1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include "internal/e_os.h"
13
14 #include <stdio.h>
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
18 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
20 #include <openssl/rand.h>
21 #include <openssl/objects.h>
22 #include <openssl/evp.h>
23 #include <openssl/x509.h>
24 #include <openssl/dh.h>
25 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
26 #include <openssl/bn.h>
27 #include <openssl/md5.h>
28 #include <openssl/trace.h>
29 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
30 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
31 #include <openssl/comp.h>
32 #include "internal/comp.h"
33
34 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
35
36 typedef struct {
37 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
38 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
39 } GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
40
41 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
42
43 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
44 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
45 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
46 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
47
48 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
49
50 static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
51 WPACKET *pkt);
52
received_client_cert(const SSL_CONNECTION * sc)53 static ossl_inline int received_client_cert(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
54 {
55 return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
56 }
57
58 /*
59 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
60 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
61 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
62 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
63 *
64 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
65 * (transition not allowed)
66 */
ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int mt)67 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
68 {
69 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
70
71 /*
72 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
73 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
74 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
75 */
76 switch (st->hand_state) {
77 default:
78 break;
79
80 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
81 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
82 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
83 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
84 return 1;
85 }
86 break;
87 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
88 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
89 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
90 return 1;
91 }
92 break;
93 }
94 /* Fall through */
95
96 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
97 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
98 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
101 return 1;
102 }
103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
105 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
107 return 1;
108 }
109 #endif
110 } else {
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
113 return 1;
114 }
115 }
116 break;
117
118 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
119 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
120 if (!received_client_cert(s)) {
121 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
122 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
123 return 1;
124 }
125 } else {
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
128 return 1;
129 }
130 }
131 break;
132
133 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
136 return 1;
137 }
138 break;
139
140 case TLS_ST_OK:
141 /*
142 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
143 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
144 */
145 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
146 break;
147
148 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
151 return 1;
152 }
153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
155 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
157 return 1;
158 }
159 #endif
160 }
161
162 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
163 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
164 return 1;
165 }
166 break;
167 }
168
169 /* No valid transition found */
170 return 0;
171 }
172
173 /*
174 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
175 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
176 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
177 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
178 *
179 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
180 * (transition not allowed)
181 */
ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int mt)182 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
183 {
184 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185
186 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
187 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
188 goto err;
189 return 1;
190 }
191
192 switch (st->hand_state) {
193 default:
194 break;
195
196 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
197 case TLS_ST_OK:
198 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
201 return 1;
202 }
203 break;
204
205 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
206 /*
207 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
208 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
209 * OR
210 * 2) If we did request one then
211 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
212 * AND
213 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
214 * list if we requested a certificate)
215 */
216 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
217 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
218 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
219 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
220 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
221 /*
222 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
223 * not going to accept it because we require a client
224 * cert.
225 */
226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
227 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
228 return 0;
229 }
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
231 return 1;
232 }
233 } else {
234 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
235 return 1;
236 }
237 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
240 return 1;
241 }
242 }
243 break;
244
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
248 return 1;
249 }
250 break;
251
252 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
253 /*
254 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
255 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
256 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
257 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
258 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
259 * set.
260 */
261 if (!received_client_cert(s) || st->no_cert_verify) {
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
263 /*
264 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
265 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
266 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
267 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
268 */
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
270 return 1;
271 }
272 } else {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
275 return 1;
276 }
277 }
278 break;
279
280 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
283 return 1;
284 }
285 break;
286
287 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
289 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
290 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
291 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
292 return 1;
293 }
294 } else {
295 #endif
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
298 return 1;
299 }
300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
301 }
302 #endif
303 break;
304
305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
306 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
307 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
309 return 1;
310 }
311 break;
312 #endif
313
314 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
317 return 1;
318 }
319 break;
320 }
321
322 err:
323 /* No valid transition found */
324 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
325 BIO *rbio;
326
327 /*
328 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
329 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
330 */
331 s->init_num = 0;
332 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
333 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
334 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
335 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
336 return 0;
337 }
338 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
339 return 0;
340 }
341
342 /*
343 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
344 *
345 * Valid return values are:
346 * 1: Yes
347 * 0: No
348 */
send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s)349 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
350 {
351 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
352
353 /*
354 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
355 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
356 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
357 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
358 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
359 * key exchange.
360 */
361 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
362 /*
363 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
364 * provided
365 */
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
367 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
368 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
369 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
370 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
371 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
372 #endif
373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
374 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
375 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
376 #endif
377 ) {
378 return 1;
379 }
380
381 return 0;
382 }
383
384 /*
385 * Used to determine if we should send a CompressedCertificate message
386 *
387 * Returns the algorithm to use, TLSEXT_comp_cert_none means no compression
388 */
get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION * sc)389 static int get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
390 {
391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
392 int *alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer;
393
394 if (sc->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
395 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
396
397 for (; *alg != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; alg++) {
398 if (sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[*alg] != NULL)
399 return *alg;
400 }
401 #endif
402 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
403 }
404
405 /*
406 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
407 *
408 * Valid return values are:
409 * 1: Yes
410 * 0: No
411 */
send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s)412 int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
413 {
414 if (
415 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
416 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
417 /*
418 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
419 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
420 */
421 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
422 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
423 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
424 /*
425 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
426 * a second time:
427 */
428 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
429 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
430 /*
431 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
432 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
433 * RFC 2246):
434 */
435 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
436 /*
437 * ... except when the application insists on
438 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
439 * this for SSL 3)
440 */
441 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
442 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
443 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
444 /*
445 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
446 * are omitted
447 */
448 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
449 return 1;
450 }
451
452 return 0;
453 }
454
do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION * sc)455 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
456 {
457 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't attempt to compress it */
458 return sc->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
459 && get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
460 }
461
462 /*
463 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
464 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
465 * client.
466 */
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s)467 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
468 {
469 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
470
471 /*
472 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
473 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
474 */
475
476 switch (st->hand_state) {
477 default:
478 /* Shouldn't happen */
479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
480 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
481
482 case TLS_ST_OK:
483 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 }
487 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490 }
491 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 }
495 /* Try to read from the client instead */
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
497
498 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
500 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
501
502 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
503 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
504 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
506 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
508 else
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511
512 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
513 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
515 else
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518
519 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
520 if (s->hit)
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
522 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
524 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
526 else
527 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
528
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
530
531 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
532 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
533 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
535 } else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) {
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
537 } else {
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
539 }
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541
542 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
543 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546
547 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550
551 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
553 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
555
556 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
557 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
558
559 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
560 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
561 /*
562 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
563 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
564 * immediately.
565 */
566 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
567 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
568 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
569 /*
570 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
571 * handshake at this point.
572 */
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 }
576 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
578 else
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581
582 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
583 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586
587 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
588 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
589 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
590 * been configured for.
