1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 *
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
9 */
10
11 #include <limits.h>
12 #include <string.h>
13 #include <stdio.h>
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
23 #include <openssl/encoder.h>
24
25 /*
26 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
27 */
28 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
29 int x509err;
30 int alert;
31 } X509ERR2ALERT;
32
33 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
34 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
35 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
36 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
37 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 };
39
ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL * s,ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb,ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb,void * mutatearg)40 int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL *s,
41 ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb,
42 ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb,
43 void *mutatearg)
44 {
45 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
46
47 if (sc == NULL)
48 return 0;
49
50 sc->statem.mutate_handshake_cb = mutate_handshake_cb;
51 sc->statem.mutatearg = mutatearg;
52 sc->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb = finish_mutate_handshake_cb;
53
54 return 1;
55 }
56
57 /*
58 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
59 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
60 */
ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint8_t type)61 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type)
62 {
63 int ret;
64 size_t written = 0;
65 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
66 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
67
68 /*
69 * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message
70 * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation.
71 */
72 if (s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb != NULL
73 && !s->statem.write_in_progress
74 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
75 && s->init_num >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
76 unsigned char *msg;
77 size_t msglen;
78
79 if (!s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
80 s->init_num,
81 &msg, &msglen,
82 s->statem.mutatearg))
83 return -1;
84 if (msglen < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
85 || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, msglen))
86 return -1;
87 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, msg, msglen);
88 s->init_num = msglen;
89 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
90 s->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s->statem.mutatearg);
91 s->statem.write_in_progress = 1;
92 }
93
94 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
95 s->init_num, &written);
96 if (ret <= 0)
97 return -1;
98 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
99 /*
100 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
101 * ignore the result anyway
102 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
103 */
104 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
105 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
106 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
107 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
108 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
109 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
110 written))
111 return -1;
112 if (written == s->init_num) {
113 s->statem.write_in_progress = 0;
114 if (s->msg_callback)
115 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
116 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ussl,
117 s->msg_callback_arg);
118 return 1;
119 }
120 s->init_off += written;
121 s->init_num -= written;
122 return 0;
123 }
124
tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,int htype)125 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
126 {
127 size_t msglen;
128
129 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
130 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
131 || msglen > INT_MAX)
132 return 0;
133 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
134 s->init_off = 0;
135
136 return 1;
137 }
138
tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION * s)139 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
140 {
141 int ver_min, ver_max, ok;
142 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
143 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
144
145 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
146 /* SSLfatal() already called */
147 return 0;
148 }
149
150 /* Reset any extension flags */
151 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
152
153 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
155 return 0;
156 }
157
158 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
159 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) {
160 int negotiated_minversion;
161 int md5sha1_needed_maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
162 ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_1_VERSION;
163
164 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
165 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, md5sha1_needed_maxversion) <= 0) {
166 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
167 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,
168 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
169 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
170 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
171 " above, or load different providers");
172 return 0;
173 }
174
175 ok = 1;
176
177 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
178 negotiated_minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ?
179 DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION;
180 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_min, negotiated_minversion) < 0)
181 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, negotiated_minversion);
182 if (!ok) {
183 /* Shouldn't happen */
184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
185 return 0;
186 }
187 }
188
189 ok = 0;
190 if (s->server) {
191 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
192 int i;
193
194 /*
195 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
196 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
197 * ClientHello.
198 */
199 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
200 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
201 int cipher_minprotover = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
202 ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls;
203 int cipher_maxprotover = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
204 ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls;
205
206 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, cipher_minprotover) >= 0
207 && ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, cipher_maxprotover) <= 0) {
208 ok = 1;
209 break;
210 }
211 }
212 if (!ok) {
213 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
214 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
215 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
216 "SSL/TLS version");
217 return 0;
218 }
219 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
220 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
221 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
222 } else {
223 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
224 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
225
226 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
227 }
228 } else {
229 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
230 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
231 else
232 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
233 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
234
235 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
236 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
237 s->hit = 0;
238
239 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
240
241 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
242 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
243 }
244
245 return 1;
246 }
247
248 /*
249 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
250 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
251 */
252 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
253 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
254
get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION * s,unsigned char * tls13tbs,void ** hdata,size_t * hdatalen)255 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
256 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
257 {
258 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
259 static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72"
260 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
261 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
262 static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69"
263 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
264
265 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
266 size_t hashlen;
267
268 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
269 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
270 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
271 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
272 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
273 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
274 else
275 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
276
277 /*
278 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
279 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
280 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
281 */
282 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
283 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
284 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
285 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
286 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
287 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
288 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
290 return 0;
291 }
292
293 *hdata = tls13tbs;
294 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
295 } else {
296 size_t retlen;
297 long retlen_l;
298
299 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
300 if (retlen_l <= 0) {
301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
302 return 0;
303 }
304 *hdatalen = retlen;
305 }
306
307 return 1;
308 }
309
tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)310 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
311 {
312 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
313 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
314 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
315 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
316 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
317 void *hdata;
318 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
319 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
320 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
321 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
322
323 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
325 goto err;
326 }
327 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
328
329 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
331 goto err;
332 }
333
334 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
335 if (mctx == NULL) {
336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
337 goto err;
338 }
339
340 /* Get the data to be signed */
341 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
342 /* SSLfatal() already called */
343 goto err;
344 }
345
346 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
348 goto err;
349 }
350
351 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
352 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
353 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
354 NULL) <= 0) {
355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
356 goto err;
357 }
358
359 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
360 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
361 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
362 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
364 goto err;
365 }
366 }
367 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
368 /*
369 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
370 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
371 */
372 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
373 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
374 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
375 s->session->master_key) <= 0
376 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
377
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
379 goto err;
380 }
381 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
382 if (sig == NULL
383 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
385 goto err;
386 }
387 } else {
388 /*
389 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
390 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
391 */
392 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
394 goto err;
395 }
396 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
397 if (sig == NULL
398 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
400 goto err;
401 }
402 }
403
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
405 {
406 int pktype = lu->sig;
407
408 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
409 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
410 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
411 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
412 }
413 #endif
414
415 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
417 goto err;
418 }
419
420 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
421 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
422 /* SSLfatal() already called */
423 goto err;
