1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29
30 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
31
32 typedef struct {
33 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
34 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
35 } GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
36
37 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
38
39 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
40 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
41 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
42 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
43
44 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
45
46 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt);
47
48 /*
49 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
50 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
51 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
52 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
53 *
54 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
55 * (transition not allowed)
56 */
ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int mt)57 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
58 {
59 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
60
61 /*
62 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
63 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
64 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
65 */
66 switch (st->hand_state) {
67 default:
68 break;
69
70 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
71 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
74 return 1;
75 }
76 break;
77 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
78 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
79 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
80 return 1;
81 }
82 break;
83 }
84 /* Fall through */
85
86 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
87 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
88 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
91 return 1;
92 }
93 } else {
94 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
95 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
96 return 1;
97 }
98 }
99 break;
100
101 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
102 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
103 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
104 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 return 1;
106 }
107 } else {
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
110 return 1;
111 }
112 }
113 break;
114
115 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
116 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
117 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
118 return 1;
119 }
120 break;
121
122 case TLS_ST_OK:
123 /*
124 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
125 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
126 */
127 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
128 break;
129
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
131 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
133 return 1;
134 }
135
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 break;
141 }
142
143 /* No valid transition found */
144 return 0;
145 }
146
147 /*
148 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
149 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
150 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
151 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 *
153 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
154 * (transition not allowed)
155 */
ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int mt)156 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
157 {
158 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
159
160 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
161 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
162 goto err;
163 return 1;
164 }
165
166 switch (st->hand_state) {
167 default:
168 break;
169
170 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
171 case TLS_ST_OK:
172 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
175 return 1;
176 }
177 break;
178
179 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
180 /*
181 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
182 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * OR
184 * 2) If we did request one then
185 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * AND
187 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
188 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 */
190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
191 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
192 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
193 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
194 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
195 /*
196 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
197 * not going to accept it because we require a client
198 * cert.
199 */
200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
202 return 0;
203 }
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
205 return 1;
206 }
207 } else {
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
209 return 1;
210 }
211 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
213 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
214 return 1;
215 }
216 }
217 break;
218
219 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
222 return 1;
223 }
224 break;
225
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
227 /*
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
233 * set.
234 */
235 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
237 /*
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
242 */
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
244 return 1;
245 }
246 } else {
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
249 return 1;
250 }
251 }
252 break;
253
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
257 return 1;
258 }
259 break;
260
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
266 return 1;
267 }
268 } else {
269 #endif
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
272 return 1;
273 }
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 }
276 #endif
277 break;
278
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
283 return 1;
284 }
285 break;
286 #endif
287
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
291 return 1;
292 }
293 break;
294 }
295
296 err:
297 /* No valid transition found */
298 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
299 BIO *rbio;
300
301 /*
302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
304 */
305 s->init_num = 0;
306 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
307 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
310 return 0;
311 }
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
313 return 0;
314 }
315
316 /*
317 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
318 *
319 * Valid return values are:
320 * 1: Yes
321 * 0: No
322 */
send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s)323 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
324 {
325 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
326
327 /*
328 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
329 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
330 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
331 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
332 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
333 * key exchange.
334 */
335 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
336 /*
337 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
338 * provided
339 */
340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
341 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
342 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
343 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
344 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
345 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
346 #endif
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
348 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
349 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
350 #endif
351 ) {
352 return 1;
353 }
354
355 return 0;
356 }
357
358 /*
359 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
360 *
361 * Valid return values are:
362 * 1: Yes
363 * 0: No
364 */
send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s)365 int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
366 {
367 if (
368 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
369 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
370 /*
371 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
372 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
373 */
374 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
375 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
376 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
377 /*
378 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
379 * a second time:
380 */
381 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
382 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
383 /*
384 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
385 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
386 * RFC 2246):
387 */
388 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
389 /*
390 * ... except when the application insists on
391 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
392 * this for SSL 3)
393 */
394 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
395 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
396 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
397 /*
398 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
399 * are omitted
400 */
401 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
402 return 1;
403 }
404
405 return 0;
406 }
407
408 /*
409 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
410 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
411 * client.
412 */
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s)413 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
414 {
415 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
416
417 /*
418 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
419 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
420 */
421
422 switch (st->hand_state) {
423 default:
424 /* Shouldn't happen */
425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
427
428 case TLS_ST_OK:
429 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 }
433 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 }
437 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440 }
441 /* Try to read from the client instead */
442 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
443
444 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447
448 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
449 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
450 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
452 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
454 else
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
459 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
461 else
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464
465 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
466 if (s->hit)
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
468 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
470 else
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
472
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474
475 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
476 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
477 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 } else {
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
481 }
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483
484 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487
488 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491
492 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495
496 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
498
499 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
500 /*
501 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
502 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
503 * immediately.
504 */
505 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
506 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
507 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
508 /*
509 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
510 * handshake at this point.
511 */
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514 }
515 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
517 else
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520
521 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
522 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525
526 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
527 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
528 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
529 * been configured for.
530 */
531 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
532 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
533 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
534 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
536 }
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
538 }
539 }
540
541 /*
542 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
543 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
544 */
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s)545 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
546 {
547 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
548
549 /*
550 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
551 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
552 */
553
554 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
555 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
556
557 switch (st->hand_state) {
558 default:
559 /* Shouldn't happen */
560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
561 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
562
563 case TLS_ST_OK:
564 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
565 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
567 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 }
570 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
571 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
572 /* SSLfatal() already called */
573 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
574 }
575 /* Fall through */
576
577 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
578 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
579 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
580
581 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584
585 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
586 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
587 && (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
588 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
589 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
590 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 } else {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
595 }
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597
598 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
599 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
600
601 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
602 if (s->hit) {
603 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
605 else
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
607 } else {
608 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
609 /* normal PSK or SRP */
610 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
611 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
613 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
615 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
617 } else {
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
619 }
620 }
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622
623 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
624 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627 }
628 /* Fall through */
629
630 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
631 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
634 }
635 /* Fall through */
636
637 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
638 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
641 }
642 /* Fall through */
643
644 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
646 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
647
648 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
649 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
650
651 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
652 if (s->hit) {
653 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
654 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
655 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
657 } else {
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
659 }
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
661
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665
666 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
667 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
668 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669
670 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
671 if (s->hit) {
672 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
673 }
674 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
675 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
676 }
677 }
678
679 /*
680 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
681 * the server to the client.
