/openssl/providers/implementations/signature/ |
H A D | eddsa_sig.c | 429 tbs, tbslen, md, &mdlen) in ed25519_sign() 435 tbslen = mdlen; in ed25519_sign() 436 } else if (tbslen != EDDSA_PREHASH_OUTPUT_LEN) { in ed25519_sign() 537 tbslen = mdlen; in ed448_sign() 538 } else if (tbslen != EDDSA_PREHASH_OUTPUT_LEN) { in ed448_sign() 594 tbs, tbslen, md, &mdlen) in ed25519_verify() 600 tbslen = mdlen; in ed25519_verify() 601 } else if (tbslen != EDDSA_PREHASH_OUTPUT_LEN) { in ed25519_verify() 652 tbslen = mdlen; in ed448_verify() 653 } else if (tbslen != EDDSA_PREHASH_OUTPUT_LEN) { in ed448_verify() [all …]
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H A D | ecdsa_sig.c | 317 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in ecdsa_sign_directly() argument 340 if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize) in ecdsa_sign_directly() 348 ret = ossl_ecdsa_deterministic_sign(tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, in ecdsa_sign_directly() 353 ret = ECDSA_sign_ex(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ctx->kinv, ctx->r, in ecdsa_sign_directly() 413 if (ecdsa_signverify_message_update(ctx, tbs, tbslen) <= 0) in ecdsa_sign() 417 return ecdsa_sign_directly(ctx, sig, siglen, sigsize, tbs, tbslen); in ecdsa_sign() 433 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in ecdsa_verify_directly() argument 440 return ECDSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ctx->ec); in ecdsa_verify_directly() 482 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in ecdsa_verify() argument 489 if (ecdsa_signverify_message_update(ctx, tbs, tbslen) <= 0) in ecdsa_verify() [all …]
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H A D | dsa_sig.c | 329 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in dsa_sign_directly() argument 353 if (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize) in dsa_sign_directly() 356 ret = ossl_dsa_sign_int(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, pdsactx->dsa, in dsa_sign_directly() 422 if (dsa_signverify_message_update(pdsactx, tbs, tbslen) <= 0) in dsa_sign() 426 return dsa_sign_directly(pdsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, tbs, tbslen); in dsa_sign() 438 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in dsa_verify_directly() argument 443 if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize)) in dsa_verify_directly() 446 return DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, pdsactx->dsa); in dsa_verify_directly() 491 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in dsa_verify() argument 498 if (dsa_signverify_message_update(pdsactx, tbs, tbslen) <= 0) in dsa_verify() [all …]
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H A D | rsa_sig.c | 699 if (tbslen != mdsize) { in rsa_sign_directly() 726 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) { in rsa_sign_directly() 736 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); in rsa_sign_directly() 738 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf, in rsa_sign_directly() 814 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa, in rsa_sign_directly() 908 return rsa_signverify_message_update(prsactx, tbs, tbslen) in rsa_sign() 1063 if (tbslen != mdsize) { in rsa_verify_directly() 1066 mdsize, tbslen); in rsa_verify_directly() 1112 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen)) in rsa_verify_directly() 1167 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in rsa_verify() argument [all …]
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H A D | sm2_sig.c | 162 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in sm2sig_sign() argument 178 if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize) in sm2sig_sign() 181 ret = ossl_sm2_internal_sign(tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ctx->ec); in sm2sig_sign() 190 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in sm2sig_verify() argument 194 if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize) in sm2sig_verify() 197 return ossl_sm2_internal_verify(tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ctx->ec); in sm2sig_verify()
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/openssl/crypto/dsa/ |
H A D | dsa_pmeth.c | 79 size_t tbslen) in pkey_dsa_sign() argument 95 if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) in pkey_dsa_sign() 99 ret = DSA_sign(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, dsa); in pkey_dsa_sign() 109 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in pkey_dsa_verify() argument 124 if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) in pkey_dsa_verify() 128 ret = DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, dsa); in pkey_dsa_verify()
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/openssl/crypto/rsa/ |
H A D | rsa_pmeth.c | 137 size_t tbslen) in pkey_rsa_sign() argument 156 if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) { in pkey_rsa_sign() 171 if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) { in pkey_rsa_sign() 179 memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); in pkey_rsa_sign() 181 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, in pkey_rsa_sign() 186 tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); in pkey_rsa_sign() 204 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); in pkey_rsa_sign() 266 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in pkey_rsa_verify() argument 280 return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, in pkey_rsa_verify() 287 if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) { in pkey_rsa_verify() [all …]
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/openssl/crypto/ec/ |
H A D | ecx_meth.c | 806 size_t tbslen) in pkey_ecd_digestsign25519() argument 835 size_t tbslen) in pkey_ecd_digestsign448() argument 862 size_t tbslen) in pkey_ecd_digestverify25519() argument 874 return ossl_ed25519_verify(tbs, tbslen, sig, edkey->pubkey, in pkey_ecd_digestverify25519() 882 size_t tbslen) in pkey_ecd_digestverify448() argument 1190 size_t tbslen) in s390x_pkey_ecd_digestsign25519() argument 1235 size_t tbslen) in s390x_pkey_ecd_digestsign448() argument 1283 size_t tbslen) in s390x_pkey_ecd_digestverify25519() argument 1308 ¶m.ed25519, tbs, tbslen) == 0 ? 1 : 0; in s390x_pkey_ecd_digestverify25519() 1315 size_t tbslen) in s390x_pkey_ecd_digestverify448() argument [all …]
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H A D | ec_pmeth.c | 105 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in pkey_ec_sign() argument 134 ret = ECDSA_sign(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ec); in pkey_ec_sign() 144 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in pkey_ec_verify() argument 160 ret = ECDSA_verify(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ec); in pkey_ec_verify()