424 }
425
426 OPENSSL_free(sig);
427 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
428 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
429 err:
430 OPENSSL_free(sig);
431 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
432 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
433 }
434
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)435 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
436 {
437 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
438 const unsigned char *data;
439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
440 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
441 #endif
442 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
443 int j;
444 unsigned int len;
445 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
446 size_t hdatalen = 0;
447 void *hdata;
448 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
449 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
450 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
451 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
452
453 if (mctx == NULL) {
454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
455 goto err;
456 }
457
458 pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
459 if (pkey == NULL) {
460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
461 goto err;
462 }
463
464 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL, sctx) == NULL) {
465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
466 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
467 goto err;
468 }
469
470 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
471 unsigned int sigalg;
472
473 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
475 goto err;
476 }
477 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
478 /* SSLfatal() already called */
479 goto err;
480 }
481 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
483 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
484 goto err;
485 }
486
487 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
489 goto err;
490 }
491
492 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
493 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
494 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
495
496 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
497 /*
498 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
499 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
500 */
501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
502 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
503 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
504 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
505 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
506 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
507 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
508 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
509 } else
510 #endif
511 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
513 goto err;
514 }
515
516 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
518 goto err;
519 }
520 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
522 goto err;
523 }
524
525 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
526 /* SSLfatal() already called */
527 goto err;
528 }
529
530 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
531 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
532
533 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
534 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
535 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
536 NULL) <= 0) {
537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
538 goto err;
539 }
540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
541 {
542 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
543 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
544 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
545 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
546 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
547 goto err;
548 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
549 data = gost_data;
550 }
551 }
552 #endif
553
554 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
555 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
556 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
557 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
559 goto err;
560 }
561 }
562 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
563 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
564 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
565 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
566 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
568 goto err;
569 }
570 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
572 goto err;
573 }
574 } else {
575 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
576 #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
577 /* Ignore bad signatures when fuzzing */
578 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s))
579 j = 1;
580 #endif
581 if (j <= 0) {
582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
583 goto err;
584 }
585 }
586
587 /*
588 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
589 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
590 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
591 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
592 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
593 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
594 */
595 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
596 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
597 else
598 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
599 err:
600 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
601 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
602 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
604 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
605 #endif
606 return ret;
607 }
608
tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)609 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
610 {
611 size_t finish_md_len;
612 const char *sender;
613 size_t slen;
614 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
615
616 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
617 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
618 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
619
620 /*
621 * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
622 * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
623 * moment. If we didn't already do this when we sent the client certificate
624 * then we need to do it now.
625 */
626 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
627 && !s->server
628 && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
629 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
630 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
631 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
632 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
633 /* SSLfatal() already called */
634 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
635 }
636
637 if (s->server) {
638 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
639 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
640 } else {
641 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
642 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
643 }
644
645 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
646 sender, slen,
647 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
648 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
650 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
651 }
652
653 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
654
655 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
657 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
658 }
659
660 /*
661 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
662 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
663 */
664 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
665 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key,
666 s->session->master_key_length)) {
667 /* SSLfatal() already called */
668 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
669 }
670
671 /*
672 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
673 */
674 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
676 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
677 }
678 if (!s->server) {
679 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
680 finish_md_len);
681 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
682 } else {
683 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
684 finish_md_len);
685 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
686 }
687
688 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
689 }
690
tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)691 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
692 {
693 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
695 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
696 }
697
698 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
699 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
700 }
701
tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)702 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
703 {
704 unsigned int updatetype;
705
706 /*
707 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
708 * be on a record boundary.
709 */
710 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
712 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
713 }
714
715 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
716 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
719 }
720
721 /*
722 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
723 * didn't recognise.
724 */
725 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
726 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
728 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
729 }
730
731 /*
732 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
733 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
734 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
735 */
736 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
737 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
738
739 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
741 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
742 }
743
744 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
745 }
746
747 /*
748 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
749 * to far.
750 */
ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION * s)751 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
752 {
753 const char *sender;
754 size_t slen;
755 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
756
757 if (!s->server) {
758 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
759 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
760 } else {
761 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
762 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
763 }
764
765 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
766 ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
767 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
768
769 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
770 /* SSLfatal() already called */
771 return 0;
772 }
773
774 return 1;
775 }
776
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)777 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
778 PACKET *pkt)
779 {
780 size_t remain;
781
782 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
783 /*
784 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
785 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
786 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
787 */
788 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
789 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
790 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
791 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
792 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
794 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
795 }
796 } else {
797 if (remain != 0) {
798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
799 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
800 }
801 }
802
803 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
804 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
807 }
808
809 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
810 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
813 }
814
815 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
816 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
817 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
818
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
820 /*
821 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
822 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
823 * SCTP is used
824 */
825 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
826 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
827 #endif
828 }
829
830 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
831 }
832
tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)833 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
834 {
835 size_t md_len;
836 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
837 int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s);
838 int ok;
839
840
841 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
842 if (s->server) {
843 /*
844 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
845 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
846 * TLSv1.3
847 */
848 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
849 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
850 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
851 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
852 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
853 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
856 }
857 }
858
859 /*
860 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
861 * message must be on a record boundary.