682 */
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)683 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
684 {
685 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
686 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
687
688 switch (st->hand_state) {
689 default:
690 /* No pre work to be done */
691 break;
692
693 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
694 s->shutdown = 0;
695 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
696 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
697 break;
698
699 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
700 s->shutdown = 0;
701 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
702 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
703 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
704 st->use_timer = 0;
705 }
706 break;
707
708 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
709 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
710 /*
711 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
712 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
713 */
714 st->use_timer = 1;
715 }
716 break;
717
718 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
720 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
721 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
722 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
723 }
724 #endif
725 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
726
727 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
728 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
729 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
730 /*
731 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
732 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
733 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
734 *
735 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
736 */
737 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
738 }
739 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
740 /*
741 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
742 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
743 */
744 st->use_timer = 0;
745 }
746 break;
747
748 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
749 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
750 break;
751 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
752 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
753 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
754 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
756 return WORK_ERROR;
757 }
758 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
760 return WORK_ERROR;
761 }
762 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
763 /*
764 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
765 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
766 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
767 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
768 */
769 st->use_timer = 0;
770 }
771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
772
773 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
774 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
775 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
776 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
777 /* Fall through */
778
779 case TLS_ST_OK:
780 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
781 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
782 }
783
784 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
785 }
786
conn_is_closed(void)787 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
788 {
789 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
790 #if defined(EPIPE)
791 case EPIPE:
792 return 1;
793 #endif
794 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
795 case ECONNRESET:
796 return 1;
797 #endif
798 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
799 case WSAECONNRESET:
800 return 1;
801 #endif
802 default:
803 return 0;
804 }
805 }
806
807 /*
808 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
809 * server to the client.
810 */
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)811 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
812 {
813 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
814 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
815
816 s->init_num = 0;
817
818 switch (st->hand_state) {
819 default:
820 /* No post work to be done */
821 break;
822
823 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
824 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
825 return WORK_MORE_A;
826 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
828 return WORK_ERROR;
829 }
830 break;
831
832 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
833 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
834 return WORK_MORE_A;
835 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
836 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
837 /* SSLfatal() already called */
838 return WORK_ERROR;
839 }
840 /*
841 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
842 * treat like it was the first packet
843 */
844 s->first_packet = 1;
845 break;
846
847 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
848 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
849 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
850 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
851 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
852 return WORK_MORE_A;
853 break;
854 }
855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
856 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
857 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
858 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
859 size_t labellen;
860
861 /*
862 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
863 * SCTP used.
864 */
865 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
866 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
867
868 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
869 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
870 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
871 labellen += 1;
872
873 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
874 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
875 labellen, NULL, 0,
876 0) <= 0) {
877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
878 return WORK_ERROR;
879 }
880
881 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
882 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
883 }
884 #endif
885 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
886 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
887 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
888 break;
889 /* Fall through */
890
891 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
892 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
893 if (!statem_flush(s))
894 return WORK_MORE_A;
895 break;
896 }
897
898 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
899 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
900 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
901 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
902 /* SSLfatal() already called */
903 return WORK_ERROR;
904 }
905
906 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
907 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
908 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
909 /* SSLfatal() already called */
910 return WORK_ERROR;
911 }
912 /*
913 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
914 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
915 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
916 */
917 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
918 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 1);
919 break;
920 }
921
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
923 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
924 /*
925 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
926 * no SCTP used.
927 */
928 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
929 0, NULL);
930 }
931 #endif
932 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
933 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
934 /* SSLfatal() already called */
935 return WORK_ERROR;
936 }
937
938 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
939 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
940 break;
941
942 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
943 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
944 return WORK_MORE_A;
945 break;
946
947 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
948 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
949 return WORK_MORE_A;
950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
951 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
952 /*
953 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
954 * no SCTP used.
955 */
956 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
957 0, NULL);
958 }
959 #endif
960 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
961 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
962 size_t dummy;
963 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
964 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
965 &dummy)
966 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
967 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
968 /* SSLfatal() already called */
969 return WORK_ERROR;
970 }
971 break;
972
973 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
974 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
975 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
976 return WORK_MORE_A;
977 }
978 break;
979
980 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
981 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
982 return WORK_MORE_A;
983 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
984 /* SSLfatal() already called */
985 return WORK_ERROR;
986 }
987 break;
988
989 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
990 clear_sys_error();
991 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
992 if (SSL_get_error(ssl, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
993 && conn_is_closed()) {
994 /*
995 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
996 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
997 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
998 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
999 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
1000 */
1001 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1002 break;
1003 }
1004
1005 return WORK_MORE_A;
1006 }
1007 break;
1008 }
1009
1010 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1011 }
1012
1013 /*
1014 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1015 * server
1016 *
1017 * Valid return values are:
1018 * 1: Success
1019 * 0: Error
1020 */
ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,confunc_f * confunc,int * mt)1021 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1022 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1023 {
1024 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1025
1026 switch (st->hand_state) {
1027 default:
1028 /* Shouldn't happen */
1029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1030 return 0;
1031
1032 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1033 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1034 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1035 else
1036 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1037 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1038 break;
1039
1040 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1041 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1042 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1043 break;
1044
1045 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1046 /* No construction function needed */
1047 *confunc = NULL;
1048 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1049 break;
1050
1051 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1052 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1053 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1054 break;
1055
1056 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1057 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1058 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1059 break;
1060
1061 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1062 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1063 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1064 break;
1065
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1068 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1070 break;
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1073 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1075 break;
1076
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1078 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1080 break;
1081
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1083 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1084 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1085 break;
1086
1087 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1088 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1089 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1090 break;
1091
1092 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1093 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1094 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1095 break;
1096
1097 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1098 *confunc = NULL;
1099 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1100 break;
1101
1102 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1103 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1104 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1105 break;
1106
1107 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1108 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1109 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1110 break;
1111 }
1112
1113 return 1;
1114 }
1115
1116 /*
1117 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1118 * calculated as follows:
1119 *
1120 * 2 + # client_version
1121 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1122 * 1 + # length of session_id
1123 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1124 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1125 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1126 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1127 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1128 * 2 + # length of extensions
1129 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1130 */
1131 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1132
1133 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1134 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1135
1136 /*
1137 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1138 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1139 */
ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1140 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1141 {
1142 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1143
1144 switch (st->hand_state) {
1145 default:
1146 /* Shouldn't happen */
1147 return 0;
1148
1149 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1150 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1151
1152 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1153 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1154
1155 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1156 return s->max_cert_list;
1157
1158 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1159 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1160
1161 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1162 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1163
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1166 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1167 #endif
1168
1169 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1170 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1171
1172 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1173 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1174
1175 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1176 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1177 }
1178 }
1179
1180 /*
1181 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1182 */
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1183 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1184 PACKET *pkt)
1185 {
1186 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1187
1188 switch (st->hand_state) {
1189 default:
1190 /* Shouldn't happen */
1191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1193
1194 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1195 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1196
1197 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1198 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1199
1200 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1201 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1202
1203 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1204 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1205
1206 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1207 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1208
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1210 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1211 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1212 #endif
1213
1214 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1215 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1216
1217 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1218 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1219
1220 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1221 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1222
1223 }
1224 }
1225
1226 /*