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/openssl/doc/man3/ |
H A D | EVP_PKEY_meth_new.pod | 65 size_t tbslen)); 72 size_t tbslen)); 128 size_t tbslen)); 134 size_t tbslen)); 165 size_t tbslen)); 172 size_t tbslen)); 228 size_t tbslen)); 294 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 303 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 362 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); [all …]
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H A D | EVP_PKEY_sign.pod | 25 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 73 or EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(), the data specified by I<tbs> and I<tbslen> is 76 specified by I<tbs> and I<tbslen> is digested by the implied message digest
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H A D | EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod | 22 size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 118 EVP_DigestVerify() verifies B<tbslen> bytes at B<tbs> against the signature
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H A D | EVP_DigestSignInit.pod | 23 size_t tbslen); 133 Unless I<sig> is NULL, EVP_DigestSign() signs the data I<tbs> of length I<tbslen>
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H A D | EVP_PKEY_verify.pod | 27 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 76 followed by a single EVP_PKEY_verify_update() call with I<tbs> and I<tbslen>,
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/openssl/crypto/evp/ |
H A D | m_sigver.c | 574 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in EVP_DigestSign() argument 593 tbs, tbslen); in EVP_DigestSign() 598 return ctx->pctx->pmeth->digestsign(ctx, sigret, siglen, tbs, tbslen); in EVP_DigestSign() 601 if (sigret != NULL && EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, tbs, tbslen) <= 0) in EVP_DigestSign() 683 size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in EVP_DigestVerify() argument 700 tbs, tbslen); in EVP_DigestVerify() 705 return ctx->pctx->pmeth->digestverify(ctx, sigret, siglen, tbs, tbslen); in EVP_DigestVerify() 707 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, tbs, tbslen) <= 0) in EVP_DigestVerify()
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H A D | signature.c | 885 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in EVP_PKEY_sign() argument 909 (sig == NULL) ? 0 : *siglen, tbs, tbslen); in EVP_PKEY_sign() 920 return ctx->pmeth->sign(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen); in EVP_PKEY_sign() 1011 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in EVP_PKEY_verify() argument 1035 tbs, tbslen); in EVP_PKEY_verify() 1044 return ctx->pmeth->verify(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen); in EVP_PKEY_verify()
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H A D | pmeth_lib.c | 1703 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign() argument 1715 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify() argument 1731 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover() argument 1808 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_set_digestsign() argument 1816 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_set_digestverify() argument 1892 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign() argument 1906 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify() argument 1924 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover() argument 2015 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_get_digestsign() argument 2024 size_t tbslen)) in EVP_PKEY_meth_get_digestverify() argument
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/openssl/test/ |
H A D | fake_rsaprov.c | 334 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in fake_rsa_sig_sign() argument 480 size_t tbslen) in fake_rsa_dgstsgn() argument 482 if (!fake_rsa_dgstsgnvfy_update(ctx, tbs, tbslen)) in fake_rsa_dgstsgn()
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H A D | enginetest.c | 197 size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in test_encrypt() argument
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H A D | tls-provider.c | 2738 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in xor_sig_sign() argument 2766 xorkey->privkey, XOR_KEY_SIZE, tbs, tbslen, in xor_sig_sign() 2781 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) in xor_sig_verify() argument 2804 xorkey->privkey, XOR_KEY_SIZE, tbs, tbslen, in xor_sig_verify()
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/openssl/include/openssl/ |
H A D | evp.h | 821 size_t tbslen); 831 size_t tbslen); 1937 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 1950 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 2075 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); 2079 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); 2084 size_t tbslen)); 2118 size_t tbslen)); 2144 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); 2154 size_t tbslen)); [all …]
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H A D | core_dispatch.h | 759 size_t tbslen)) 773 size_t tbslen)) 798 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) 808 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen))
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/openssl/doc/man7/ |
H A D | provider-signature.pod | 32 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 44 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 74 size_t tbslen); 87 size_t tbslen); 245 The data to be signed is pointed to be the I<tbs> parameter which is I<tbslen> 275 case, I<tbs> is expected to be the whole message to be signed, I<tbslen> bytes 299 is I<tbslen> bytes long. 329 I<tbslen> bytes long. 383 signed is in I<tbs> which should be I<tbslen> bytes long. Unless I<sig> is NULL, 417 verified is in I<tbs> which should be I<tbslen> bytes long. The signature to be
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/openssl/include/crypto/ |
H A D | evp.h | 157 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 161 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 183 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); 186 size_t tbslen);
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/openssl/ssl/statem/ |
H A D | statem_srvr.c | 2758 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen; in tls_construct_server_key_exchange() local 2790 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, in tls_construct_server_key_exchange() 2793 if (tbslen == 0) { in tls_construct_server_key_exchange() 2798 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0 in tls_construct_server_key_exchange() 2800 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0 in tls_construct_server_key_exchange()
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