591 */
592 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
595 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
597 }
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 }
600 }
601
602 /*
603 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
604 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
605 */
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s)606 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
607 {
608 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
609
610 /*
611 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
612 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
613 */
614
615 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
616 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
617
618 switch (st->hand_state) {
619 default:
620 /* Shouldn't happen */
621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
622 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
623
624 case TLS_ST_OK:
625 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
626 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
627 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
628 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
630 }
631 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
632 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
633 /* SSLfatal() already called */
634 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
635 }
636 /* Fall through */
637
638 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
639 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
640 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
641
642 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
645
646 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
647 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
648 && (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
649 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
650 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
651 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 } else {
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
656 }
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
658
659 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
660 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
661
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
663 if (s->hit) {
664 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
665 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
666 else
667 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
668 } else {
669 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
670 /* normal PSK or SRP */
671 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
672 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
673 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
674 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
675 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
676 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
677 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
678 } else {
679 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
680 }
681 }
682 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
683
684 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
685 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
686 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
687 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
688 }
689 /* Fall through */
690
691 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
692 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
693 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
694 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
695 }
696 /* Fall through */
697
698 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
699 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
700 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
701 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
702 }
703 /* Fall through */
704
705 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
706 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
707 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
708
709 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
710 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
711 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
712
713 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
714 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
715 if (s->hit) {
716 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
717 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
718 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
719 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
720 } else {
721 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
722 }
723 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
724
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
726 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
727 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
728
729 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
730 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
731 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
732
733 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
734 if (s->hit) {
735 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
736 }
737 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
738 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
739 }
740 }
741
742 /*
743 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
744 * the server to the client.
745 */
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)746 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
747 {
748 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
749 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
750
751 switch (st->hand_state) {
752 default:
753 /* No pre work to be done */
754 break;
755
756 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
757 s->shutdown = 0;
758 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
759 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
760 break;
761
762 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
763 s->shutdown = 0;
764 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
765 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
766 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
767 st->use_timer = 0;
768 }
769 break;
770
771 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
772 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
773 /*
774 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
775 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
776 */
777 st->use_timer = 1;
778 }
779 break;
780
781 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
783 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
784 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
785 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
786 }
787 #endif
788 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
789
790 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
791 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
792 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
793 /*
794 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
795 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
796 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
797 *
798 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
799 */
800 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
801 }
802 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
803 /*
804 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
805 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
806 */
807 st->use_timer = 0;
808 }
809 break;
810
811 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
812 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
813 break;
814 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
815 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
816 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
817 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
819 return WORK_ERROR;
820 }
821 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
822 /* SSLfatal() already called */
823 return WORK_ERROR;
824 }
825 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
826 /*
827 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
828 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
829 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
830 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
831 */
832 st->use_timer = 0;
833 }
834 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
835
836 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
837 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
838 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
839 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
840 /* Fall through */
841
842 case TLS_ST_OK:
843 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
844 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
845 }
846
847 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
848 }
849
conn_is_closed(void)850 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
851 {
852 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
853 #if defined(EPIPE)
854 case EPIPE:
855 return 1;
856 #endif
857 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
858 case ECONNRESET:
859 return 1;
860 #endif
861 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
862 case WSAECONNRESET:
863 return 1;
864 #endif
865 default:
866 return 0;
867 }
868 }
869
870 /*
871 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
872 * server to the client.
873 */
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)874 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
875 {
876 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
877 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
878
879 s->init_num = 0;
880
881 switch (st->hand_state) {
882 default:
883 /* No post work to be done */
884 break;
885
886 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
887 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
888 return WORK_MORE_A;
889 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
890 /* SSLfatal() already called */
891 return WORK_ERROR;
892 }
893 break;
894
895 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
896 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
897 return WORK_MORE_A;
898 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
899 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
900 /* SSLfatal() already called */
901 return WORK_ERROR;
902 }
903 /*
904 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
905 * treat like it was the first packet
906 */
907 s->first_packet = 1;
908 break;
909
910 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
911 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
912 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
913 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
914 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
915 return WORK_MORE_A;
916 break;
917 }
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
919 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
920 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
921 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
922 size_t labellen;
923
924 /*
925 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
926 * SCTP used.
927 */
928 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
929 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
930
931 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
932 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
933 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
934 labellen += 1;
935
936 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
937 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
938 labellen, NULL, 0,
939 0) <= 0) {
940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
941 return WORK_ERROR;
942 }
943
944 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
945 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
946 }
947 #endif
948 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
949 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
950 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
951 break;
952 /* Fall through */
953
954 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
955 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
956 if (!statem_flush(s))
957 return WORK_MORE_A;
958 break;
959 }
960
961 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
962 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
963 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
964 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
965 /* SSLfatal() already called */
966 return WORK_ERROR;
967 }
968
969 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
970 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
971 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
972 /* SSLfatal() already called */
973 return WORK_ERROR;
974 }
975 /*
976 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
977 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
978 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
979 */
980 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
981 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 1);
982 break;
983 }
984
985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
986 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
987 /*
988 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
989 * no SCTP used.
990 */
991 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
992 0, NULL);
993 }
994 #endif
995 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
996 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
997 /* SSLfatal() already called */
998 return WORK_ERROR;
999 }
1000 break;
1001
1002 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1003 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1004 return WORK_MORE_A;
1005 break;
1006
1007 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1008 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1009 return WORK_MORE_A;
1010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1011 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1012 /*
1013 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1014 * no SCTP used.
1015 */
1016 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
1017 0, NULL);
1018 }
1019 #endif
1020 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1021 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
1022 size_t dummy;
1023 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1024 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
1025 &dummy)
1026 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1027 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
1028 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1029 return WORK_ERROR;
1030 }
1031 break;
1032
1033 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1034 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
1035 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1036 return WORK_MORE_A;
1037 } else {
1038 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1039 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
1040 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
1041 }
1042 break;
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1045 if (!s->hit && !send_certificate_request(s)) {
1046 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1047 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
1048 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
1049 }
1050 break;
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1053 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1054 return WORK_MORE_A;
1055 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
1056 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1057 return WORK_ERROR;
1058 }
1059 break;
1060
1061 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1062 clear_sys_error();
1063 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
1064 if (SSL_get_error(ssl, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
1065 && conn_is_closed()) {
1066 /*
1067 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
1068 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
1069 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
1070 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
1071 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
1072 */
1073 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1074 break;
1075 }
1076
1077 return WORK_MORE_A;
1078 }
1079 break;
1080 }
1081
1082 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1083 }
1084
1085 /*
1086 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1087 * server
1088 *
1089 * Valid return values are:
1090 * 1: Success
1091 * 0: Error
1092 */
ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,confunc_f * confunc,int * mt)1093 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1094 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1095 {
1096 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1097
1098 switch (st->hand_state) {
1099 default:
1100 /* Shouldn't happen */
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1102 return 0;
1103
1104 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1105 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1106 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1107 else
1108 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1109 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1110 break;
1111
1112 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1113 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1114 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1115 break;
1116
1117 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1118 /* No construction function needed */
1119 *confunc = NULL;
1120 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1121 break;
1122
1123 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1124 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1125 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1126 break;
1127
1128 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1129 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1130 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1131 break;
1132
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1134 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
1135 *confunc = tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate;
1136 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
1137 break;
1138 #endif
1139
1140 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1141 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1142 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1143 break;
1144
1145
1146 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1147 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1148 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1149 break;
1150
1151 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1152 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1153 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1154 break;
1155
1156 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1157 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1158 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1159 break;
1160
1161 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1162 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1163 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1164 break;
1165
1166 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1167 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1168 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1169 break;
1170