1227 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1228 * from the client
1229 */
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)1230 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1231 WORK_STATE wst)
1232 {
1233 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1234
1235 switch (st->hand_state) {
1236 default:
1237 /* Shouldn't happen */
1238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 return WORK_ERROR;
1240
1241 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1242 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1243
1244 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1245 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1246 }
1247 }
1248
1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1250 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1251 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1252 {
1253 int ret;
1254 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1255
1256 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1257 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1258 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1259 /*
1260 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1261 * login name
1262 */
1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1264 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1265 return -1;
1266 } else {
1267 ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
1268 if (ret < 0)
1269 return 0;
1270 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, al,
1272 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1273 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1274 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1275 return -1;
1276 }
1277 }
1278 }
1279 return 1;
1280 }
1281 #endif
1282
dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET * pkt,unsigned char * cookie,size_t cookie_len)1283 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1284 size_t cookie_len)
1285 {
1286 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1287 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1288 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1289 return 0;
1290
1291 return 1;
1292 }
1293
dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)1294 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1295 {
1296 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1297 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1298
1299 if (sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
1300 || sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->d1->cookie,
1301 &cookie_leni) == 0
1302 || cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1304 return 0;
1305 }
1306 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1307
1308 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1309 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1311 return 0;
1312 }
1313
1314 return 1;
1315 }
1316
1317 /*-
1318 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1319 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1320 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1321 * SNI,
1322 * elliptic_curves
1323 * ec_point_formats
1324 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1325 *
1326 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1327 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1328 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1329 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1330 */
ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const CLIENTHELLO_MSG * hello)1331 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1332 const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1333 {
1334 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1335 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1336 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1337 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1338 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1339 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1340 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1341
1342 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1343 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1344 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1345 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1346 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1347 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1348 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1349 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1350 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1351 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1352 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1353 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1354 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1355 };
1356 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1357 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1358 unsigned int type;
1359 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1360 size_t ext_len;
1361
1362 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1363
1364 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1365 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1366 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1367 return;
1368 }
1369
1370 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1371 return;
1372
1373 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(
1374 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1375 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1376
1377 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1378 ext_len);
1379 }
1380
1381 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
1382 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
1383 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
1384
tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1385 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1386 {
1387 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1388 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1389 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1390 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1391
1392 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1393 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1394 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 goto err;
1397 }
1398 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
1399 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1400 && (s->options
1401 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1402 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1403 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1404 }
1405 s->renegotiate = 1;
1406 s->new_session = 1;
1407 }
1408
1409 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1410 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1412 goto err;
1413 }
1414
1415 /*
1416 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1417 */
1418 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1419 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1420
1421 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1422 unsigned int mt;
1423
1424 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1425 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1427 goto err;
1428 }
1429
1430 /*-
1431 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1432 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1433 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1434 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1435 * Byte Content
1436 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1437 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1438 * 3-4 version
1439 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1440 * 7-8 session_id_length
1441 * 9-10 challenge_length
1442 * ... ...
1443 */
1444
1445 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1446 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1447 /*
1448 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1449 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1450 * in the first place
1451 */
1452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 goto err;
1454 }
1455 }
1456
1457 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1459 goto err;
1460 }
1461
1462 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1463 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1464 /*
1465 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1466 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1467 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1468 */
1469 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1470 PACKET challenge;
1471
1472 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1473 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1474 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1476 goto err;
1477 }
1478
1479 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1481 goto err;
1482 }
1483
1484 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1485 ciphersuite_len)
1486 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1487 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1488 /* No extensions. */
1489 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1491 goto err;
1492 }
1493 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1494
1495 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1496 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1497 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1498 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1499 */
1500 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1501 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1502 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1503 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1504 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1505 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1506 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1507 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1509 goto err;
1510 }
1511
1512 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1513 } else {
1514 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1515 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1516 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1517 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1518 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1519 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1521 goto err;
1522 }
1523
1524 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1525 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1527 goto err;
1528 }
1529 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1530 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1531 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 goto err;
1534 }
1535 /*
1536 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1537 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1538 * So check cookie length...
1539 */
1540 if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1541 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1542 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1543 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1544 }
1545 }
1546 }
1547
1548 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1550 goto err;
1551 }
1552
1553 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1555 goto err;
1556 }
1557
1558 /* Could be empty. */
1559 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1560 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1561 } else {
1562 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1563 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1565 goto err;
1566 }
1567 }
1568 }
1569
1570 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1571 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1572 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1574 goto err;
1575 }
1576
1577 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1578 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1579 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1580 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1581 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1582 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1583 goto err;
1584 }
1585 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1586
1587 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1588
1589 err:
1590 if (clienthello != NULL)
1591 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1592 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1593
1594 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1595 }
1596
tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1597 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1598 {
1599 unsigned int j;
1600 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1601 int protverr;
1602 size_t loop;
1603 unsigned long id;
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1605 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1606 #endif
1607 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1608 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1609 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1610 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1611 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1612 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1613 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1614
1615 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1616 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1617 if (sctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1618 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1619 switch (sctx->client_hello_cb(ssl, &al, sctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1620 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1621 break;
1622 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1623 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1624 return -1;
1625 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1626 default:
1627 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1628 goto err;
1629 }
1630 }
1631
1632 /* Set up the client_random */
1633 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1634
1635 /* Choose the version */
1636
1637 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1638 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1639 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1640 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1641 /*
1642 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1643 * support it.
1644 */
1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1646 goto err;
1647 }
1648 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1649 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1650 }
1651 /*
1652 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1653 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1654 */
1655 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1656 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1657 } else if (ssl->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1658 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1659 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1660 } else {
1661 protverr = 0;
1662 }
1663
1664 if (protverr) {
1665 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1666 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1667 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1668 }
1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1670 goto err;
1671 }
1672
1673 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1674 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1675 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1677 goto err;
1678 }
1679
1680 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1681 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1682 if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1683 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1684 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1685 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1687 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1688 goto err;
1689 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1690 }
1691 /* default verification */
1692 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1693 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1694 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1699 }
1700 if (ssl->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1701 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1702 if (protverr != 0) {
1703 s->version = s->client_version;
1704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1705 goto err;
1706 }
1707 }
1708 }
1709
1710 s->hit = 0;
1711
1712 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1713 clienthello->isv2) ||
1714 !ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1715 &scsvs, clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1716 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1717 goto err;
1718 }
1719
1720 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1721 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1722 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1723 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1724 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1725 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1726 if (s->renegotiate) {
1727 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1729 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1733 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1734 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1735 /*
1736 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1737 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1738 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1739 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1740 * an insecure downgrade.