862 */
863 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
864 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
867 }
868
869 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
870 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
872 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
873 }
874 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
875
876 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
877
878 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
881 }
882
883 ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
884 md_len);
885 #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
886 if (ok != 0) {
887 if ((PACKET_data(pkt)[0] ^ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md[0]) != 0xFF) {
888 ok = 0;
889 }
890 }
891 #endif
892 if (ok != 0) {
893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
894 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
895 }
896
897 /*
898 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
899 */
900 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
902 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
903 }
904 if (s->server) {
905 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
906 md_len);
907 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
908 } else {
909 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
910 md_len);
911 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
912 }
913
914 /*
915 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
916 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
917 */
918 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
919 if (s->server) {
920 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
921 !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
922 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
923 /* SSLfatal() already called */
924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
925 }
926 } else {
927 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
928 size_t dummy;
929 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
930 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
931 &dummy)) {
932 /* SSLfatal() already called */
933 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
934 }
935 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
936 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
937 /* SSLfatal() already called */
938 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
939 }
940 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
941 /* SSLfatal() already called */
942 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
943 }
944 }
945 }
946
947 if (was_first
948 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
949 && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
950 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
951
952 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
953 }
954
tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)955 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
956 {
957 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
959 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
960 }
961
962 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
963 }
964
965 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,X509 * x,int chain,int for_comp)966 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
967 X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp)
968 {
969 int len;
970 unsigned char *outbytes;
971 int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE;
972
973 if (for_comp)
974 context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION;
975
976 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
977 if (len < 0) {
978 if (!for_comp)
979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
980 return 0;
981 }
982 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
983 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
984 if (!for_comp)
985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
986 return 0;
987 }
988
989 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp)
990 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) {
991 /* SSLfatal() already called */
992 return 0;
993 }
994
995 return 1;
996 }
997
998 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,CERT_PKEY * cpk,int for_comp)999 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
1000 {
1001 int i, chain_count;
1002 X509 *x;
1003 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
1004 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
1005 X509_STORE *chain_store;
1006 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1007
1008 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
1009 return 1;
1010
1011 x = cpk->x509;
1012
1013 /*
1014 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
1015 */
1016 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
1017 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
1018 else
1019 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs;
1020
1021 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
1022 chain_store = NULL;
1023 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
1024 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
1025 else
1026 chain_store = sctx->cert_store;
1027
1028 if (chain_store != NULL) {
1029 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx,
1030 sctx->propq);
1031
1032 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
1033 if (!for_comp)
1034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1035 return 0;
1036 }
1037 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
1038 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1039 if (!for_comp)
1040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1041 return 0;
1042 }
1043 /*
1044 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
1045 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
1046 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
1047 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
1048 */
1049 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
1050 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1051 ERR_clear_error();
1052 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
1053 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
1054 if (i != 1) {
1055 #if 0
1056 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
1057 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1058 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1059 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
1060 #endif
1061 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1062 if (!for_comp)
1063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1064 return 0;
1065 }
1066 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
1067 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
1068 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1069
1070 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) {
1071 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1072 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1073 return 0;
1074 }
1075 }
1076 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1077 } else {
1078 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
1079 if (i != 1) {
1080 if (!for_comp)
1081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1082 return 0;
1083 }
1084 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) {
1085 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1086 return 0;
1087 }
1088 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
1089 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
1090 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) {
1091 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1092 return 0;
1093 }
1094 }
1095 }
1096 return 1;
1097 }
1098
tls_get_peer_pkey(const SSL_CONNECTION * sc)1099 EVP_PKEY* tls_get_peer_pkey(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
1100 {
1101 if (sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
1102 return sc->session->peer_rpk;
1103 if (sc->session->peer != NULL)
1104 return X509_get0_pubkey(sc->session->peer);
1105 return NULL;
1106 }
1107
tls_process_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** peer_rpk)1108 int tls_process_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **peer_rpk)
1109 {
1110 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1111 int ret = 0;
1112 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1113 PACKET extensions;
1114 PACKET context;
1115 unsigned long cert_len = 0, spki_len = 0;
1116 const unsigned char *spki, *spkistart;
1117 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc);
1118
1119 /*-
1120 * ----------------------------
1121 * TLS 1.3 Certificate message:
1122 * ----------------------------
1123 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2
1124 *
1125 * enum {
1126 * X509(0),
1127 * RawPublicKey(2),
1128 * (255)
1129 * } CertificateType;
1130 *
1131 * struct {
1132 * select (certificate_type) {
1133 * case RawPublicKey:
1134 * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo
1135 * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
1136 *
1137 * case X509:
1138 * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
1139 * };
1140 * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
1141 * } CertificateEntry;
1142 *
1143 * struct {
1144 * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
1145 * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
1146 * } Certificate;
1147 *
1148 * The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server
1149 * has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message
1150 * (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no
1151 * suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate
1152 * message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list"
1153 * field having length 0).
1154 *
1155 * ----------------------------
1156 * TLS 1.2 Certificate message:
1157 * ----------------------------
1158 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250#section-3
1159 *
1160 * opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
1161 *
1162 * struct {
1163 * select(certificate_type){
1164 *
1165 * // certificate type defined in this document.
1166 * case RawPublicKey:
1167 * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
1168 *
1169 * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246
1170 * case X.509:
1171 * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
1172 *
1173 * // Additional certificate type based on
1174 * // "TLS Certificate Types" subregistry
1175 * };
1176 * } Certificate;
1177 *
1178 * -------------
1179 * Consequently:
1180 * -------------
1181 * After the (TLS 1.3 only) context octet string (1 byte length + data) the
1182 * Certificate message has a 3-byte length that is zero in the client to
1183 * server message when the client has no RPK to send. In that case, there
1184 * are no (TLS 1.3 only) per-certificate extensions either, because the
1185 * [CertificateEntry] list is empty.
1186 *
1187 * In the server to client direction, or when the client had an RPK to send,
1188 * the TLS 1.3 message just prepends the length of the RPK+extensions,
1189 * while TLS <= 1.2 sends just the RPK (octet-string).