1171 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1172 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1173 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1174 break;
1175
1176 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1177 *confunc = NULL;
1178 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1179 break;
1180
1181 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1182 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1183 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1184 break;
1185
1186 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1187 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1188 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1189 break;
1190 }
1191
1192 return 1;
1193 }
1194
1195 /*
1196 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1197 * calculated as follows:
1198 *
1199 * 2 + # client_version
1200 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1201 * 1 + # length of session_id
1202 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1203 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1204 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1205 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1206 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1207 * 2 + # length of extensions
1208 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1209 */
1210 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1211
1212 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1213 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1214
1215 /*
1216 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1217 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1218 */
ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1219 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1220 {
1221 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1222
1223 switch (st->hand_state) {
1224 default:
1225 /* Shouldn't happen */
1226 return 0;
1227
1228 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1229 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1230
1231 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1232 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1233
1234 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
1235 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1236 return s->max_cert_list;
1237
1238 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1239 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1240
1241 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1242 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
1243
1244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1245 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1246 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1247 #endif
1248
1249 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1250 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1251
1252 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1253 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1254
1255 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1256 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1257 }
1258 }
1259
1260 /*
1261 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1262 */
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1263 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1264 PACKET *pkt)
1265 {
1266 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1267
1268 switch (st->hand_state) {
1269 default:
1270 /* Shouldn't happen */
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1272 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1273
1274 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1275 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1276
1277 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1278 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1279
1280 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1281 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1282
1283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1284 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
1285 return tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1286 #endif
1287
1288 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1289 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1290
1291 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1292 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1293
1294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1295 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1296 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1297 #endif
1298
1299 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1300 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1301
1302 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1303 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1304
1305 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1306 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1307
1308 }
1309 }
1310
1311 /*
1312 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1313 * from the client
1314 */
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)1315 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1316 WORK_STATE wst)
1317 {
1318 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1319
1320 switch (st->hand_state) {
1321 default:
1322 /* Shouldn't happen */
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1324 return WORK_ERROR;
1325
1326 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1327 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1328
1329 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1330 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1331 }
1332 }
1333
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1335 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1336 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1337 {
1338 int ret;
1339 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1340
1341 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1342 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1343 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1344 /*
1345 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1346 * login name
1347 */
1348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1349 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1350 return -1;
1351 } else {
1352 ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
1353 if (ret < 0)
1354 return 0;
1355 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1356 SSLfatal(s, al,
1357 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1358 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1359 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1360 return -1;
1361 }
1362 }
1363 }
1364 return 1;
1365 }
1366 #endif
1367
dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET * pkt,unsigned char * cookie,size_t cookie_len)1368 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1369 size_t cookie_len)
1370 {
1371 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1372 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1373 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1374 return 0;
1375
1376 return 1;
1377 }
1378
dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)1379 CON_FUNC_RETURN dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1380 WPACKET *pkt)
1381 {
1382 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1383 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1384
1385 if (sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
1386 || sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), s->d1->cookie,
1387 &cookie_leni) == 0
1388 || cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
1389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1390 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1391 }
1392 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1393
1394 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1395 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1397 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1398 }
1399
1400 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1401 }
1402
1403 /*-
1404 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1405 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1406 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1407 * SNI,
1408 * elliptic_curves
1409 * ec_point_formats
1410 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1411 *
1412 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1413 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1414 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1415 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1416 */
ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const CLIENTHELLO_MSG * hello)1417 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1418 const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1419 {
1420 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1421 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1422 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1423 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1424 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1425 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1426 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1427
1428 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1429 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1430 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1431 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1432 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1433 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1434 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1435 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1436 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1437 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1438 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1439 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1440 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1441 };
1442 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1443 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1444 unsigned int type;
1445 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1446 size_t ext_len;
1447
1448 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1449
1450 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1451 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1452 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1453 return;
1454 }
1455
1456 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1457 return;
1458
1459 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(
1460 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1461 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1462
1463 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1464 ext_len);
1465 }
1466
1467 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
1468 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
1469 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
1470
tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1471 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1472 {
1473 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1474 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1475 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1476 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1477
1478 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1479 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1480 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1482 goto err;
1483 }
1484 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
1485 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1486 && (s->options
1487 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1488 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1489 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1490 }
1491 s->renegotiate = 1;
1492 s->new_session = 1;
1493 }
1494
1495 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1496 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1498 goto err;
1499 }
1500
1501 /*
1502 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1503 */
1504 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1505 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1506
1507 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1508 unsigned int mt;
1509
1510 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1511 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1513 goto err;
1514 }
1515
1516 /*-
1517 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1518 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1519 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1520 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1521 * Byte Content
1522 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1523 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1524 * 3-4 version
1525 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1526 * 7-8 session_id_length
1527 * 9-10 challenge_length
1528 * ... ...
1529 */
1530
1531 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1532 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1533 /*
1534 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1535 * layer in order to have determined that this is an SSLv2 record
1536 * in the first place
1537 */
1538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 goto err;
1540 }
1541 }
1542
1543 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1545 goto err;
1546 }
1547
1548 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1549 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1550 /*
1551 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1552 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1553 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1554 */
1555 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1556 PACKET challenge;
1557
1558 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1559 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1560 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1562 goto err;
1563 }
1564
1565 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1567 goto err;
1568 }
1569
1570 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1571 ciphersuite_len)
1572 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1573 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1574 /* No extensions. */
1575 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1577 goto err;
1578 }
1579 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1580
1581 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1582 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1583 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1584 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1585 */
1586 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1587 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1588 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1589 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1590 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1591 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1592 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1593 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 goto err;
1596 }
1597
1598 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1599 } else {
1600 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1601 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1602 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1603 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1604 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1605 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1607 goto err;
1608 }
1609
1610 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1611 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1613 goto err;
1614 }
1615 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1616 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1617 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 goto err;
1620 }
1621 /*
1622 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1623 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1624 * So check cookie length...
1625 */
1626 if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1627 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1628 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1629 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1630 }
1631 }
1632 }
1633
1634 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1636 goto err;
1637 }
1638
1639 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1641 goto err;
1642 }
1643
1644 /* Could be empty. */
1645 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1646 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1647 } else {
1648 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1649 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1651 goto err;
1652 }
1653 }
1654 }
1655
1656 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1657 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1658 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1660 goto err;
1661 }
1662
1663 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1664 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1665 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1666 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1667 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1668 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1669 goto err;
1670 }
1671 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1672
1673 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1674
1675 err:
1676 if (clienthello != NULL)
1677 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1678 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1679
1680 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1681 }
1682
tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1683 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1684 {
1685 unsigned int j;
1686 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1687 int protverr;
1688 unsigned long id;
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1690 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1691 #endif
1692 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1693 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1694 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1695 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1696 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1697 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1698 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1699 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1700
1701 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1702 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1703 if (sctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1704 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1705 switch (sctx->client_hello_cb(ussl, &al, sctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1706 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1707 break;
1708 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1709 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1710 return -1;
1711 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1712 default:
1713 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1714 goto err;
1715 }
1716 }
1717
1718 /* Set up the client_random */
1719 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1720
1721 /* Choose the version */
1722
1723 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1724 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1725 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1726 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1727 /*
1728 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1729 * support it.