1741 */
1742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1743 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1744 goto err;
1745 }
1746 }
1747 }
1748
1749 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1750 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1751 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1752 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
1753
1754 if (cipher == NULL) {
1755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1756 goto err;
1757 }
1758 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1759 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1760 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1761 /*
1762 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1763 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1764 */
1765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1766 goto err;
1767 }
1768 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1769 }
1770
1771 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1772 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1773 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1774 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1775 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1776 goto err;
1777 }
1778
1779 /*
1780 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1781 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1782 *
1783 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1784 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1785 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1786 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1787 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1788 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1789 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1790 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1791 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1792 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1793 * ignored.
1794 */
1795 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1796 (s->new_session &&
1797 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1798 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1800 goto err;
1801 }
1802 } else {
1803 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1804 if (i == 1) {
1805 /* previous session */
1806 s->hit = 1;
1807 } else if (i == -1) {
1808 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1809 goto err;
1810 } else {
1811 /* i == 0 */
1812 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1814 goto err;
1815 }
1816 }
1817 }
1818
1819 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1820 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1821 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1822 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1823 }
1824
1825 /*
1826 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1827 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1828 */
1829 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1830 j = 0;
1831 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1832
1833 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1834 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1835 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1836 }
1837 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1838 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1839 if (trc_out != NULL)
1840 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1841 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1842 if (c->id == id) {
1843 j = 1;
1844 break;
1845 }
1846 }
1847 if (j == 0) {
1848 /*
1849 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1850 * to reuse it
1851 */
1852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1853 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1854 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1858 }
1859
1860 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1861 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1862 break;
1863 }
1864
1865 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1866 /* no compress */
1867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1868 goto err;
1869 }
1870
1871 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1872 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1873
1874 /* TLS extensions */
1875 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1876 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1878 goto err;
1879 }
1880
1881 /*
1882 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1883 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1884 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1885 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1886 */
1887 {
1888 unsigned char *pos;
1889 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1890 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1892 goto err;
1893 }
1894 }
1895
1896 if (!s->hit
1897 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1898 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1899 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1900 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL) {
1901 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1902 /*
1903 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1904 * backwards compat reasons
1905 */
1906 int master_key_length;
1907
1908 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1909 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1910 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1911 &pref_cipher,
1912 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1913 && master_key_length > 0) {
1914 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1915 s->hit = 1;
1916 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1917 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1918
1919 ciphers = NULL;
1920
1921 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1922 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1923 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1924 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
1925 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1927 goto err;
1928 }
1929
1930 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1931 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1932 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1933 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1934 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1935 }
1936 }
1937
1938 /*
1939 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1940 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1941 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1942 */
1943 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1944 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1945 /*
1946 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1947 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1948 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1949 */
1950 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1952 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1953 goto err;
1954 }
1955 }
1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1957 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1958 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1959 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1960 unsigned int k;
1961 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1962 /* Can't disable compression */
1963 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1965 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1966 goto err;
1967 }
1968 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1969 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1970 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
1971 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1972 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1973 break;
1974 }
1975 }
1976 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1978 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1979 goto err;
1980 }
1981 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1982 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1983 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1984 break;
1985 }
1986 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1988 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1989 goto err;
1990 }
1991 } else if (s->hit) {
1992 comp = NULL;
1993 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods) {
1994 /* See if we have a match */
1995 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1996 unsigned int o;
1997
1998 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1999 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2000 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
2001 v = comp->id;
2002 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2003 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2004 done = 1;
2005 break;
2006 }
2007 }
2008 if (done)
2009 break;
2010 }
2011 if (done)
2012 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2013 else
2014 comp = NULL;
2015 }
2016 #else
2017 /*
2018 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2019 * using compression.
2020 */
2021 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2023 goto err;
2024 }
2025 #endif
2026
2027 /*
2028 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2029 */
2030
2031 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2032 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2033 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2034 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2036 goto err;
2037 }
2038 ciphers = NULL;
2039 }
2040
2041 if (!s->hit) {
2042 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2043 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2044 #else
2045 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2046 #endif
2047 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2048 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2049 goto err;
2050 }
2051 }
2052
2053 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2054 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2055 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2056 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2057 s->clienthello = NULL;
2058 return 1;
2059 err:
2060 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2061 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2062 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2063 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2064 s->clienthello = NULL;
2065
2066 return 0;
2067 }
2068
2069 /*
2070 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2071 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2072 */
tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2073 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2074 {
2075 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2076
2077 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2078
2079 /*
2080 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2081 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2082 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2083 * influence which certificate is sent
2084 */
2085 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx != NULL
2086 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2087 int ret;
2088
2089 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2090 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2091 /*
2092 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2093 * et al can pick it up.
2094 */
2095 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2096 ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2097 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2098 switch (ret) {
2099 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2100 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2101 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2102 break;
2103 /* status request response should be sent */
2104 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2105 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2106 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2107 break;
2108 /* something bad happened */
2109 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2110 default:
2111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2112 return 0;
2113 }
2114 }
2115 }
2116
2117 return 1;
2118 }
2119
2120 /*
2121 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2122 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2123 */
tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2124 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2125 {
2126 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2127 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2128 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2129
2130 if (sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2131 int r = sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2132 &selected, &selected_len,
2133 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2134 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2135 sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2136
2137 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2138 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2139 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2140 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2141 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2143 return 0;
2144 }
2145 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2147 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2148 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
2149 #endif
2150
2151 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2152 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2153 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2154 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2155 selected_len) != 0) {
2156 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2157 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2158
2159 if (!s->hit) {
2160 /*
2161 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2162 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2163 * selected ALPN.
2164 */
2165 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2167 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2168 return 0;
2169 }
2170 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2171 selected_len);
2172 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2174 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2175 return 0;
2176 }
2177 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2178 }
2179 }
2180
2181 return 1;
2182 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
2184 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2185 return 0;
2186 }
2187 /*
2188 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2189 * present.
