise locking in rsa_get_blinding() so that we normally take a
read lock, and only fallback to a write lock if we need to. This will
be v

Optimise locking in rsa_get_blinding()

We optimise locking in rsa_get_blinding() so that we normally take a
read lock, and only fallback to a write lock if we need to. This will
be very slightly slower in the case of single use RSA objects, but should
be significantly better when an RSA object is reused in a multi-threaded
environment. It's probably worth the trade off.

Partially fixes #20286

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20953)

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Alternative fix for CVE-2022-4304

This is about a timing leak in the topmost limb
of the internal result of RSA_private_decrypt,
before the padding check.

There are in fact

Alternative fix for CVE-2022-4304

This is about a timing leak in the topmost limb
of the internal result of RSA_private_decrypt,
before the padding check.

There are in fact at least three bugs together that
caused the timing leak:

First and probably most important is the fact that
the blinding did not use the constant time code path
at all when the RSA object was used for a private
decrypt, due to the fact that the Montgomery context
rsa->_method_mod_n was not set up early enough in
rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, when BN_BLINDING_create_param
needed it, and that was persisted as blinding->m_ctx,
although the RSA object creates the Montgomery context
just a bit later.

Then the infamous bn_correct_top was used on the
secret value right after the blinding was removed.

And finally the function BN_bn2binpad did not use
the constant-time code path since the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
was not set on the secret value.

In order to address the first problem, this patch
makes sure that the rsa->_method_mod_n is initialized
right before the blinding context.

And to fix the second problem, we add a new utility
function bn_correct_top_consttime, a const-time
variant of bn_correct_top.

Together with the fact, that BN_bn2binpad is already
constant time if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set,
this should eliminate the timing oracle completely.

In addition the no-asm variant may also have
branches that depend on secret values, because the last
invocation of bn_sub_words in bn_from_montgomery_word
had branches when the function is compiled by certain
gcc compiler versions, due to the clumsy coding style.

So additionally this patch stream-lined the no-asm
C-code in order to avoid branches where possible and
improve the resulting code quality.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20281)

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Revert "Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption"

This reverts commit b1892d21f8f0435deb0250f24a97915dc641c807.

Except for the moving derive_kdk to a separate function.

Reviewed

Revert "Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption"

This reverts commit b1892d21f8f0435deb0250f24a97915dc641c807.

Except for the moving derive_kdk to a separate function.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20281)

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S390x: Support ME and CRT offloading

S390x has to ability to offload modular exponentiation and CRT operations to
Crypto Express Adapters. This possible performance optimization was not

S390x: Support ME and CRT offloading

S390x has to ability to offload modular exponentiation and CRT operations to
Crypto Express Adapters. This possible performance optimization was not yet
used by OpenSSL. Add support for offloading and implement an optimized
version of RSA and DH with it.

The environment variable OPENSSL_s390xcap now recognizes the token "nocex" to
prevent offloading.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20113)

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Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network

Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario

CVE-2022-4304

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>

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rsa: Add option to disable implicit rejection

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>

rsa: Add option to disable implicit rejection

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)

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rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5

The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling
of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned

rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5

The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling
of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned
ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities
(CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of
OpenSSL do it correctly.

Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in
application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods
as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in
application code.

To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection".
For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the
padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret
data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the
attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case
any part of padding check fails.

The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the
returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the
actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have
to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free
way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks.

Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla
NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the
other in heterogeneous environments.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)

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Stop raising ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE in most places

Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,

Stop raising ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE in most places

Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.

There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.

Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)

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Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Release: yes

rsa: add check after calling BN_BLINDING_lock

As the potential failure of getting lock, we need to check the return
value of the BN_BLINDING_lock() in order to avoid the dirty data.

rsa: add check after calling BN_BLINDING_lock

As the potential failure of getting lock, we need to check the return
value of the BN_BLINDING_lock() in order to avoid the dirty data.

Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17642)

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rsa: remove TODOs

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15539)

Dual 1024-bit exponentiation optimization for Intel IceLake CPU
with AVX512_IFMA + AVX512_VL instructions, primarily for RSA CRT private key
operations. It uses 256-bit registers to avoid CPU

Dual 1024-bit exponentiation optimization for Intel IceLake CPU
with AVX512_IFMA + AVX512_VL instructions, primarily for RSA CRT private key
operations. It uses 256-bit registers to avoid CPU frequency scaling issues.
The performance speedup for RSA2k signature on ICL is ~2x.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13750)

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Always check CRYPTO_LOCK_{read,write}_lock

Some functions that lock things are void, so we just return early.

Also make ossl_namemap_empty return 0 on error. Updated the docs, and

Always check CRYPTO_LOCK_{read,write}_lock

Some functions that lock things are void, so we just return early.

Also make ossl_namemap_empty return 0 on error. Updated the docs, and added
some code to ossl_namemap_stored() to handle the failure, and updated the
tests to allow for failure.

Fixes: #14230

Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14238)

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Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14512)

Remove RSA SSLv23 padding mode

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14248)

Convert all {NAME}err() in crypto/ to their corresponding ERR_raise() call

This includes error reporting for libcrypto sub-libraries in surprising
places.

This was done using ut

Convert all {NAME}err() in crypto/ to their corresponding ERR_raise() call

This includes error reporting for libcrypto sub-libraries in surprising
places.

This was done using util/err-to-raise

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13318)

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rsa: add ossl_ prefix to internal rsa_ calls.

The functions being:
rsa_check_crt_components, rsa_check_key, rsa_check_pminusq_diff,
rsa_check_prime_factor, rsa_check_prime_fa

rsa: add ossl_ prefix to internal rsa_ calls.

The functions being:
rsa_check_crt_components, rsa_check_key, rsa_check_pminusq_diff,
rsa_check_prime_factor, rsa_check_prime_factor_range,
rsa_check_private_exponent, rsa_check_public_exponent,
rsa_digestinfo_encoding, rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes, rsa_fromdata,
rsa_get0_all_params, rsa_get0_libctx, rsa_get0_pss_params_30,
rsa_get_lcm, rsa_mgf_nid2name, rsa_mp_coeff_names, rsa_mp_exp_names,
rsa_mp_factor_names, rsa_new_with_ctx, rsa_oaeppss_md2nid,
rsa_oaeppss_nid2name, rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_with_libctx,
rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_with_libctx,
rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_with_libctx, rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS,
rsa_pkey_method, rsa_pss_params_30_copy, rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata,
rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted,
rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg, rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg,
rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen, rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults,
rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenalg,
rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen,
rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield, rsa_pss_params_30_todata,
rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield, rsa_pss_pkey_method, rsa_set0_all_params,
rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair, rsa_sp800_56b_check_private,
rsa_sp800_56b_check_public, rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq,
rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key, rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test,
rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength, rsa_todata, rsa_validate_pairwise,
rsa_validate_private and rsa_validate_public.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13040)

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Run the withlibctx.pl script

Automatically rename all instances of _with_libctx() to _ex() as per
our coding style.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged fro

Run the withlibctx.pl script

Automatically rename all instances of _with_libctx() to _ex() as per
our coding style.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12970)

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Rename FIPS_MODE to FIPS_MODULE

This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should
become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing.

Fixes #11538

Rename FIPS_MODE to FIPS_MODULE

This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should
become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing.

Fixes #11538

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11539)

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Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11616)