1190 *
1191 * The context must be zero-length in the server to client direction, and
1192 * must match the value recorded in the certificate request in the client
1193 * to server direction.
1194 */
1195 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1196 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) {
1197 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1198 goto err;
1199 }
1200 if (sc->server) {
1201 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
1202 if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) {
1203 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1204 goto err;
1205 }
1206 } else {
1207 if (!PACKET_equal(&context, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len)) {
1208 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1209 goto err;
1210 }
1211 }
1212 } else {
1213 if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) {
1214 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
1215 goto err;
1216 }
1217 }
1218 }
1219
1220 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1221 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_len) {
1222 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1223 goto err;
1224 }
1225
1226 /*
1227 * The list length may be zero when there is no RPK. In the case of TLS
1228 * 1.2 this is actually the RPK length, which cannot be zero as specified,
1229 * but that breaks the ability of the client to decline client auth. We
1230 * overload the 0 RPK length to mean "no RPK". This interpretation is
1231 * also used some other (reference?) implementations, but is not supported
1232 * by the verbatim RFC7250 text.
1233 */
1234 if (cert_len == 0)
1235 return 1;
1236
1237 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1238 /*
1239 * With TLS 1.3, a non-empty explicit-length RPK octet-string followed
1240 * by a possibly empty extension block.
1241 */
1242 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &spki_len)) {
1243 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1244 goto err;
1245 }
1246 if (spki_len == 0) {
1247 /* empty RPK */
1248 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EMPTY_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
1249 goto err;
1250 }
1251 } else {
1252 spki_len = cert_len;
1253 }
1254
1255 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &spki, spki_len)) {
1256 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1257 goto err;
1258 }
1259 spkistart = spki;
1260 if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_ex(NULL, &spki, spki_len, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq)) == NULL
1261 || spki != (spkistart + spki_len)) {
1262 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1263 goto err;
1264 }
1265 if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1266 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1267 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1268 goto err;
1269 }
1270
1271 /* Process the Extensions block */
1272 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1273 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != (cert_len - 3 - spki_len)) {
1274 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1275 goto err;
1276 }
1277 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
1278 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1279 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1280 goto err;
1281 }
1282 if (!tls_collect_extensions(sc, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
1283 &rawexts, NULL, 1)) {
1284 /* SSLfatal already called */
1285 goto err;
1286 }
1287 /* chain index is always zero and fin always 1 for RPK */
1288 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(sc, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
1289 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1290 /* SSLfatal already called */
1291 goto err;
1292 }
1293 }
1294 ret = 1;
1295 if (peer_rpk != NULL) {
1296 *peer_rpk = pkey;
1297 pkey = NULL;
1298 }
1299
1300 err:
1301 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1302 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1303 return ret;
1304 }
1305
tls_output_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,WPACKET * pkt,CERT_PKEY * cpk)1306 unsigned long tls_output_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
1307 {
1308 int pdata_len = 0;
1309 unsigned char *pdata = NULL;
1310 X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL;
1311 unsigned long ret = 0;
1312 X509 *x509 = NULL;
1313
1314 if (cpk != NULL && cpk->x509 != NULL) {
1315 x509 = cpk->x509;
1316 /* Get the RPK from the certificate */
1317 xpk = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cpk->x509);
1318 if (xpk == NULL) {
1319 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1320 goto err;
1321 }
1322 pdata_len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, &pdata);
1323 } else if (cpk != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
1324 /* Get the RPK from the private key */
1325 pdata_len = i2d_PUBKEY(cpk->privatekey, &pdata);
1326 } else {
1327 /* The server RPK is not optional */
1328 if (sc->server) {
1329 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1330 goto err;
1331 }
1332 /* The client can send a zero length certificate list */
1333 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) {
1334 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1335 goto err;
1336 }
1337 return 1;
1338 }
1339
1340 if (pdata_len <= 0) {
1341 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 goto err;
1343 }
1344
1345 /*
1346 * TLSv1.2 is _just_ the raw public key
1347 * TLSv1.3 includes extensions, so there's a length wrapper
1348 */
1349 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1350 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1351 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 goto err;
1353 }
1354 }
1355
1356 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) {
1357 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1358 goto err;
1359 }
1360
1361 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1362 /*
1363 * Only send extensions relevant to raw public keys. Until such
1364 * extensions are defined, this will be an empty set of extensions.
1365 * |x509| may be NULL, which raw public-key extensions need to handle.
1366 */
1367 if (!tls_construct_extensions(sc, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
1368 x509, 0)) {
1369 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1370 goto err;
1371 }
1372 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1373 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1374 goto err;
1375 }
1376 }
1377
1378 ret = 1;
1379 err:
1380 OPENSSL_free(pdata);
1381 return ret;
1382 }
1383
ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,CERT_PKEY * cpk,int for_comp)1384 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1385 CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
1386 {
1387 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1388 if (!for_comp)
1389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 return 0;
1391 }
1392
1393 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp))
1394 return 0;
1395
1396 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1397 if (!for_comp)
1398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1399 return 0;
1400 }
1401
1402 return 1;
1403 }
1404
1405 /*
1406 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1407 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1408 * freed up as well.
1409 */
tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION * s,ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,int clearbufs,int stop)1410 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,
1411 int clearbufs, int stop)
1412 {
1413 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1414 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1415 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1416 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1417
1418 if (clearbufs) {
1419 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1421 /*
1422 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1423 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1424 * MUST NOT be used.