2190 */
2191 }
2192
2193 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2194 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2195 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2196 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2197 }
2198
2199 return 1;
2200 }
2201
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)2202 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2203 {
2204 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2205 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2206
2207 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2208 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2209 if (rv == 0) {
2210 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2211 goto err;
2212 }
2213 if (rv < 0)
2214 return WORK_MORE_A;
2215 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2216 }
2217 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2218 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2219 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2220 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2221 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2222 if (rv == 0) {
2223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2224 goto err;
2225 }
2226 if (rv < 0) {
2227 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2228 return WORK_MORE_B;
2229 }
2230 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2231 }
2232
2233 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2234 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2235 cipher =
2236 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
2237 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
2238
2239 if (cipher == NULL) {
2240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2241 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2242 goto err;
2243 }
2244 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2245 }
2246 if (!s->hit) {
2247 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2248 /* SSLfatal already called */
2249 goto err;
2250 }
2251 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2252 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2253 s->session->not_resumable =
2254 s->not_resumable_session_cb(ssl,
2255 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2256 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2257 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2258 /* do not send a session ticket */
2259 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2260 }
2261 } else {
2262 /* Session-id reuse */
2263 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2264 }
2265
2266 /*-
2267 * we now have the following setup.
2268 * client_random
2269 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2270 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2271 * compression - basically ignored right now
2272 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2273 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2274 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2275 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2276 */
2277
2278 /*
2279 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2280 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2281 */
2282 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2284 goto err;
2285 }
2286 /*
2287 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2288 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2289 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2290 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2291 */
2292 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 goto err;
2295 }
2296
2297 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2298 }
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2300 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2301 int ret;
2302 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2303 /*
2304 * callback indicates further work to be done
2305 */
2306 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2307 return WORK_MORE_C;
2308 }
2309 if (ret < 0) {
2310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2311 goto err;
2312 }
2313 }
2314 #endif
2315
2316 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2317 err:
2318 return WORK_ERROR;
2319 }
2320
tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2321 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2322 {
2323 int compm;
2324 size_t sl, len;
2325 int version;
2326 unsigned char *session_id;
2327 int usetls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2328 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2329
2330 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2331 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2332 /*
2333 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2334 * tls_process_client_hello()
2335 */
2336 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2337 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2338 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2339 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2341 return 0;
2342 }
2343
2344 /*-
2345 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2346 * back in the server hello:
2347 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2348 * we send back the old session ID.
2349 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2350 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2351 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2352 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2353 * session ID.
2354 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2355 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2356 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2357 * regardless
2358 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2359 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2360 * to send back.
2361 */
2362 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2363 (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2364 && !s->hit))
2365 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2366
2367 if (usetls13) {
2368 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2369 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2370 } else {
2371 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2372 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2373 }
2374
2375 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2377 return 0;
2378 }
2379
2380 /* set up the compression method */
2381 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2382 compm = 0;
2383 #else
2384 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2385 compm = 0;
2386 else
2387 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2388 #endif
2389
2390 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2391 || !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher,
2392 pkt, &len)
2393 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397
2398 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2399 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2400 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2401 : (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2402 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2403 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2404 NULL, 0)) {
2405 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2406 return 0;
2407 }
2408
2409 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2410 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2411 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2412 s->session = NULL;
2413 s->hit = 0;
2414
2415 /*
2416 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2417 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2418 */
2419 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2421 return 0;
2422 }
2423 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2424 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2425 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2426 return 0;
2427 }
2428
2429 return 1;
2430 }
2431
tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2432 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2433 {
2434 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2435 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2436 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2437 return 0;
2438 }
2439 }
2440 return 1;
2441 }
2442
tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2443 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2444 {
2445 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2446 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2447 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2448 int curve_id = 0;
2449 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2450 int i;
2451 unsigned long type;
2452 BIGNUM *r[4];
2453 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2454 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2455 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2456 int freer = 0, ret = 0;
2457 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2458
2459 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2461 goto err;
2462 }
2463
2464 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2466 goto err;
2467 }
2468
2469 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2470
2471 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2473 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2474 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2475 } else
2476 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2477 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2478 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2479 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2480
2481 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2482 pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2483 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2485 goto err;
2486 }
2487 pkdhp = pkdh;
2488 } else {
2489 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2490 }
2491 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
2492 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2493 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2494 0, 1024));
2495 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2497 goto err;
2498 }
2499 pkdhp = pkdh;
2500 }
2501 #endif
2502 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2504 goto err;
2505 }
2506 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2507 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2509 goto err;
2510 }
2511 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2513 goto err;
2514 }
2515
2516 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2517 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2519 goto err;
2520 }
2521
2522 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2523 pkdh = NULL;
2524
2525 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2526 freer = 1;
2527 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
2528 &r[0])
2529 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
2530 &r[1])
2531 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2532 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
2533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2534 goto err;
2535 }
2536 } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2537
2538 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2540 goto err;
2541 }
2542
2543 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2544 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2545 if (curve_id == 0) {
2546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2547 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2548 goto err;
2549 }
2550 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
2551 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2552 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2553 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2554 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2556 goto err;
2557 }
2558
2559 /* Encode the public key. */
2560 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2561 &encodedPoint);
2562 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2564 goto err;
2565 }
2566
2567 /*
2568 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2569 * can set these to NULLs
2570 */
2571 r[0] = NULL;
2572 r[1] = NULL;
2573 r[2] = NULL;
2574 r[3] = NULL;
2575 } else
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2577 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2578 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2579 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2580 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2582 goto err;
2583 }
2584 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2585 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2586 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2587 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2588 } else
2589 #endif
2590 {
2591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2592 goto err;
2593 }
2594
2595 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2596 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2597 lu = NULL;
2598 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2600 goto err;
2601 }
2602
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2604 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2605 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2606 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2607
2608 /*
2609 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2610 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2611 */
2612 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2613 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2614 len)) {
2615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2616 goto err;
2617 }
2618 }
2619 #endif
2620
2621 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2622 unsigned char *binval;
2623 int res;
2624
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2626 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2627 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2628 } else
2629 #endif
2630 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2631
2632 if (!res) {
2633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2634 goto err;
2635 }
2636
2637 /*-
2638 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2639 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2640 * as the prime
2641 */
2642 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2643 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2644
2645 if (len > 0) {
2646 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2648 goto err;
2649 }
2650 memset(binval, 0, len);
2651 }
2652 }
2653
2654 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2655 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2657 goto err;
2658 }
2659
2660 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2661 }
2662
2663 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2664 /*
2665 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2666 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2667 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2668 * point itself
2669 */