1730 */
1731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1732 goto err;
1733 }
1734 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1735 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1736 }
1737
1738 /* Choose the server SSL/TLS/DTLS version. */
1739 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1740
1741 if (protverr) {
1742 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1743 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1744 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1745 }
1746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1747 goto err;
1748 }
1749
1750 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1751 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1752 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1754 goto err;
1755 }
1756
1757 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1758 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1759 if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1760 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1761 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ussl, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1762 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1764 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1765 goto err;
1766 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1767 }
1768 /* default verification */
1769 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1770 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1771 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1773 goto err;
1774 }
1775 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1776 }
1777 }
1778
1779 s->hit = 0;
1780
1781 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1782 clienthello->isv2) ||
1783 !ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1784 &scsvs, clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1785 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1786 goto err;
1787 }
1788
1789 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1790 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1791 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1792 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1793 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1794 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1795 if (s->renegotiate) {
1796 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1798 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1802 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1803 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1804 /*
1805 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1806 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1807 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1808 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1809 * an insecure downgrade.
1810 */
1811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1812 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1813 goto err;
1814 }
1815 }
1816 }
1817
1818 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1819 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1820 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1821 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
1822
1823 if (cipher == NULL) {
1824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1825 goto err;
1826 }
1827 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1828 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1829 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1830 /*
1831 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1832 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1833 */
1834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1835 goto err;
1836 }
1837 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1838 }
1839
1840 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1841 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1842 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1843 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1845 goto err;
1846 }
1847
1848 /*
1849 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1850 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1851 *
1852 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1853 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1854 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1855 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1856 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1857 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1858 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1859 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1860 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1861 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1862 * ignored.
1863 */
1864 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1865 (s->new_session &&
1866 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1867 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1869 goto err;
1870 }
1871 } else {
1872 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1873 if (i == 1) {
1874 /* previous session */
1875 s->hit = 1;
1876 } else if (i == -1) {
1877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1878 goto err;
1879 } else {
1880 /* i == 0 */
1881 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1883 goto err;
1884 }
1885 }
1886 }
1887
1888 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1889 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1890 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1891 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1892 }
1893
1894 /*
1895 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1896 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1897 */
1898 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1899 j = 0;
1900 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1901
1902 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1903 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1904 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1905 }
1906 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1907 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1908 if (trc_out != NULL)
1909 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1910 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1911 if (c->id == id) {
1912 j = 1;
1913 break;
1914 }
1915 }
1916 if (j == 0) {
1917 /*
1918 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1919 * to reuse it
1920 */
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1922 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1923 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1924 goto err;
1925 }
1926 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1927 }
1928
1929 /* At least one compression method must be preset. */
1930 if (clienthello->compressions_len == 0) {
1931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1932 goto err;
1933 }
1934 /* Make sure at least the null compression is supported. */
1935 if (memchr(clienthello->compressions, 0,
1936 clienthello->compressions_len) == NULL) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1938 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1939 goto err;
1940 }
1941
1942 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1943 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1944
1945 /* TLS extensions */
1946 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1947 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1948 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1949 goto err;
1950 }
1951
1952 /*
1953 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1954 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1955 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1956 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1957 */
1958 {
1959 unsigned char *pos;
1960 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1961 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1963 goto err;
1964 }
1965 }
1966
1967 if (!s->hit && !tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1968 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1969 goto err;
1970 }
1971
1972 if (!s->hit
1973 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1974 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1975 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1976 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL) {
1977 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1978 /*
1979 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1980 * backwards compat reasons
1981 */
1982 int master_key_length;
1983
1984 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1985 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ussl, s->session->master_key,
1986 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1987 &pref_cipher,
1988 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1989 && master_key_length > 0) {
1990 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1991 s->hit = 1;
1992 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1993 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1994
1995 ciphers = NULL;
1996
1997 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1998 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1999 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
2000 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
2001 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
2002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2003 goto err;
2004 }
2005
2006 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
2007 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
2008 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
2009 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
2010 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
2011 }
2012 }
2013
2014 /*
2015 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
2016 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
2017 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
2018 */
2019 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
2020 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2021 /*
2022 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
2023 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
2024 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
2025 */
2026 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
2027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2028 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2029 goto err;
2030 }
2031 }
2032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2033 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
2034 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2035 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
2036 unsigned int k;
2037 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
2038 /* Can't disable compression */
2039 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2041 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2042 goto err;
2043 }
2044 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2045 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2046 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
2047 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2048 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2049 break;
2050 }
2051 }
2052 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2054 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2055 goto err;
2056 }
2057 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2058 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2059 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2060 break;
2061 }
2062 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2064 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2065 goto err;
2066 }
2067 } else if (s->hit) {
2068 comp = NULL;
2069 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods) {
2070 /* See if we have a match */
2071 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2072 unsigned int o;
2073
2074 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
2075 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2076 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
2077 v = comp->id;
2078 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2079 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2080 done = 1;
2081 break;
2082 }
2083 }
2084 if (done)
2085 break;
2086 }
2087 if (done)
2088 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2089 else
2090 comp = NULL;
2091 }
2092 #else
2093 /*
2094 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2095 * using compression.
2096 */
2097 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2099 goto err;
2100 }
2101 #endif
2102
2103 /*
2104 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2105 */
2106
2107 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2108 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2109 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2110 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2112 goto err;
2113 }
2114 ciphers = NULL;
2115 }
2116
2117 if (!s->hit) {
2118 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2119 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2120 #else
2121 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2122 #endif
2123 }
2124
2125 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2126 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2127 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2128 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2129 s->clienthello = NULL;
2130 return 1;
2131 err:
2132 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2133 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2134 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2135 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2136 s->clienthello = NULL;
2137
2138 return 0;
2139 }
2140
2141 /*
2142 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2143 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2144 */
tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2145 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2146 {
2147 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2148
2149 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2150
2151 /*
2152 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2153 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2154 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2155 * influence which certificate is sent
2156 */
2157 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx != NULL
2158 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2159 int ret;
2160
2161 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2162 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2163 /*
2164 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2165 * et al can pick it up.
2166 */
2167 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2168 ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
2169 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2170 switch (ret) {
2171 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2172 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2173 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2174 break;
2175 /* status request response should be sent */
2176 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2177 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2178 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2179 break;
2180 /* something bad happened */
2181 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2182 default:
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2184 return 0;
2185 }
2186 }
2187 }
2188
2189 return 1;
2190 }
2191
2192 /*
2193 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2194 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2195 */
tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2196 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2197 {
2198 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2199 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2200 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2201
2202 if (sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2203 int r = sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
2204 &selected, &selected_len,
2205 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2206 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2207 sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2208
2209 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2210 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2211 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2212 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2213 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
2214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2215 return 0;
2216 }
2217 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2219 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2220 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
2221 #endif
2222
2223 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2224 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2225 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2226 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2227 selected_len) != 0) {
2228 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2229 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2230
2231 if (!s->hit) {
2232 /*
2233 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2234 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2235 * selected ALPN.
2236 */
2237 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2240 return 0;
2241 }
2242 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2243 selected_len);
2244 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2247 return 0;
2248 }
2249 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2250 }
2251 }
2252
2253 return 1;
2254 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
2256 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2257 return 0;
2258 }
2259 /*
2260 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2261 * present.