1425 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1426 */
1427 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))
1428 #endif
1429 ) {
1430 /*
1431 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1432 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1433 */
1434 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1435 s->init_buf = NULL;
1436 }
1437
1438 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 return WORK_ERROR;
1441 }
1442 s->init_num = 0;
1443 }
1444
1445 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1446 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1447 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1448
1449 /*
1450 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1451 * post handshake exchange
1452 */
1453 if (cleanuphand) {
1454 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1455 s->renegotiate = 0;
1456 s->new_session = 0;
1457 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1458 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1459
1460 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1461
1462 if (s->server) {
1463 /*
1464 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1465 * NewSessionTicket
1466 */
1467 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1468 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1469
1470 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1471 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1472 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1473 } else {
1474 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1475 /*
1476 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1477 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1478 */
1479 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1480 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1481 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1482 } else {
1483 /*
1484 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1485 * NewSessionTicket
1486 */
1487 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1488 }
1489 if (s->hit)
1490 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1491 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1492
1493 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1494 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1495 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1496 }
1497
1498 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1499 /* done with handshaking */
1500 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1501 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1502 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1503 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1504 }
1505 }
1506
1507 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1508 cb = s->info_callback;
1509 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL)
1510 cb = sctx->info_callback;
1511
1512 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1513 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1514
1515 if (cb != NULL) {
1516 if (cleanuphand
1517 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1518 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1519 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1520 }
1521
1522 if (!stop) {
1523 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1524 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1525 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1526 }
1527
1528 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1529 }
1530
tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int * mt)1531 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
1532 {
1533 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1534 int skip_message, i;
1535 uint8_t recvd_type;
1536 unsigned char *p;
1537 size_t l, readbytes;
1538 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1539 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1540
1541 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1542
1543 do {
1544 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1545 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1546 &p[s->init_num],
1547 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1548 0, &readbytes);
1549 if (i <= 0) {
1550 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1551 return 0;
1552 }
1553 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1554 /*
1555 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1556 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1557 */
1558 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1560 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1561 return 0;
1562 }
1563 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1564 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1565 /*
1566 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1567 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1568 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1569 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1570 * with a valid cookie.
1571 */
1572 return 0;
1573 }
1574 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1575 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1576 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1577 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1578 return 1;
1579 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1581 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1582 return 0;
1583 }
1584 s->init_num += readbytes;
1585 }
1586
1587 skip_message = 0;
1588 if (!s->server)
1589 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1590 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1591 /*
1592 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1593 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1594 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1595 * MAC.
1596 */
1597 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1598 s->init_num = 0;
1599 skip_message = 1;
1600
1601 if (s->msg_callback)
1602 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1603 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ussl,
1604 s->msg_callback_arg);
1605 }
1606 } while (skip_message);
1607 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1608
1609 *mt = *p;
1610 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1611
1612 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1613 /*
1614 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1615 * ClientHello
1616 *
1617 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1618 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1619 */
1620 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1621 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1622
1623 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1624 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1625 } else {
1626 n2l3(p, l);
1627 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1628 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1630 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1631 return 0;
1632 }
1633 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1634
1635 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1636 s->init_num = 0;
1637 }
1638
1639 return 1;
1640 }
1641
tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION * s,size_t * len)1642 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
1643 {
1644 size_t n, readbytes;
1645 unsigned char *p;
1646 int i;
1647 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1648 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1649
1650 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1651 /* We've already read everything in */
1652 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1653 return 1;
1654 }
1655
1656 p = s->init_msg;
1657 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1658 while (n > 0) {
1659 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1660 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1661 if (i <= 0) {
1662 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1663 *len = 0;
1664 return 0;
1665 }
1666 s->init_num += readbytes;
1667 n -= readbytes;
1668 }
1669
1670 /*
1671 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1672 * Finished verification.
1673 */
1674 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1675 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1676 *len = 0;
1677 return 0;
1678 }
1679
1680 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1681 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1682 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1683 s->init_num)) {
1684 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1685 *len = 0;
1686 return 0;
1687 }
1688 if (s->msg_callback)
1689 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1690 (size_t)s->init_num, ussl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1691 } else {
1692 /*
1693 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1694 * processing the message
1695 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1696 * message.
1697 */
1698 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1699 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1700 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1701 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1702 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1703 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1704 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1705 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1706 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1707 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1708 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1709 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1710 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1711 *len = 0;
1712 return 0;
1713 }
1714 }
1715 }
1716 if (s->msg_callback)
1717 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1718 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ussl,
1719 s->msg_callback_arg);
1720 }
1721
1722 *len = s->init_num;
1723 return 1;
1724 }
1725
1726 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1727 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1728 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1729 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1730 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1731 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1732 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1733 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1734 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1735 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1736 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1737 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1738 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1739 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1740 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1741 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1742 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1743 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1744 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1745 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1746 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1747 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1748 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1749 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1750 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1751 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1752 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1753 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1754 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1755 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1756 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1757 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1758 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1759 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1760 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1761 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1762 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1763 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1764 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1765 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1766 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1767
1768 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1769 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1770 };
1771
ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)1772 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1773 {
1774 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1775
1776 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1777 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1778 break;
1779 return tp->alert;
1780 }
1781
ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1782 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1783 {
1784 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1785 return 0;
1786 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1787 }
1788
1789 /*
1790 * SSL/TLS/DTLS version comparison
1791 *
1792 * Returns
1793 * 0 if versiona is equal to versionb
1794 * 1 if versiona is greater than versionb
1795 * -1 if versiona is less than versionb
1796 */
ssl_version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,int versiona,int versionb)1797 int ssl_version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int versiona, int versionb)
1798 {
1799 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
1800
1801 if (versiona == versionb)
1802 return 0;
1803 if (!dtls)
1804 return versiona < versionb ? -1 : 1;
1805 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(versiona, versionb) ? -1 : 1;
1806 }
1807
1808 typedef struct {
1809 int version;
1810 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1811 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1812 } version_info;
1813
1814 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1815 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1816 #endif
1817
1818 /* Must be in order high to low */
1819 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1821 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1822 #else
1823 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1824 #endif
1825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1826 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1827 #else
1828 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1829 #endif
1830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1831 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1832 #else
1833 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1834 #endif
1835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1836 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1837 #else
1838 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1839 #endif
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1841 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1842 #else
1843 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1844 #endif
1845 {0, NULL, NULL},
1846 };
1847
1848 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1849 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1850 #endif
1851
1852 /* Must be in order high to low */
1853 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1855 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1856 #else
1857 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1858 #endif
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1860 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1861 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1862 #else
1863 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1864 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1865 #endif
1866 {0, NULL, NULL},
1867 };
1868
1869 /*
1870 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1871 *
1872 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1873 * @method: the intended method.