2670 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2671 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2672 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2673 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2675 goto err;
2676 }
2677 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2678 encodedPoint = NULL;
2679 }
2680
2681 /* not anonymous */
2682 if (lu != NULL) {
2683 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2684 const EVP_MD *md;
2685 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2686 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2687
2688 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
2689 /* Should never happen */
2690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2691 goto err;
2692 }
2693 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2694 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2696 goto err;
2697 }
2698 /* send signature algorithm */
2699 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 goto err;
2702 }
2703
2704 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2705 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2706 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2707 NULL) <= 0) {
2708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2709 goto err;
2710 }
2711 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2712 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2713 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2715 goto err;
2716 }
2717 }
2718 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2719 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2720 paramlen);
2721 if (tbslen == 0) {
2722 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2723 goto err;
2724 }
2725
2726 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2727 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2728 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2729 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2730 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2731 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2733 goto err;
2734 }
2735 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2736 }
2737
2738 ret = 1;
2739 err:
2740 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2741 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2742 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2743 if (freer) {
2744 BN_free(r[0]);
2745 BN_free(r[1]);
2746 BN_free(r[2]);
2747 BN_free(r[3]);
2748 }
2749 return ret;
2750 }
2751
tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2752 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2753 {
2754 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2755 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2756 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2757 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2758 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2759 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
2760 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 return 0;
2763 }
2764 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
2765 s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
2766 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
2767 s->pha_context_len)) {
2768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2769 return 0;
2770 }
2771 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2772 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2773 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2774 return 0;
2775 }
2776 } else {
2777 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2779 return 0;
2780 }
2781 }
2782
2783 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2784 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2785 0)) {
2786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2787 return 0;
2788 }
2789 goto done;
2790 }
2791
2792 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2793 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2794 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2796 return 0;
2797 }
2798
2799 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2800 const uint16_t *psigs;
2801 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2802
2803 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2804 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2805 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2806 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 return 0;
2809 }
2810 }
2811
2812 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2814 return 0;
2815 }
2816
2817 done:
2818 s->certreqs_sent++;
2819 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2820 return 1;
2821 }
2822
tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2823 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2824 {
2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2826 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2827 size_t psklen;
2828 PACKET psk_identity;
2829
2830 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2832 return 0;
2833 }
2834 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2836 return 0;
2837 }
2838 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2840 return 0;
2841 }
2842
2843 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2845 return 0;
2846 }
2847
2848 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2849 s->session->psk_identity,
2850 psk, sizeof(psk));
2851
2852 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 return 0;
2855 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2856 /*
2857 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2858 */
2859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2860 return 0;
2861 }
2862
2863 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2864 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2865 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2866
2867 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2868 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
2869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2870 return 0;
2871 }
2872
2873 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2874
2875 return 1;
2876 #else
2877 /* Should never happen */
2878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2879 return 0;
2880 #endif
2881 }
2882
tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2883 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2884 {
2885 size_t outlen;
2886 PACKET enc_premaster;
2887 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2888 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2889 int ret = 0;
2890 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2891 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2892 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2893
2894 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2895 if (rsa == NULL) {
2896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2897 return 0;
2898 }
2899
2900 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2901 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2902 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2903 } else {
2904 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2905 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2907 return 0;
2908 }
2909 }
2910
2911 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2912 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
2913 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2915 return 0;
2916 }
2917
2918 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, rsa, sctx->propq);
2919 if (ctx == NULL) {
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2921 goto err;
2922 }
2923
2924 /*
2925 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2926 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2927 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
2928 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
2929 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
2930 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
2931 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
2932 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
2933 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2934 */
2935 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
2936 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2938 goto err;
2939 }
2940
2941 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
2942 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
2943 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
2944 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
2945 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
2946 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
2947 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
2948
2949 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
2950 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
2951 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2952 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
2953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2954 goto err;
2955 }
2956
2957 /*
2958 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
2959 * we double check anyway.
2960 */
2961 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2962 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2964 goto err;
2965 }
2966
2967 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
2968 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2969 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
2970 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2971 goto err;
2972 }
2973
2974 ret = 1;
2975 err:
2976 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2977 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
2978 return ret;
2979 }
2980
tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2981 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2982 {
2983 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2984 unsigned int i;
2985 const unsigned char *data;
2986 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2987 int ret = 0;
2988
2989 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2991 goto err;
2992 }
2993 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
2994 if (skey == NULL) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2996 goto err;
2997 }
2998
2999 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3001 goto err;
3002 }
3003 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3004 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3006 goto err;
3007 }
3008 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3009 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3011 goto err;
3012 }
3013
3014 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
3015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3016 goto err;
3017 }
3018
3019 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3020 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3021 goto err;
3022 }
3023
3024 ret = 1;
3025 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3026 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3027 err:
3028 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3029 return ret;
3030 }
3031
tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3032 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3033 {
3034 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3035 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3036 int ret = 0;
3037
3038 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3039 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3041 goto err;
3042 } else {
3043 unsigned int i;
3044 const unsigned char *data;
3045
3046 /*
3047 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3048 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3049 */
3050
3051 /* Get encoded point length */
3052 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3053 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3055 goto err;
3056 }
3057 if (skey == NULL) {
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3059 goto err;
3060 }
3061
3062 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3063 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3065 goto err;
3066 }
3067
3068 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3070 goto err;
3071 }
3072 }
3073
3074 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3075 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3076 goto err;
3077 }
3078
3079 ret = 1;
3080 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3081 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3082 err:
3083 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3084
3085 return ret;
3086 }
3087
tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3088 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3089 {
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3091 unsigned int i;
3092 const unsigned char *data;
3093
3094 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3095 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3097 return 0;
3098 }
3099 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3101 return 0;
3102 }
3103 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3105 return 0;
3106 }
3107 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3108 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3109 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3111 return 0;
3112 }
3113
3114 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3115 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3116 return 0;
3117 }
3118
3119 return 1;
3120 #else
3121 /* Should never happen */
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 return 0;
3124 #endif
3125 }
3126
tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3127 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3128 {
3129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3130 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3131 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3132 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3133 const unsigned char *start;
3134 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3135 unsigned long alg_a;
3136 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3137 const unsigned char *ptr;
3138 int ret = 0;
3139 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3140
3141 /* Get our certificate private key */
3142 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3143 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3144 /*
3145 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3146 */
3147 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3148 if (pk == NULL) {
3149 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3150 }
3151 if (pk == NULL) {
3152 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3153 }
3154 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3155 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3156 }
3157
3158 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3159 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3161 return 0;
3162 }
3163 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3165 return 0;
3166 }
3167 /*
3168 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3169 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3170 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3171 * client certificate for authorization only.