2262 */
2263 }
2264
2265 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2266 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2267 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2268 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2269 }
2270
2271 return 1;
2272 }
2273
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)2274 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2275 {
2276 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2277 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2278 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
2279
2280 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2281 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2282 if (rv == 0) {
2283 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2284 goto err;
2285 }
2286 if (rv < 0)
2287 return WORK_MORE_A;
2288 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2289 }
2290 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2291 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2292 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2293 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2294 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(ussl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2295
2296 if (rv == 0) {
2297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2298 goto err;
2299 }
2300 if (rv < 0) {
2301 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2302 return WORK_MORE_B;
2303 }
2304 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2305 }
2306
2307 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2308 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2309 cipher =
2310 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
2311 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
2312
2313 if (cipher == NULL) {
2314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2315 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2316 goto err;
2317 }
2318 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2319 }
2320 if (!s->hit) {
2321 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2322 /* SSLfatal already called */
2323 goto err;
2324 }
2325 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2326 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2327 s->session->not_resumable =
2328 s->not_resumable_session_cb(ussl,
2329 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2330 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2331 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2332 /* do not send a session ticket */
2333 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2334 }
2335 } else {
2336 /* Session-id reuse */
2337 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2338 }
2339
2340 /*-
2341 * we now have the following setup.
2342 * client_random
2343 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2344 * ciphers - the client's preferred list of ciphers
2345 * compression - basically ignored right now
2346 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2347 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2348 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2349 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2350 */
2351
2352 /*
2353 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2354 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2355 */
2356 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2357 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2358 goto err;
2359 }
2360 /*
2361 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2362 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2363 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2364 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2365 */
2366 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2367 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2368 goto err;
2369 }
2370
2371 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2372 }
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2374 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2375 int ret;
2376 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2377 /*
2378 * callback indicates further work to be done
2379 */
2380 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2381 return WORK_MORE_C;
2382 }
2383 if (ret < 0) {
2384 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387 }
2388 #endif
2389
2390 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2391 err:
2392 return WORK_ERROR;
2393 }
2394
tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2395 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2396 {
2397 int compm;
2398 size_t sl, len;
2399 int version;
2400 unsigned char *session_id;
2401 int usetls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2402 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2403
2404 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2405 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2406 /*
2407 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2408 * tls_process_client_hello()
2409 */
2410 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2411 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2412 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2413 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2415 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2416 }
2417
2418 /*-
2419 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2420 * back in the server hello:
2421 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2422 * we send back the old session ID.
2423 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2424 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2425 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2426 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2427 * session ID.
2428 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2429 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2430 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2431 * regardless
2432 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2433 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2434 * to send back.
2435 */
2436 if (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2437 && !s->hit)
2438 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2439
2440 if (usetls13) {
2441 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2442 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2443 } else {
2444 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2445 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2446 }
2447
2448 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2450 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2451 }
2452
2453 /* set up the compression method */
2454 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2455 compm = 0;
2456 #else
2457 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2458 compm = 0;
2459 else
2460 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2461 #endif
2462
2463 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2464 || !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher,
2465 pkt, &len)
2466 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2468 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2469 }
2470
2471 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2472 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2473 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2474 : (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2475 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2476 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2477 NULL, 0)) {
2478 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2479 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2480 }
2481
2482 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2483 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2484 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2485 s->session = NULL;
2486 s->hit = 0;
2487
2488 /*
2489 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2490 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2491 */
2492 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2493 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2494 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2495 }
2496 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2497 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2498 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2499 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2500 }
2501
2502 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2503 }
2504
tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2505 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2506 {
2507 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2508 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2509 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2510 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2511 }
2512 }
2513 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2514 }
2515
tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2516 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2517 WPACKET *pkt)
2518 {
2519 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2520 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2521 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2522 int curve_id = 0;
2523 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2524 int i;
2525 unsigned long type;
2526 BIGNUM *r[4];
2527 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2528 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2529 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2530 int freer = 0;
2531 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2532 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2533
2534 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2536 goto err;
2537 }
2538
2539 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2541 goto err;
2542 }
2543
2544 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2545
2546 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2548 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2549 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2550 } else
2551 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2552 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2553 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2554 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2555
2556 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2557 pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2558 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2560 goto err;
2561 }
2562 pkdhp = pkdh;
2563 } else {
2564 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2565 }
2566 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
2567 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2568 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
2569 0, 1024));
2570 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2572 goto err;
2573 }
2574 pkdhp = pkdh;
2575 }
2576 #endif
2577 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2579 goto err;
2580 }
2581 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2582 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2584 goto err;
2585 }
2586 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2588 goto err;
2589 }
2590
2591 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2592 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2594 goto err;
2595 }
2596
2597 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2598 pkdh = NULL;
2599
2600 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2601 freer = 1;
2602 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
2603 &r[0])
2604 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
2605 &r[1])
2606 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2607 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
2608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2609 goto err;
2610 }
2611 } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2612
2613 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2615 goto err;
2616 }
2617
2618 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2619 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2620 if (curve_id == 0) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2622 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2623 goto err;
2624 }
2625 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
2626 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2627 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2628 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2629 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2630 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2631 goto err;
2632 }
2633
2634 /* Encode the public key. */
2635 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2636 &encodedPoint);
2637 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2639 goto err;
2640 }
2641
2642 /*
2643 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2644 * can set these to NULLs
2645 */
2646 r[0] = NULL;
2647 r[1] = NULL;
2648 r[2] = NULL;
2649 r[3] = NULL;
2650 } else
2651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2652 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2653 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2654 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2655 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2657 goto err;
2658 }
2659 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2660 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2661 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2662 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2663 } else
2664 #endif
2665 {
2666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2667 goto err;
2668 }
2669
2670 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2671 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2672 lu = NULL;
2673 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2675 goto err;
2676 }
2677
2678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2679 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2680 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2681 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2682
2683 /*
2684 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2685 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2686 */
2687 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2688 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2689 len)) {
2690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2691 goto err;
2692 }
2693 }
2694 #endif
2695
2696 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2697 unsigned char *binval;
2698 int res;
2699
2700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2701 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2702 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2703 } else
2704 #endif
2705 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2706
2707 if (!res) {
2708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2709 goto err;
2710 }
2711
2712 /*-
2713 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2714 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2715 * as the prime
2716 */
2717 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2718 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2719
2720 if (len > 0) {
2721 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2723 goto err;
2724 }
2725 memset(binval, 0, len);
2726 }
2727 }
2728
2729 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2730 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2732 goto err;
2733 }
2734
2735 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2736 }
2737
2738 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2739 /*
2740 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2741 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2742 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2743 * point itself
2744 */
2745 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2746 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2747 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2748 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 goto err;
2751 }
2752 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2753 encodedPoint = NULL;
2754 }
2755
2756 /* not anonymous */
2757 if (lu != NULL) {
2758 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2759 const EVP_MD *md;
2760 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2761 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2762
2763 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
2764 /* Should never happen */
2765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 goto err;
2767 }
2768 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2769 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 goto err;
2772 }
2773 /* send signature algorithm */
2774 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2776 goto err;
2777 }
2778
2779 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2780 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2781 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2782 NULL) <= 0) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2784 goto err;
2785 }
2786 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2787 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2788 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2790 goto err;
2791 }
2792 }
2793 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2794 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2795 paramlen);
2796 if (tbslen == 0) {
2797 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2798 goto err;
2799 }
2800
2801 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2802 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2803 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2804 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2805 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2806 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 goto err;
2809 }
2810 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2811 }
2812
2813 ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2814 err:
2815 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2816 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2817 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2818 if (freer) {
2819 BN_free(r[0]);
2820 BN_free(r[1]);
2821 BN_free(r[2]);
2822 BN_free(r[3]);
2823 }
2824 return ret;
2825 }
2826
tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)2827 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2828 WPACKET *pkt)
2829 {
2830 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2831 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2832 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2833 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2834 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2835 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
2836 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2838 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2839 }
2840 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
2841 s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
2842 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
2843 s->pha_context_len)) {