1874 *
1875 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1876 */
ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,const SSL_METHOD * method)1877 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1878 {
1879 int version = method->version;
1880
1881 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1882 ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1883 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1884 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1885
1886 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1887 ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1888 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1889
1890 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1891 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1892 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1893 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1894
1895 return 0;
1896 }
1897
1898 /*
1899 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1900 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1901 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1902 */
is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION * s)1903 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1904 {
1905 size_t i;
1906 int curve;
1907 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1908
1909 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1910 return 0;
1911
1912 /*
1913 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1914 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1915 */
1916 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1917 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1918 return 1;
1919
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1921 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1922 return 1;
1923 #endif
1924
1925 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1926 return 1;
1927
1928 /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */
1929 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
1930 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1931 switch (i) {
1932 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1933 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1934 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1935 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1936 continue;
1937 default:
1938 break;
1939 }
1940 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1941 continue;
1942 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1943 return 1;
1944 /*
1945 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1946 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1947 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1948 */
1949 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1950 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1951 return 1;
1952 }
1953
1954 return 0;
1955 }
1956
1957 /*
1958 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1959 * `SSL *` instance
1960 *
1961 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1962 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1963 *
1964 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1965 */
ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,int version,const SSL_METHOD ** meth)1966 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1967 const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1968 {
1969 const version_info *vent;
1970 const version_info *table;
1971
1972 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) {
1973 default:
1974 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1975 return ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1976 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1977 table = tls_version_table;
1978 break;
1979 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1980 table = dtls_version_table;
1981 break;
1982 }
1983
1984 for (vent = table;
1985 vent->version != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1986 ++vent) {
1987 const SSL_METHOD *(*thismeth)(void) = s->server ? vent->smeth
1988 : vent->cmeth;
1989
1990 if (thismeth != NULL
1991 && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1992 && ssl_method_error(s, thismeth()) == 0
1993 && (!s->server
1994 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1995 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1996 if (meth != NULL)
1997 *meth = thismeth();
1998 return 1;
1999 }
2000 }
2001 return 0;
2002 }
2003
2004 /*
2005 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
2006 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
2007 * supported protocol version.
2008 *
2009 * @s server SSL handle.
2010 *
2011 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
2012 */
ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2013 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2014 {
2015 const version_info *vent;
2016 const version_info *table;
2017 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2018
2019 /*
2020 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
2021 * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed
2022 * s->method).
2023 */
2024 if (s->version == ssl->defltmeth->version)
2025 return 1;
2026
2027 /*
2028 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
2029 * highest protocol version).
2030 */
2031 if (ssl->defltmeth->version == TLS_method()->version)
2032 table = tls_version_table;
2033 else if (ssl->defltmeth->version == DTLS_method()->version)
2034 table = dtls_version_table;
2035 else {
2036 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
2037 return 0;
2038 }
2039
2040 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2041 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
2042 return s->version == vent->version;
2043 }
2044 return 0;
2045 }
2046
2047 /*
2048 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
2049 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
2050 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
2051 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
2052 *
2053 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
2054 * @version: the intended limit.
2055 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
2056 *
2057 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
2058 */
ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version,int version,int * bound)2059 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
2060 {
2061 int valid_tls;
2062 int valid_dtls;
2063
2064 if (version == 0) {
2065 *bound = version;
2066 return 1;
2067 }
2068
2069 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
2070 valid_dtls =
2071 /* We support client side pre-standardisation version of DTLS */
2072 (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2073 || (DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL)
2074 && DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_VERSION));
2075
2076 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
2077 return 0;
2078
2079 /*-
2080 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
2081 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
2082 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
2083 *
2084 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
2085 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
2086 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
2087 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
2088 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
2089 *
2090 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
2091 * returning success.
2092 */
2093 switch (method_version) {
2094 default:
2095 break;
2096
2097 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2098 if (valid_tls)
2099 *bound = version;
2100 break;
2101
2102 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2103 if (valid_dtls)
2104 *bound = version;
2105 break;
2106 }
2107 return 1;
2108 }
2109
check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int vers,DOWNGRADE * dgrd)2110 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
2111 {
2112 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
2113 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
2114 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
2115 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2116 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
2117 /*
2118 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
2119 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
2120 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
2121 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
2122 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
2123 */
2124 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
2125 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
2126 } else {
2127 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
2128 }
2129 }
2130
2131 /*
2132 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
2133 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
2134 * the version specific method.
2135 *
2136 * @s: server SSL handle.
2137 *
2138 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2139 */
ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION * s,CLIENTHELLO_MSG * hello,DOWNGRADE * dgrd)2140 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2141 DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
2142 {
2143 /*-
2144 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
2145 *
2146 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
2147 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
2148 *
2149 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
2150 * handle version.