3172 */
3173 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3174 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3175 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3176 ERR_clear_error();
3177 }
3178
3179 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3180 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3181 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3182 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3183 if (pKX == NULL
3184 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3185 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3187 goto err;
3188 }
3189
3190 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3192 goto err;
3193 }
3194
3195 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3197 goto err;
3198 }
3199
3200 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3201 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3202
3203 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3204 inlen) <= 0) {
3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3206 goto err;
3207 }
3208 /* Generate master secret */
3209 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3210 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3211 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3212 goto err;
3213 }
3214 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3215 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3216 NULL) > 0)
3217 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3218
3219 ret = 1;
3220 err:
3221 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3222 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3223 return ret;
3224 #else
3225 /* Should never happen */
3226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3227 return 0;
3228 #endif
3229 }
3230
tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3231 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3232 {
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3234 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3235 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3236 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3237 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3238 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3239 size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
3240 int ret = 0;
3241 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3242 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3243
3244 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3246 return 0;
3247 }
3248
3249 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3251 goto err;
3252 }
3253
3254 /* Get our certificate private key */
3255 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3256 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3257 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3258 if (pk == NULL) {
3259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3260 goto err;
3261 }
3262
3263 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3264 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3266 goto err;
3267 }
3268 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 goto err;
3271 }
3272
3273 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3274 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3275 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3277 goto err;
3278 }
3279
3280 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3281 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3283 goto err;
3284 }
3285 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3286 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3287
3288 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3290 goto err;
3291 }
3292 /* Generate master secret */
3293 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3294 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3296 goto err;
3297 }
3298 ret = 1;
3299
3300 err:
3301 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3302 return ret;
3303 #else
3304 /* Should never happen */
3305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3306 return 0;
3307 #endif
3308 }
3309
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3310 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3311 PACKET *pkt)
3312 {
3313 unsigned long alg_k;
3314
3315 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3316
3317 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3318 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3319 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3320 goto err;
3321 }
3322
3323 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3324 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3325 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3327 goto err;
3328 }
3329 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3330 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3332 goto err;
3333 }
3334 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3335 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3336 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3337 goto err;
3338 }
3339 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3340 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3341 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3342 goto err;
3343 }
3344 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3345 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3346 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3347 goto err;
3348 }
3349 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3350 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3351 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3352 goto err;
3353 }
3354 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3355 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3356 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3357 goto err;
3358 }
3359 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3360 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3361 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3362 goto err;
3363 }
3364 } else {
3365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3366 goto err;
3367 }
3368
3369 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3370 err:
3371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3372 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3373 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3374 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3375 #endif
3376 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3377 }
3378
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)3379 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3380 WORK_STATE wst)
3381 {
3382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3383 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3384 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3385 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3386 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3387 size_t labellen;
3388 /*
3389 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3390 * used.
3391 */
3392 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3393 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3394
3395 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3396 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3397 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3398 labellen += 1;
3399
3400 if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3401 sctpauthkey,
3402 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3403 labellen, NULL, 0,
3404 0) <= 0) {
3405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3406 return WORK_ERROR;
3407 }
3408
3409 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3410 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3411 }
3412 }
3413 #endif
3414
3415 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3416 /*
3417 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3418 * the handshake_buffer
3419 */
3420 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3422 return WORK_ERROR;
3423 }
3424 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3425 } else {
3426 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3428 return WORK_ERROR;
3429 }
3430 /*
3431 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3432 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3433 */
3434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3435 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3436 return WORK_ERROR;
3437 }
3438 }
3439
3440 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3441 }
3442
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3443 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3444 PACKET *pkt)
3445 {
3446 int i;
3447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3448 X509 *x = NULL;
3449 unsigned long l;
3450 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3451 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3452 PACKET spkt, context;
3453 size_t chainidx;
3454 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3455 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3456
3457 /*
3458 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3459 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
3460 */
3461 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
3462 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
3463
3464 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3466 goto err;
3467 }
3468
3469 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3470 && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3471 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3472 || (s->pha_context != NULL
3473 && !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context,
3474 s->pha_context_len)))) {
3475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3476 goto err;
3477 }
3478
3479 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3480 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3482 goto err;
3483 }
3484
3485 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3486 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3487 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3489 goto err;
3490 }
3491
3492 certstart = certbytes;
3493 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
3494 if (x == NULL) {
3495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3496 goto err;
3497 }
3498 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
3499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3500 goto err;
3501 }
3502
3503 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3505 goto err;
3506 }
3507
3508 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3509 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3510 PACKET extensions;
3511
3512 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3514 goto err;
3515 }
3516 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3517 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3518 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3519 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3520 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3521 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3522 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3523 goto err;
3524 }
3525 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3526 }
3527
3528 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3530 goto err;
3531 }
3532 x = NULL;
3533 }
3534
3535 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3536 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3537 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3539 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3540 goto err;
3541 }
3542 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3543 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3544 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3546 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3547 goto err;
3548 }
3549 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3550 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3551 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3552 goto err;
3553 }
3554 } else {
3555 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3556 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3557 if (i <= 0) {
3558 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3559 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3560 goto err;
3561 }
3562 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3563 if (pkey == NULL) {
3564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3565 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3566 goto err;
3567 }
3568 }
3569
3570 /*
3571 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3572 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3573 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3574 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3575 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3576 */
3577
3578 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3579 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3581 goto err;
3582 }
3583
3584 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3585 s->session = new_sess;
3586 }
3587
3588 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3589 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3590 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3591
3592 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
3593 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3594 sk = NULL;
3595
3596 /*
3597 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3598 * message
3599 */
3600 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3601 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3602 goto err;
3603 }
3604
3605 /*
3606 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3607 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3608 */
3609
3610 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3611 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3612 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3613 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3614 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3616 goto err;
3617 }
3618
3619 /* Resend session tickets */
3620 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3621 }
3622
3623 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3624
3625 err:
3626 X509_free(x);
3627 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
3628 return ret;
3629 }
3630
tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3631 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3632 {
3633 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3634
3635 if (cpk == NULL) {
3636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3637 return 0;
3638 }
3639
3640 /*
3641 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3642 * for the server Certificate message
3643 */
3644 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3646 return 0;
3647 }
3648 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3650 return 0;
3651 }
3652
3653 return 1;
3654 }
3655
create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3656 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3657 uint32_t age_add, unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3658 {
3659 uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)s->session->timeout;
3660
3661 /*
3662 * Ticket lifetime hint:
3663 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3664 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
3665 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
3666 * resumed session (for simplicity).