2844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2845 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2846 }
2847 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2848 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2850 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2851 }
2852 } else {
2853 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2856 }
2857 }
2858
2859 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2860 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2861 0)) {
2862 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2863 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2864 }
2865 goto done;
2866 }
2867
2868 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2869 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2870 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2872 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2873 }
2874
2875 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2876 const uint16_t *psigs;
2877 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2878
2879 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2880 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2881 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2882 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2884 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2885 }
2886 }
2887
2888 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2889 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2890 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2891 }
2892
2893 done:
2894 s->certreqs_sent++;
2895 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2896 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2897 }
2898
tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2899 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2900 {
2901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2902 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2903 size_t psklen;
2904 PACKET psk_identity;
2905
2906 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2907 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2908 return 0;
2909 }
2910 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2911 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2912 return 0;
2913 }
2914 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2916 return 0;
2917 }
2918
2919 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2921 return 0;
2922 }
2923
2924 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
2925 s->session->psk_identity,
2926 psk, sizeof(psk));
2927
2928 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2930 return 0;
2931 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2932 /*
2933 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2934 */
2935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2936 return 0;
2937 }
2938
2939 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2940 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2941 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2942
2943 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2944 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
2945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2946 return 0;
2947 }
2948
2949 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2950
2951 return 1;
2952 #else
2953 /* Should never happen */
2954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2955 return 0;
2956 #endif
2957 }
2958
tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2959 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2960 {
2961 size_t outlen;
2962 PACKET enc_premaster;
2963 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2964 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2965 int ret = 0;
2966 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2967 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2968 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2969
2970 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2971 if (rsa == NULL) {
2972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2973 return 0;
2974 }
2975
2976 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2977 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2978 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2979 } else {
2980 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2981 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2983 return 0;
2984 }
2985 }
2986
2987 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2988 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
2989 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2991 return 0;
2992 }
2993
2994 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, rsa, sctx->propq);
2995 if (ctx == NULL) {
2996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2997 goto err;
2998 }
2999
3000 /*
3001 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3002 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3003 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3004 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
3005 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3006 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3007 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3008 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3009 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3010 */
3011 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3012 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3014 goto err;
3015 }
3016
3017 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3018 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3019 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3020 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3021 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3022 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3023 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3024
3025 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3026 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3027 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3028 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3030 goto err;
3031 }
3032
3033 /*
3034 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3035 * we double check anyway.
3036 */
3037 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3038 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3040 goto err;
3041 }
3042
3043 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3044 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, outlen, 0)) {
3045 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3046 goto err;
3047 }
3048
3049 ret = 1;
3050 err:
3051 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3052 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3053 return ret;
3054 }
3055
tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3056 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3057 {
3058 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3059 unsigned int i;
3060 const unsigned char *data;
3061 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3062 int ret = 0;
3063
3064 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3066 goto err;
3067 }
3068 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3069 if (skey == NULL) {
3070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3071 goto err;
3072 }
3073
3074 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3076 goto err;
3077 }
3078 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3079 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3081 goto err;
3082 }
3083 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3084 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3086 goto err;
3087 }
3088
3089 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3091 goto err;
3092 }
3093
3094 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3096 goto err;
3097 }
3098
3099 ret = 1;
3100 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3101 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3102 err:
3103 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3104 return ret;
3105 }
3106
tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3107 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3108 {
3109 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3110 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3111 int ret = 0;
3112
3113 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3114 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3116 goto err;
3117 } else {
3118 unsigned int i;
3119 const unsigned char *data;
3120
3121 /*
3122 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3123 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3124 */
3125
3126 /* Get encoded point length */
3127 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3128 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3130 goto err;
3131 }
3132 if (skey == NULL) {
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3134 goto err;
3135 }
3136
3137 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3138 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3140 goto err;
3141 }
3142
3143 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3145 goto err;
3146 }
3147 }
3148
3149 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3150 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3151 goto err;
3152 }
3153
3154 ret = 1;
3155 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3156 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3157 err:
3158 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3159
3160 return ret;
3161 }
3162
tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3163 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3164 {
3165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3166 unsigned int i;
3167 const unsigned char *data;
3168
3169 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3170 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3172 return 0;
3173 }
3174 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3176 return 0;
3177 }
3178 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3180 return 0;
3181 }
3182 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3183 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3184 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3186 return 0;
3187 }
3188
3189 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3190 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3191 return 0;
3192 }
3193
3194 return 1;
3195 #else
3196 /* Should never happen */
3197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3198 return 0;
3199 #endif
3200 }
3201
tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3202 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3203 {
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3205 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3206 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3207 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3208 const unsigned char *start;
3209 size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen;
3210 unsigned long alg_a;
3211 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3212 const unsigned char *ptr;
3213 int ret = 0;
3214 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3215
3216 /* Get our certificate private key */
3217 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3218 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3219 /*
3220 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3221 */
3222 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3223 if (pk == NULL) {
3224 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3225 }
3226 if (pk == NULL) {
3227 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3228 }
3229 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3230 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3231 }
3232
3233 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3234 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3236 return 0;
3237 }
3238 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3240 goto err;
3241 }
3242 /*
3243 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3244 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3245 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3246 * client certificate for authorization only.
3247 */
3248 client_pub_pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
3249 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3250 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3251 ERR_clear_error();
3252 }
3253
3254 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3255 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3256 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3257 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3258 if (pKX == NULL
3259 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3260 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3262 goto err;
3263 }
3264
3265 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3267 goto err;
3268 }
3269
3270 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3272 goto err;
3273 }
3274
3275 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3276 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3277
3278 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3279 inlen) <= 0) {
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3281 goto err;
3282 }
3283 /* Generate master secret */
3284 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
3285 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3286 goto err;
3287 }
3288 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3289 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3290 NULL) > 0)
3291 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3292
3293 ret = 1;
3294 err:
3295 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3296 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3297 return ret;
3298 #else
3299 /* Should never happen */
3300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3301 return 0;
3302 #endif
3303 }
3304
tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3305 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3306 {
3307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3308 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3309 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3310 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3311 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3312 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3313 size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen = 0;
3314 int ret = 0;
3315 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3316 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3317
3318 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3320 return 0;
3321 }
3322
3323 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3325 goto err;
3326 }
3327
3328 /* Get our certificate private key */
3329 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3330 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3331 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3332 if (pk == NULL) {
3333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3334 goto err;
3335 }
3336
3337 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3338 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3340 goto err;
3341 }
3342 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3344 goto err;
3345 }
3346
3347 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3348 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3349 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3351 goto err;
3352 }
3353
3354 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3355 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3357 goto err;
3358 }
3359 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3360 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3361
3362 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3364 goto err;
3365 }
3366 /* Generate master secret */
3367 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
3368 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3369 goto err;
3370 }
3371 ret = 1;
3372
3373 err:
3374 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3375 return ret;
3376 #else
3377 /* Should never happen */
3378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3379 return 0;
3380 #endif
3381 }
3382
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3383 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3384 PACKET *pkt)
3385 {
3386 unsigned long alg_k;
3387
3388 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3389
3390 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3391 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3393 goto err;
3394 }
3395
3396 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3397 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3398 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3400 goto err;
3401 }
3402 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3403 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3404 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3405 goto err;
3406 }
3407 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3408 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3409 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3410 goto err;
3411 }
3412 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3413 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3414 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3415 goto err;
3416 }
3417 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3418 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3419 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3420 goto err;
3421 }
3422 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3423 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3424 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3425 goto err;
3426 }
3427 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3428 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3429 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3430 goto err;
3431 }
3432 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3433 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3434 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3435 goto err;
3436 }
3437 } else {
3438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3439 goto err;
3440 }
3441
3442 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3443 err:
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3445 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3446 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3447 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3448 #endif
3449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3450 }
3451
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)3452 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3453 WORK_STATE wst)
3454 {
3455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3456 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3457 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3458 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3459 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3460 size_t labellen;
3461 /*
3462 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3463 * used.
