1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include "internal/e_os.h"
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <limits.h>
14 #include <errno.h>
15 #include <assert.h>
16 #include "../ssl_local.h"
17 #include "../quic/quic_local.h"
18 #include <openssl/evp.h>
19 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
20 #include <openssl/rand.h>
21 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
22 #include "record_local.h"
23 #include "internal/packet.h"
24 #include "internal/comp.h"
25
RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER * rl,SSL_CONNECTION * s)26 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s)
27 {
28 rl->s = s;
29 }
30
RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER * rl)31 int RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
32 {
33 int ret = 1;
34
35 /* Clear any buffered records we no longer need */
36 while (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
37 ret &= ssl_release_record(rl->s,
38 &(rl->tlsrecs[rl->curr_rec++]),
39 0);
40
41
42 rl->wnum = 0;
43 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
44 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
45 rl->wpend_tot = 0;
46 rl->wpend_type = 0;
47 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
48 rl->alert_count = 0;
49 rl->num_recs = 0;
50 rl->curr_rec = 0;
51
52 BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
53 rl->rrlnext = NULL;
54
55 if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL)
56 rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */
57 if (rl->wrlmethod != NULL)
58 rl->wrlmethod->free(rl->wrl); /* Ignore return value */
59 BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
60 rl->rrlmethod = NULL;
61 rl->wrlmethod = NULL;
62 rl->rrlnext = NULL;
63 rl->rrl = NULL;
64 rl->wrl = NULL;
65
66 if (rl->d)
67 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
68
69 return ret;
70 }
71
RECORD_LAYER_reset(RECORD_LAYER * rl)72 int RECORD_LAYER_reset(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
73 {
74 int ret;
75
76 ret = RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
77
78 /* We try and reset both record layers even if one fails */
79 ret &= ssl_set_new_record_layer(rl->s,
80 SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s)
81 ? DTLS_ANY_VERSION : TLS_ANY_VERSION,
82 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ,
83 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0,
84 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
85 NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL);
86
87 ret &= ssl_set_new_record_layer(rl->s,
88 SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s)
89 ? DTLS_ANY_VERSION : TLS_ANY_VERSION,
90 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
91 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0,
92 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
93 NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL);
94
95 /* SSLfatal already called in the event of failure */
96 return ret;
97 }
98
99 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)100 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
101 {
102 return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
103 }
104
105 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)106 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
107 {
108 return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
109 || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
110 }
111
RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)112 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
113 {
114 return rl->wpend_tot > 0;
115 }
116
ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION * s)117 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
118 {
119 uint32_t max_early_data;
120 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
121
122 /*
123 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
124 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
125 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
126 */
127 if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
128 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
129 && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
131 return 0;
132 }
133 sess = s->psksession;
134 }
135
136 if (!s->server)
137 max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
138 else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
139 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
140 else
141 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
142 ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
143
144 return max_early_data;
145 }
146
ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION * s,size_t length,size_t overhead,int send)147 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t length,
148 size_t overhead, int send)
149 {
150 uint32_t max_early_data;
151
152 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
153
154 if (max_early_data == 0) {
155 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
156 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
157 return 0;
158 }
159
160 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
161 max_early_data += overhead;
162
163 if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
164 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
165 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
166 return 0;
167 }
168 s->early_data_count += length;
169
170 return 1;
171 }
172
ssl3_pending(const SSL * s)173 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
174 {
175 size_t i, num = 0;
176 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
177
178 if (sc == NULL)
179 return 0;
180
181 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
182 TLS_RECORD *rdata;
183 pitem *item, *iter;
184
185 iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data);
186 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
187 rdata = item->data;
188 num += rdata->length;
189 }
190 }
191
192 for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) {
193 if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
194 return num;
195 num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length;
196 }
197
198 num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl);
199
200 return num;
201 }
202
SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX * ctx,size_t len)203 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
204 {
205 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
206 }
207
SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL * s,size_t len)208 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
209 {
210 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
211
212 if (sc == NULL || IS_QUIC(s))
213 return;
214 sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len;
215 }
216
SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL * s)217 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
218 {
219 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
220 const char *lng;
221
222 if (sc == NULL)
223 return NULL;
224
225 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
226 return "unknown";
227
228 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng);
229
230 return lng;
231 }
232
SSL_rstate_string(const SSL * s)233 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
234 {
235 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
236 const char *shrt;
237
238 if (sc == NULL)
239 return NULL;
240
241 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
242 return "unknown";
243
244 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL);
245
246 return shrt;
247 }
248
tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint8_t type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t len)249 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type,
250 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
251 {
252 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0)
253 return 0;
254
255 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
256 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
257 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
258 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
259 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
261 return -1;
262 }
263 return 1;
264 }
265
266 /*
267 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
268 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
269 */
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL * ssl,uint8_t type,const void * buf_,size_t len,size_t * written)270 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
271 size_t *written)
272 {
273 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
274 size_t tot;
275 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
276 int i;
277 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
278 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
279 unsigned int recversion;
280
281 if (s == NULL)
282 return -1;
283
284 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
285 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
286 /*
287 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
288 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
289 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
290 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
291 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
292 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
293 * report the error in a way the user will notice
294 */
295 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
296 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot != 0)
297 && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
299 return -1;
300 }
301
302 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
303 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
304 /* SSLfatal() already called */
305 return -1;
306 }
307
308 s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
309
310 /*
311 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
312 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
313 * doing that first.