3667 */
3668 #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
3669
3670 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3671 if (s->session->timeout > ONE_WEEK_SEC)
3672 timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
3673 } else if (s->hit)
3674 timeout = 0;
3675
3676 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3678 return 0;
3679 }
3680
3681 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3682 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3683 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3685 return 0;
3686 }
3687 }
3688
3689 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3690 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3692 return 0;
3693 }
3694
3695 return 1;
3696 }
3697
construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3698 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3699 uint32_t age_add,
3700 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3701 {
3702 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3703 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3704 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3705 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3706 const unsigned char *const_p;
3707 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3708 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3709 size_t hlen;
3710 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3711 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3712 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3713 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3714 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3715 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3716 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3717
3718 /* get session encoding length */
3719 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3720 /*
3721 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3722 * long
3723 */
3724 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3726 goto err;
3727 }
3728 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3729 if (senc == NULL) {
3730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3731 goto err;
3732 }
3733
3734 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3735 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3736 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3738 goto err;
3739 }
3740
3741 p = senc;
3742 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3744 goto err;
3745 }
3746
3747 /*
3748 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3749 */
3750 const_p = senc;
3751 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3752 if (sess == NULL) {
3753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3754 goto err;
3755 }
3756
3757 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3758 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3759 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3761 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3762 goto err;
3763 }
3764 p = senc;
3765 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3767 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3768 goto err;
3769 }
3770 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3771
3772 /*
3773 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3774 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3775 */
3776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3777 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3778 #else
3779 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3780 #endif
3781 {
3782 int ret = 0;
3783
3784 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3785 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
3786 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
3787 1);
3788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3789 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3790 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3791 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
3792 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
3793 #endif
3794
3795 if (ret == 0) {
3796
3797 /* Put timeout and length */
3798 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3799 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3801 goto err;
3802 }
3803 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3804 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3805 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3806 return 1;
3807 }
3808 if (ret < 0) {
3809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3810 goto err;
3811 }
3812 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
3813 if (iv_len < 0) {
3814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3815 goto err;
3816 }
3817 } else {
3818 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
3819 sctx->propq);
3820
3821 if (cipher == NULL) {
3822 /* Error is already recorded */
3823 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3824 goto err;
3825 }
3826
3827 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
3828 if (iv_len < 0
3829 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
3830 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3831 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3832 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3833 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3834 "SHA256")) {
3835 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
3836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3837 goto err;
3838 }
3839 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
3840 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3841 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3842 }
3843
3844 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3845 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3846 goto err;
3847 }
3848
3849 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3850 /* Output key name */
3851 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3852 /* output IV */
3853 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3854 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3855 &encdata1)
3856 /* Encrypt session data */
3857 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3858 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3859 || encdata1 != encdata2
3860 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3861 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3862 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3863 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3864 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3865 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
3866 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3867 macendoffset - macoffset)
3868 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3869 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
3870 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3871 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3872 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3874 goto err;
3875 }
3876
3877 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3878 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3880 goto err;
3881 }
3882
3883 ok = 1;
3884 err:
3885 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3886 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3887 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3888 return ok;
3889 }
3890
construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3891 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3892 uint32_t age_add,
3893 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3894 {
3895 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3896 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3897 return 0;
3898 }
3899
3900 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3901 s->session->session_id_length)
3902 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3904 return 0;
3905 }
3906
3907 return 1;
3908 }
3909
tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3910 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3911 {
3912 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3913 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3914 union {
3915 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3916 uint32_t age_add;
3917 } age_add_u;
3918
3919 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3920
3921 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3922 size_t i, hashlen;
3923 uint64_t nonce;
3924 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
3925 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
3926 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
3927
3928 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3929 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
3930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3931 goto err;
3932 }
3933 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
3934
3935 /*
3936 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
3937 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
3938 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
3939 */
3940 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
3941 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
3942
3943 if (new_sess == NULL) {
3944 /* SSLfatal already called */
3945 goto err;
3946 }
3947
3948 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3949 s->session = new_sess;
3950 }
3951
3952 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
3953 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3954 goto err;
3955 }
3956 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
3957 age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
3958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3959 goto err;
3960 }
3961 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3962
3963 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
3964 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
3965 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
3966 nonce >>= 8;
3967 }
3968
3969 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
3970 nonce_label,
3971 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
3972 tick_nonce,
3973 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
3974 s->session->master_key,
3975 hashlen, 1)) {
3976 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3977 goto err;
3978 }
3979 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
3980
3981 s->session->time = time(NULL);
3982 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
3983 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
3984 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3985 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3986 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
3987 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3988 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
3989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3990 goto err;
3991 }
3992 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
3993 }
3994 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3995 }
3996
3997 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
3998 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3999 tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
4000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4001 goto err;
4002 }
4003 /*
4004 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4005 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4006 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4007 */
4008 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
4009 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4010 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4011 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4012 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4013 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4014 goto err;
4015 }
4016 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4017 tick_nonce)) {
4018 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4019 goto err;
4020 }
4021
4022 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4023 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4024 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4025 NULL, 0)) {
4026 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4027 goto err;
4028 }
4029 /*
4030 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4031 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4032 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4033 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4034 */
4035 s->sent_tickets++;
4036 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4037 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
4038 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
4039 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4040 }
4041
4042 return 1;
4043 err:
4044 return 0;
4045 }
4046
4047 /*
4048 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4049 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4050 */
tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4051 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4052 {
4053 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4054 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4055 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4057 return 0;
4058 }
4059
4060 return 1;
4061 }
4062
tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4063 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4064 {
4065 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4066 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4067 return 0;
4068 }
4069
4070 return 1;
4071 }
4072
4073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4074 /*
4075 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4076 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4077 */
tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)4078 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4079 {
4080 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4081 size_t next_proto_len;
4082
4083 /*-
4084 * The payload looks like:
4085 * uint8 proto_len;
4086 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4087 * uint8 padding_len;
4088 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4089 */
4090 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4091 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4092 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4094 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4095 }
4096
4097 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4098 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4100 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4101 }
4102
4103 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4104
4105 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4106 }
4107 #endif
4108
tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4109 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4110 {
4111 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4112 NULL, 0)) {
4113 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4114 return 0;
4115 }
4116
4117 return 1;
4118 }
4119
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)4120 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4121 {
4122 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4124 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4125 }
4126
4127 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4128 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4130 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4131 }
4132
4133 /*
4134 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4135 * a record boundary.
4136 */
4137 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4139 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4140 }
4141
4142 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4143 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4144 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4146 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4147 }
4148
4149 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4150 }
4151