3464 */
3465 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3466 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3467
3468 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3469 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3470 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3471 labellen += 1;
3472
3473 if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3474 sctpauthkey,
3475 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3476 labellen, NULL, 0,
3477 0) <= 0) {
3478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3479 return WORK_ERROR;
3480 }
3481
3482 BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3483 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3484 }
3485 }
3486 #endif
3487
3488 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !received_client_cert(s)) {
3489 /*
3490 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3491 * the handshake_buffer
3492 */
3493 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3494 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3495 return WORK_ERROR;
3496 }
3497 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3498 } else {
3499 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3501 return WORK_ERROR;
3502 }
3503 /*
3504 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3505 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3506 */
3507 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3508 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3509 return WORK_ERROR;
3510 }
3511 }
3512
3513 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3514 }
3515
tls_process_client_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,PACKET * pkt)3516 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
3517 {
3518 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3519 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3520 EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk = NULL;
3521
3522 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
3523 /* SSLfatal already called */
3524 goto err;
3525 }
3526
3527 if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
3528 if ((sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
3529 && (sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
3530 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3531 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3532 goto err;
3533 }
3534 } else {
3535 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, peer_rpk) <= 0) {
3536 SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
3537 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3538 goto err;
3539 }
3540 }
3541
3542 /*
3543 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3544 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3545 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3546 * a new RPK (or certificate) is received via post-handshake authentication,
3547 * as the session may have already gone into the session cache.
3548 */
3549
3550 if (sc->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3551 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(sc->session, 0)) == NULL) {
3552 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3553 goto err;
3554 }
3555
3556 SSL_SESSION_free(sc->session);
3557 sc->session = new_sess;
3558 }
3559
3560 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
3561 X509_free(sc->session->peer);
3562 sc->session->peer = NULL;
3563 sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3564 sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
3565 /* Save RPK */
3566 EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
3567 sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
3568 peer_rpk = NULL;
3569
3570 sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
3571
3572 /*
3573 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3574 * message
3575 */
3576 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
3577 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(sc, 1)) {
3578 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3579 goto err;
3580 }
3581
3582 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3583 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
3584 sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
3585 &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3586 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
3587 goto err;
3588 }
3589
3590 /* resend session tickets */
3591 sc->sent_tickets = 0;
3592 }
3593
3594 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3595
3596 err:
3597 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_rpk);
3598 return ret;
3599 }
3600
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3601 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3602 PACKET *pkt)
3603 {
3604 int i;
3605 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3606 X509 *x = NULL;
3607 unsigned long l;
3608 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3609 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3610 PACKET spkt, context;
3611 size_t chainidx;
3612 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3613 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3614
3615 /*
3616 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3617 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
3618 */
3619 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
3620 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
3621
3622 if (s->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
3623 return tls_process_client_rpk(s, pkt);
3624
3625 if (s->ext.client_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
3626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
3627 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3628 goto err;
3629 }
3630
3631 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3633 goto err;
3634 }
3635
3636 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3637 && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3638 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3639 || (s->pha_context != NULL
3640 && !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context,
3641 s->pha_context_len)))) {
3642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3643 goto err;
3644 }
3645
3646 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3647 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3649 goto err;
3650 }
3651
3652 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3653 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3654 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3656 goto err;
3657 }
3658
3659 certstart = certbytes;
3660 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
3661 if (x == NULL) {
3662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
3663 goto err;
3664 }
3665 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
3666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3667 goto err;
3668 }
3669
3670 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3672 goto err;
3673 }
3674
3675 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3676 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3677 PACKET extensions;
3678
3679 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3681 goto err;
3682 }
3683 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3684 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3685 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3686 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3687 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3688 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3689 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3690 goto err;
3691 }
3692 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3693 }
3694
3695 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3697 goto err;
3698 }
3699 x = NULL;
3700 }
3701
3702 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3703 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3704 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3706 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3707 goto err;
3708 }
3709 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3710 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3711 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3713 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3714 goto err;
3715 }
3716 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3717 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3719 goto err;
3720 }
3721 } else {
3722 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3723 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3724 if (i <= 0) {
3725 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3726 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3727 goto err;
3728 }
3729 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3730 if (pkey == NULL) {
3731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3732 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3733 goto err;
3734 }
3735 }
3736
3737 /*
3738 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3739 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3740 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3741 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3742 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3743 */
3744
3745 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3746 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3748 goto err;
3749 }
3750
3751 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3752 s->session = new_sess;
3753 }
3754
3755 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3756 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3757 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3758
3759 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
3760 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3761 sk = NULL;
3762 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
3763 EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
3764 s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
3765
3766 /*
3767 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3768 * message
3769 */
3770 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3772 goto err;
3773 }
3774
3775 /*
3776 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3777 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3778 */
3779
3780 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3781 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3782 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3783 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3784 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3785 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3786 goto err;
3787 }
3788
3789 /* Resend session tickets */
3790 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3791 }
3792
3793 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3794
3795 err:
3796 X509_free(x);
3797 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
3798 return ret;
3799 }
3800
3801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,PACKET * pkt)3802 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
3803 {
3804 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3805 PACKET tmppkt;
3806 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
3807
3808 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
3809 ret = tls_process_client_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
3810
3811 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
3812 return ret;
3813 }
3814 #endif
3815
tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3816 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3817 {
3818 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3819
3820 if (cpk == NULL) {
3821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3822 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3823 }
3824
3825 /*
3826 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3827 * for the server Certificate message
3828 */
3829 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3831 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3832 }
3833 switch (s->ext.server_cert_type) {
3834 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
3835 if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3837 return 0;
3838 }
3839 break;
3840 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
3841 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
3842 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3843 return 0;
3844 }
3845 break;
3846 default:
3847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3848 return 0;
3849 }
3850
3851 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3852 }
3853
3854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,WPACKET * pkt)3855 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt)
3856 {
3857 int alg = get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc);
3858 OSSL_COMP_CERT *cc = sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[alg];
3859
3860 if (!ossl_assert(cc != NULL)) {
3861 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3862 return 0;
3863 }
3864 /*
3865 * Server can't compress on-demand
3866 * Use pre-compressed certificate
3867 */
3868 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3869 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, cc->orig_len)
3870 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3871 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cc->data, cc->len)
3872 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3873 return 0;
3874
3875 sc->s3.tmp.cert->cert_comp_used++;
3876 return 1;
3877 }
3878 #endif
3879
create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3880 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3881 uint32_t age_add, unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3882 {
3883 uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(s->session->timeout);
3884
3885 /*
3886 * Ticket lifetime hint:
3887 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3888 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
3889 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
3890 * resumed session (for simplicity).