314 */
315 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
316 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
317 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
318
319 /*
320 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
321 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
322 * messages yet.
323 */
324 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
325 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
326 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
327 /* SSLfatal() already called */
328 if (i < 0)
329 return i;
330 if (i == 0) {
331 return -1;
332 }
333 }
334
335 i = tls_write_check_pending(s, type, buf, len);
336 if (i < 0) {
337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
338 return i;
339 } else if (i > 0) {
340 /* Retry needed */
341 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
342 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->retry_write_records(s->rlayer.wrl));
343 if (i <= 0) {
344 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
345 return i;
346 }
347 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
348 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
349 } /* else no retry required */
350
351 if (tot == 0) {
352 /*
353 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
354 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
355 */
356 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
357 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
358 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
359 }
360
361 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
362 *written = tot;
363 return 1;
364 }
365
366 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
367 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) {
368 i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
369 if (i <= 0) {
370 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
371 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
372 return i;
373 }
374 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
375 }
376
377 n = (len - tot);
378
379 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
380 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
381
382 if (max_send_fragment == 0
383 || split_send_fragment == 0
384 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
385 /*
386 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
387 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
388 */
389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
390 return -1;
391 }
392
393 /*
394 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
395 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
396 */
397 recversion = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
398 if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
399 && !s->renegotiate
400 && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION
401 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
402 recversion = TLS1_VERSION;
403
404 for (;;) {
405 size_t tmppipelen, remain;
406 size_t j, lensofar = 0;
407
408 /*
409 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
410 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
411 */
412 maxpipes = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_records(s->rlayer.wrl, type, n,
413 max_send_fragment,
414 &split_send_fragment);
415 /*
416 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
417 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
418 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
419 * configured by the user.
420 */
421 if (s->max_pipelines > 0 && maxpipes > s->max_pipelines)
422 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
423
424 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
425 maxpipes = SSL_MAX_PIPELINES;
426
427 if (split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
429 return -1;
430 }
431
432 if (n / maxpipes >= split_send_fragment) {
433 /*
434 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
435 * pipelines
436 */
437 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
438 tmpls[j].type = type;
439 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
440 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + (j * split_send_fragment);
441 tmpls[j].buflen = split_send_fragment;
442 }
443 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
444 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = maxpipes * split_send_fragment;
445 } else {
446 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
447 tmppipelen = n / maxpipes;
448 remain = n % maxpipes;
449 /*
450 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
451 * pipelines
452 */
453 if (remain > 0)
454 tmppipelen++;
455 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
456 tmpls[j].type = type;
457 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
458 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + lensofar;
459 tmpls[j].buflen = tmppipelen;
460 lensofar += tmppipelen;
461 if (j + 1 == remain)
462 tmppipelen--;
463 }
464 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
465 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = n;
466 }
467
468 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
469 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(s->rlayer.wrl, tmpls, maxpipes));
470 if (i <= 0) {
471 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
472 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
473 return i;
474 }
475
476 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == n
477 || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
478 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE) != 0)) {
479 *written = tot + s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
480 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
481 return 1;
482 }
483
484 n -= s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
485 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
486 }
487 }
488
ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int writing,int ret,char * file,int line)489 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int writing, int ret,
490 char *file, int line)
491 {
492 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
493
494 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) {
495 s->rwstate = writing ? SSL_WRITING : SSL_READING;
496 ret = -1;
497 } else {
498 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
499 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) {
500 if (writing) {
501 /*
502 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
503 * as fatal.
504 */
505 ERR_new();
506 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
507 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, NULL);
509 ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
510 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) != 0) {
511 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
512 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
513 } else {
514 ERR_new();
515 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
516 /*
517 * This reason code is part of the API and may be used by
518 * applications for control flow decisions.