2151 */
2152 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2153 int server_version = ssl->method->version;
2154 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
2155 const version_info *vent;
2156 const version_info *table;
2157 int disabled = 0;
2158 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
2159
2160 s->client_version = client_version;
2161
2162 switch (server_version) {
2163 default:
2164 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2165 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
2166 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
2167 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
2168 /*
2169 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2170 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2171 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2172 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2173 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2174 */
2175 return 0;
2176 }
2177 /*
2178 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
2179 * a HelloRetryRequest
2180 */
2181 /* fall thru */
2182 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2183 table = tls_version_table;
2184 break;
2185 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2186 table = dtls_version_table;
2187 break;
2188 }
2189
2190 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
2191
2192 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
2193 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
2194 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
2195
2196 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2197 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
2198 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
2199 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
2200 PACKET versionslist;
2201
2202 suppversions->parsed = 1;
2203
2204 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
2205 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
2206 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
2207 }
2208
2209 /*
2210 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
2211 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
2212 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
2213 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
2214 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
2215 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
2216 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
2217 */
2218 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
2219 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
2220
2221 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
2222 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
2223 continue;
2224 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
2225 best_vers = candidate_vers;
2226 }
2227 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
2228 /* Trailing data? */
2229 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
2230 }
2231
2232 if (best_vers > 0) {
2233 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
2234 /*
2235 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
2236 * negotiated TLSv1.3
2237 */
2238 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
2239 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
2240 return 0;
2241 }
2242 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
2243 s->version = best_vers;
2244 ssl->method = best_method;
2245 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers))
2246 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2247
2248 return 0;
2249 }
2250 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
2251 }
2252
2253 /*
2254 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
2255 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
2256 */
2257 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
2258 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2259
2260 /*
2261 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
2262 * the ClientHello.
2263 */
2264 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2265 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2266
2267 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
2268 ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
2269 continue;
2270 method = vent->smeth();
2271 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
2272 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
2273 s->version = vent->version;
2274 ssl->method = method;
2275 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version))
2276 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2277
2278 return 0;
2279 }
2280 disabled = 1;
2281 }
2282 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
2283 }
2284
2285 /*
2286 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
2287 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
2288 * the version specific method.
2289 *
2290 * @s: client SSL handle.
2291 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
2292 * @extensions: The extensions received
2293 *
2294 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
2295 */
ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int version,RAW_EXTENSION * extensions)2296 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
2297 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
2298 {
2299 const version_info *vent;
2300 const version_info *table;
2301 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
2302 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2303
2304 origv = s->version;
2305 s->version = version;
2306
2307 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
2308 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
2309 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
2310 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
2311 NULL, 0)) {
2312 s->version = origv;
2313 return 0;
2314 }
2315
2316 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
2317 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2318 s->version = origv;
2319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
2320 return 0;
2321 }
2322
2323 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2324 default:
2325 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) {
2326 s->version = origv;
2327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
2328 return 0;
2329 }
2330 /*
2331 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2332 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2333 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2334 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2335 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2336 */
2337 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
2338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2339 return 0;
2340 }
2341 return 1;
2342 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2343 table = tls_version_table;
2344 break;
2345 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2346 table = dtls_version_table;
2347 break;
2348 }
2349
2350 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
2351 if (ret != 0) {
2352 s->version = origv;
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret);
2354 return 0;
2355 }
2356 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, ver_min) < 0
2357 || ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, ver_max) > 0) {
2358 s->version = origv;
2359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2360 return 0;
2361 }
2362
2363 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
2364 real_max = ver_max;
2365
2366 /* Check for downgrades */
2367 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
2368 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
2369 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2370 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
2371 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
2372 s->version = origv;
2373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2374 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2375 return 0;
2376 }
2377 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2378 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
2379 && real_max > s->version) {
2380 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
2381 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2382 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
2383 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
2384 s->version = origv;
2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2386 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2387 return 0;
2388 }
2389 }
2390
2391 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2392 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2393 continue;
2394
2395 ssl->method = vent->cmeth();
2396 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2398 return 0;
2399 }
2400 return 1;
2401 }
2402
2403 s->version = origv;
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2405 return 0;
2406 }
2407
2408 /*
2409 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2410 * @s: The SSL connection
2411 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2412 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2413 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2414 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2415 * protocol.
2416 *
2417 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2418 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2419 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2420 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2421 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2422 *
2423 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2424 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2425 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2426 *
2427 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2428 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2429 */
ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,int * min_version,int * max_version,int * real_max)2430 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
2431 int *max_version, int *real_max)
2432 {
2433 int version, tmp_real_max;
2434 int hole;
2435 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2436 const version_info *table;
2437 const version_info *vent;
2438 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2439
2440 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2441 default:
2442 /*
2443 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2444 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2445 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2446 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2447 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2448 */
2449 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2450 /*
2451 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2452 * flexible method.
2453 */
2454 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2455 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2456 return 0;
2457 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2458 table = tls_version_table;
2459 break;
2460 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2461 table = dtls_version_table;
2462 break;
2463 }
2464
2465 /*
2466 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2467 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2468 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2469 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2470 *
2471 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2472 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2473 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2474 *
2475 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2476 * the selected version. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2477 *
2478 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, we support a contiguous
2479 * range of at least two methods. If we hit a disabled method,
2480 * then hole becomes true again, but nothing else changes yet,
2481 * because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2482 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2483 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2484 */
2485 *min_version = version = 0;
2486 hole = 1;
2487 if (real_max != NULL)
2488 *real_max = 0;
2489 tmp_real_max = 0;
2490 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2491 /*
2492 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2493 * "version capability" vector.
2494 */
2495 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2496 hole = 1;
2497 tmp_real_max = 0;
2498 continue;
2499 }
2500 method = vent->cmeth();
2501
2502 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2503 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2504
2505 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2506 hole = 1;
2507 } else if (!hole) {
2508 *min_version = method->version;
2509 } else {
2510 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2511 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2512 version = method->version;
2513 *min_version = version;
2514 hole = 0;
2515 }
2516 }
2517
2518 *max_version = version;
2519
2520 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2521 if (version == 0)
2522 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2523
2524 return 0;
2525 }
2526
2527 /*
2528 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2529 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2530 *
2531 * @s: client SSL handle.