3891 */
3892 #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
3893
3894 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3895 if (ossl_time_compare(s->session->timeout,
3896 ossl_seconds2time(ONE_WEEK_SEC)) > 0)
3897 timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
3898 } else if (s->hit)
3899 timeout = 0;
3900
3901 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
3902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3903 return 0;
3904 }
3905
3906 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3907 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3908 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3910 return 0;
3911 }
3912 }
3913
3914 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3915 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3917 return 0;
3918 }
3919
3920 return 1;
3921 }
3922
construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3923 static CON_FUNC_RETURN construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3924 WPACKET *pkt,
3925 uint32_t age_add,
3926 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3927 {
3928 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3929 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3930 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3931 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3932 const unsigned char *const_p;
3933 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3934 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3935 size_t hlen;
3936 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3937 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3938 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3939 int iv_len;
3940 CON_FUNC_RETURN ok = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3941 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3942 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
3943 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3944
3945 /* get session encoding length */
3946 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3947 /*
3948 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3949 * long
3950 */
3951 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3953 goto err;
3954 }
3955 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3956 if (senc == NULL) {
3957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3958 goto err;
3959 }
3960
3961 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3962 if (ctx == NULL) {
3963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3964 goto err;
3965 }
3966 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3967 if (hctx == NULL) {
3968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3969 goto err;
3970 }
3971
3972 p = senc;
3973 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3975 goto err;
3976 }
3977
3978 /*
3979 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3980 */
3981 const_p = senc;
3982 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &const_p, slen_full, sctx->libctx,
3983 sctx->propq);
3984 if (sess == NULL) {
3985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3986 goto err;
3987 }
3988
3989 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3990 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3991 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3993 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3994 goto err;
3995 }
3996 p = senc;
3997 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3999 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4000 goto err;
4001 }
4002 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4003
4004 /*
4005 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
4006 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
4007 */
4008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4009 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4010 #else
4011 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4012 #endif
4013 {
4014 int ret = 0;
4015
4016 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4017 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
4018 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
4019 1);
4020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4021 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4022 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
4023 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
4024 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
4025 #endif
4026
4027 if (ret == 0) {
4028 /*
4029 * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
4030 * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
4031 * ticket
4032 */
4033 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4034 ok = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
4035 goto err;
4036 }
4037 /* Put timeout and length */
4038 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
4039 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
4040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4041 goto err;
4042 }
4043 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4044 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4045 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4046 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4047 }
4048 if (ret < 0) {
4049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
4050 goto err;
4051 }
4052 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
4053 if (iv_len < 0) {
4054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4055 goto err;
4056 }
4057 } else {
4058 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
4059 sctx->propq);
4060
4061 if (cipher == NULL) {
4062 /* Error is already recorded */
4063 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4064 goto err;
4065 }
4066
4067 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
4068 if (iv_len < 0
4069 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
4070 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
4071 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
4072 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
4073 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
4074 "SHA256")) {
4075 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4077 goto err;
4078 }
4079 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4080 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
4081 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
4082 }
4083
4084 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4085 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4086 goto err;
4087 }
4088
4089 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
4090 /* Output key name */
4091 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
4092 /* output IV */
4093 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
4094 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
4095 &encdata1)
4096 /* Encrypt session data */
4097 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
4098 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
4099 || encdata1 != encdata2
4100 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
4101 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
4102 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
4103 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
4104 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
4105 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
4106 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
4107 macendoffset - macoffset)
4108 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
4109 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
4110 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
4111 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
4112 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
4113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4114 goto err;
4115 }
4116
4117 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4118 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4120 goto err;
4121 }
4122
4123 ok = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4124 err:
4125 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4126 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4127 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4128 return ok;
4129 }
4130
construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)4131 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
4132 uint32_t age_add,
4133 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4134 {
4135 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4136 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4137 return 0;
4138 }
4139
4140 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4141 s->session->session_id_length)
4142 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4144 return 0;
4145 }
4146
4147 return 1;
4148 }
4149
tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION * s)4150 static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
4151 {
4152 /*
4153 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4154 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4155 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4156 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4157 */
4158 s->sent_tickets++;
4159 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4160 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
4161 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
4162 }
4163
tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4164 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4165 {
4166 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4167 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4168 union {
4169 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4170 uint32_t age_add;
4171 } age_add_u;
4172 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4173
4174 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4175
4176 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4177 size_t i, hashlen;
4178 uint64_t nonce;
4179 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4180 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4181 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
4182
4183 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4184 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni > 0)) {
4185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4186 goto err;
4187 }
4188 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4189
4190 /*
4191 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4192 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4193 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4194 */
4195 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4196 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4197
4198 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4199 /* SSLfatal already called */
4200 goto err;
4201 }
4202
4203 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4204 s->session = new_sess;
4205 }
4206
4207 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4208 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4209 goto err;
4210 }
4211 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
4212 age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
4213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4214 goto err;
4215 }
4216 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4217
4218 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4219 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4220 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4221 nonce >>= 8;
4222 }
4223
4224 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4225 nonce_label,
4226 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4227 tick_nonce,
4228 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4229 s->session->master_key,
4230 hashlen, 1)) {
4231 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4232 goto err;
4233 }
4234 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4235
4236 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
4237 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
4238 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4239 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4240 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4241 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4242 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4243 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
4244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
4245 goto err;
4246 }
4247 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4248 }
4249 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4250 }
4251
4252 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4253 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
4254 tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
4255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4256 goto err;
4257 }
4258 /*
4259 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4260 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4261 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4262 */
4263 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
4264 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4265 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4266 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4267 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4268 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4269 goto err;
4270 }
4271 } else {
4272 CON_FUNC_RETURN tmpret;
4273
4274 tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4275 tick_nonce);
4276 if (tmpret != CON_FUNC_SUCCESS) {
4277 if (tmpret == CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND) {
4278 /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
4279 ret = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
4280 /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
4281 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4282 }
4283 /* else SSLfatal() already called */
4284 goto err;
4285 }
4286 }
4287
4288 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4289 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4290 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4291 NULL, 0)) {
4292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4293 goto err;
4294 }
4295 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4296 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4297 }
4298
4299 ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4300 err:
4301 return ret;
4302 }
4303
4304 /*
4305 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4306 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4307 */
tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4308 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4309 {
4310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4311 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4312 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4314 return 0;
4315 }
4316
4317 return 1;
4318 }
4319
tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4320 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4321 {
4322 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4323 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4324 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4325 }
4326
4327 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4328 }
4329
4330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4331 /*
4332 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4333 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4334 */
tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)4335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4336 {
4337 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4338 size_t next_proto_len;
4339
4340 /*-
4341 * The payload looks like:
4342 * uint8 proto_len;
4343 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4344 * uint8 padding_len;
4345 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4346 */
4347 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4348 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4349 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4351 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4352 }
4353
4354 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4355 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4357 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4358 }
4359
4360 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4361
4362 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4363 }
4364 #endif
4365
tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4366 static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
4367 WPACKET *pkt)
4368 {
4369 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4370 NULL, 0)) {
4371 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4372 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4373 }
4374
4375 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4376 }
4377
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)4378 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4379 {
4380 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4382 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4383 }
4384
4385 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4386 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4388 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4389 }
4390
4391 /*
4392 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4393 * a record boundary.
4394 */
4395 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4397 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4398 }
4399
4400 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4401 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4402 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4403 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4404 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4405 }
4406
4407 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4408 }
4409