519 */
520 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
521 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL);
522 }
523 } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) {
524 int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl);
525
526 if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) {
527 ERR_new();
528 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
529 ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL);
530 }
531 /*
532 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
533 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
534 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
535 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
536 */
537 }
538 /*
539 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
540 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
541 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
542 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
543 */
544 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF)
545 ret = 0;
546 else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR)
547 ret = -1;
548 }
549
550 return ret;
551 }
552
ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION * s,TLS_RECORD * rr,size_t length)553 int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr, size_t length)
554 {
555 assert(rr->length >= length);
556 if (rr->rechandle != NULL) {
557 if (length == 0)
558 length = rr->length;
559 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
560 if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
561 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
562 rr->rechandle,
563 length)) <= 0) {
564 /* RLAYER_fatal already called */
565 return 0;
566 }
567
568 if (length == rr->length)
569 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
570 } else if (length == 0 || length == rr->length) {
571 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
572 OPENSSL_free(rr->allocdata);
573 rr->allocdata = NULL;
574 }
575 rr->length -= length;
576 if (rr->length > 0)
577 rr->off += length;
578 else
579 rr->off = 0;
580
581 return 1;
582 }
583
584 /*-
585 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
586 * 'type' is one of the following:
587 *
588 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when tls_get_message_header and tls_get_message_body
589 * call us)
590 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
591 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
592 *
593 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read an SSL/TLS record first
594 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
595 *
596 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
597 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
598 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
599 * argument is non NULL.
600 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
601 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
602 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
603 * Change cipher spec protocol
604 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
605 * Alert protocol
606 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
607 * Handshake protocol
608 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
609 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
610 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
611 * Application data protocol
612 * none of our business
613 */
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL * ssl,uint8_t type,uint8_t * recvd_type,unsigned char * buf,size_t len,int peek,size_t * readbytes)614 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type,
615 unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
616 int peek, size_t *readbytes)
617 {
618 int i, j, ret;
619 size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes;
620 TLS_RECORD *rr;
621 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
622 int is_tls13;
623 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
624
625 is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
626
627 if ((type != 0
628 && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
629 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
630 || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
632 return -1;
633 }
634
635 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
636 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
637 {
638 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
639 unsigned char *dst = buf;
640 unsigned int k;
641
642 /* peek == 0 */
643 n = 0;
644 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
645 *dst++ = *src++;
646 len--;
647 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
648 n++;
649 }
650 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
651 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
652 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
653
654 if (recvd_type != NULL)
655 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
656
657 *readbytes = n;
658 return 1;
659 }
660
661 /*
662 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
663 */
664
665 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
666 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
667 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
669 if (i < 0)
670 return i;
671 if (i == 0)
672 return -1;
673 }
674 start:
675 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
676
677 /*-
678 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
679 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
680 * rr[i].data, - data
681 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
682 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
683 */
684 /* get new records if necessary */
685 if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) {
686 s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
687 do {
688 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs];
689
690 ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
691 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
692 &rr->rechandle,
693 &rr->version, &rr->type,
694 &rr->data, &rr->length,
695 NULL, NULL));
696 if (ret <= 0) {
697 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
698 return ret;
699 }
700 rr->off = 0;
701 s->rlayer.num_recs++;
702 } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl)
703 && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
704 }
705 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec];
706
707 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
708 && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
709 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
711 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
712 return -1;
713 }
714
715 /*
716 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
717 * record that isn't an alert.
718 */
719 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
720 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
721
722 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
723
724 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
725 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
726 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
728 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
729 return -1;
730 }
731
732 /*
733 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
734 * 'peek' mode)
735 */
736 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
737 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
738 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
739 return 0;
740 }
741
742 if (type == rr->type
743 || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
744 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
745 && !is_tls13)) {
746 /*
747 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
748 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
749 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
750 */
751 /*
752 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
753 * doing a handshake for the first time
754 */
755 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
756 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
758 return -1;
759 }
760
761 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
762 && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
763 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
765 return -1;
766 }
767
768 if (recvd_type != NULL)
769 *recvd_type = rr->type;
770
771 if (len == 0) {
772 /*
773 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
774 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
775 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
776 */
777 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
778 return -1;
779
780 return 0;
781 }
782
783 totalbytes = 0;
784 curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec;
785 do {
786 if (len - totalbytes > rr->length)
787 n = rr->length;
788 else
789 n = len - totalbytes;
790
791 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
792 buf += n;
793 if (peek) {
794 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
795 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
796 return -1;
797 } else {
798 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
799 return -1;
800 }
801 if (rr->length == 0
802 || (peek && n == rr->length)) {
803 rr++;
804 curr_rec++;
805 }
806 totalbytes += n;
807 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
808 && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs
809 && totalbytes < len);
810 if (totalbytes == 0) {
811 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
812 goto start;
813 }
814 *readbytes = totalbytes;
815 return 1;
816 }
817
818 /*
819 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
820 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
821 * were actually expecting a CCS).