2532 *
2533 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2534 */
ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2535 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2536 {
2537 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2538
2539 /*
2540 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2541 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2542 */
2543 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2544 return 0;
2545
2546 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2547
2548 if (ret != 0)
2549 return ret;
2550
2551 s->version = ver_max;
2552
2553 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2554 if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2555 /*
2556 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
2557 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
2558 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
2559 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
2560 * about this immediately.
2561 */
2562 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max))
2563 return 0;
2564 }
2565 } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2566 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2567 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2568 }
2569
2570 s->client_version = ver_max;
2571 return 0;
2572 }
2573
2574 /*
2575 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2576 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2577 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2578 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2579 */
check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint16_t group_id,const uint16_t * groups,size_t num_groups,int checkallow)2580 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2581 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2582 {
2583 size_t i;
2584
2585 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2586 return 0;
2587
2588 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2589 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2590
2591 if (group_id == group
2592 && (!checkallow
2593 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2594 return 1;
2595 }
2596 }
2597
2598 return 0;
2599 }
2600
2601 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const unsigned char * hashval,size_t hashlen,const unsigned char * hrr,size_t hrrlen)2602 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2603 const unsigned char *hashval,
2604 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2605 size_t hrrlen)
2606 {
2607 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2608 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2609
2610 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2611
2612 if (hashval == NULL) {
2613 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2614 hashlen = 0;
2615 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2616 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2617 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2618 &hashlen)) {
2619 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2620 return 0;
2621 }
2622 }
2623
2624 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2625 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2626 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2627 return 0;
2628 }
2629
2630 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2631 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2632 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2633 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2634 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2636 return 0;
2637 }
2638
2639 /*
2640 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2641 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2642 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2643 */
2644 if (hrr != NULL
2645 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2646 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2647 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2648 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2650 return 0;
2651 }
2652
2653 return 1;
2654 }
2655
ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const * a,const X509_NAME * const * b)2656 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2657 {
2658 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2659 }
2660
parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2661 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2662 {
2663 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2664 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2665 PACKET cadns;
2666
2667 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2669 goto err;
2670 }
2671 /* get the CA RDNs */
2672 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2674 goto err;
2675 }
2676
2677 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2678 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2679 unsigned int name_len;
2680
2681 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2682 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2684 goto err;
2685 }
2686
2687 namestart = namebytes;
2688 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2690 goto err;
2691 }
2692 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2694 goto err;
2695 }
2696
2697 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2699 goto err;
2700 }
2701 xn = NULL;
2702 }
2703
2704 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2705 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2706
2707 return 1;
2708
2709 err:
2710 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2711 X509_NAME_free(xn);
2712 return 0;
2713 }
2714
STACK_OF(X509_NAME)2715 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2716 {
2717 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2718 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2719
2720 if (s->server) {
2721 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
2722 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2723 ca_sk = NULL;
2724 }
2725
2726 if (ca_sk == NULL)
2727 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl);
2728
2729 return ca_sk;
2730 }
2731
construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const STACK_OF (X509_NAME)* ca_sk,WPACKET * pkt)2732 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk,
2733 WPACKET *pkt)
2734 {
2735 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2736 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2738 return 0;
2739 }
2740
2741 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) {
2742 int i;
2743
2744 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2745 unsigned char *namebytes;
2746 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2747 int namelen;
2748
2749 if (name == NULL
2750 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2751 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2752 &namebytes)
2753 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2755 return 0;
2756 }
2757 }
2758 }
2759
2760 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 return 0;
2763 }
2764
2765 return 1;
2766 }
2767
2768 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION * s,unsigned char ** ptbs,const void * param,size_t paramlen)2769 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2770 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2771 {
2772 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2773 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2774
2775 if (tbs == NULL) {
2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2777 return 0;
2778 }
2779 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2780 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2781
2782 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2783
2784 *ptbs = tbs;
2785 return tbslen;
2786 }
2787
2788 /*
2789 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2790 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2791 */
tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2792 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2793 {
2794 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2795 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2797 return 0;
2798
2799 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2800 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2802 return 0;
2803 }
2804 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2805 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
2808 s->pha_dgst = NULL;
2809 return 0;
2810 }
2811 }
2812 return 1;
2813 }
2814
2815 /*
2816 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2817 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2818 */
tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2819 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2820 {
2821 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2823 return 0;
2824 }
2825 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2826 s->pha_dgst)) {
2827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2828 return 0;
2829 }
2830 return 1;
2831 }
2832
2833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,PACKET * pkt,PACKET * tmppkt,BUF_MEM * buf)2834 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
2835 PACKET *pkt,
2836 PACKET *tmppkt,
2837 BUF_MEM *buf)
2838 {
2839 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2840 int comp_alg;
2841 COMP_METHOD *method = NULL;
2842 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
2843 size_t expected_length;
2844 size_t comp_length;
2845 int i;
2846 int found = 0;
2847
2848 if (buf == NULL) {
2849 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2850 goto err;
2851 }
2852 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg)) {
2853 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 goto err;
2855 }
2856 /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */
2857 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) {
2858 for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) {
2859 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) {
2860 found = 1;
2861 break;
2862 }
2863 }
2864 if (!found) {
2865 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2866 goto err;
2867 }
2868 }
2869 if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) {
2870 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2871 goto err;
2872 }
2873 switch (comp_alg) {
2874 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
2875 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
2876 break;
2877 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
2878 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
2879 break;
2880 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
2881 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
2882 break;
2883 default:
2884 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2885 goto err;
2886 }
2887
2888 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
2889 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length)
2890 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length)) {
2891 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
2892 goto err;
2893 }
2894
2895 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length || comp_length == 0) {
2896 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
2897 goto err;
2898 }
2899
2900 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length)
2901 || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length)
2902 || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length,
2903 (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) != (int)expected_length) {
2904 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
2905 goto err;
2906 }
2907 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2908 err:
2909 COMP_CTX_free(comp);
2910 return ret;
2911 }
2912 #endif
2913