822 */
823
824 /*
825 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
826 */
827 if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
828 /*
829 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
830 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
831 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
832 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
833 */
834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
835 return -1;
836 }
837
838 if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
839 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
840 /*
841 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
842 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
843 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
844 * if we are a server.
845 */
846 s->version = rr->version;
847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
848 return -1;
849 }
850
851 /*-
852 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
853 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
854 */
855
856 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
857 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
858 const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off;
859 PACKET alert;
860
861 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
862 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
863 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
864 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
866 return -1;
867 }
868
869 if (s->msg_callback)
870 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl,
871 s->msg_callback_arg);
872
873 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
874 cb = s->info_callback;
875 else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
876 cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
877
878 if (cb != NULL) {
879 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
880 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
881 }
882
883 if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
884 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
885 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
886 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
887 return -1;
888
889 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
890 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
892 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
893 return -1;
894 }
895 }
896
897 /*
898 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
899 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
900 */
901 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
902 goto start;
903 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
904 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
905 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
906 return 0;
907 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
908 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
909 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
910 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
911 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
912 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
913 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
914 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
915 return -1;
916 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
917 return 0;
918 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
919 /*
920 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
921 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
922 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
923 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
924 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
925 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
926 */
927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
928 return -1;
929 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
930 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
931 goto start;
932 }
933
934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
935 return -1;
936 }
937
938 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
939 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
940 BIO *rbio;
941
942 /*
943 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
944 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
945 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
946 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
947 * sent close_notify.
948 */
949 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
950 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
951 return -1;
952
953 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
954 goto start;
955
956 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
957 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
958 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
959 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
960 return -1;
961 }
962 } else {
963 /*
964 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
965 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
966 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
967 * above.
968 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
969 */
970 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
971 return -1;
972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
973 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
974 return -1;
975 }
976 }
977
978 /*
979 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
980 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
981 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
982 * that we're just going to discard.
983 */
984 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
985 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
986 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
987 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
988
989 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
990 if (rr->length < n)
991 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
992
993 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
994 if (n > 0) {
995 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n);
996 *dest_len += n;
997 }
998 /*
999 * We release the number of bytes consumed, or the whole record if it
1000 * is zero length
1001 */
1002 if ((n > 0 || rr->length == 0) && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
1003 return -1;
1004
1005 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1006 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1007 }
1008
1009 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1011 return -1;
1012 }
1013
1014 /*
1015 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1016 * protocol violation)
1017 */
1018 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1019 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1020 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1021
1022 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1023 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1024
1025 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
1026 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1027 if (i < 0)
1028 return i;
1029 if (i == 0) {
1030 return -1;
1031 }
1032
1033 /*
1034 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1035 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1036 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1037 */
1038 if (ined)
1039 return -1;
1040
1041 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1042 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1043 BIO *bio;
1044 /*
1045 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1046 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1047 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1048 * problems in the blocking world
1049 */
1050 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1051 bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
1052 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1053 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1054 return -1;
1055 }
1056 }
1057 goto start;
1058 }
1059
1060 switch (rr->type) {
1061 default:
1062 /*
1063 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1064 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1065 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1066 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1067 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1068 */
1069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1070 return -1;
1071 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1072 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1073 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1074 /*
1075 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1076 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1077 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1078 */
1079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 return -1;
1081 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1082 /*
1083 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1084 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1085 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1086 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1087 * started), we will indulge it.
1088 */
1089 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1090 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
1091 return -1;
1092 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1093 /*
1094 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1095 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1096 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1097 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1098 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1099 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1100 * record.
1101 */
1102 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1103 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1104 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1105 return -1;
1106 }
1107 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
1108 return -1;
1109 goto start;
1110 } else {
1111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1112 return -1;
1113 }
1114 }
1115 }
1116
1117 /*
1118 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1119 * format and false otherwise.
1120 */
RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1121 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1122 {
1123 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s))
1124 return 0;
1125 return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION;
1126 }
1127
1128 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper;
rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p,int version,int content_type,const void * buf,size_t len,void * cbarg)1129 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version,
1130 int content_type, const void *buf,
1131 size_t len, void *cbarg)
1132 {
1133 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1134 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1135
1136 if (s->msg_callback != NULL)
1137 s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl,
1138 s->msg_callback_arg);
1139 }
1140
1141 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper;
rlayer_security_wrapper(void * cbarg,int op,int bits,int nid,void * other)1142 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid,
1143 void *other)
1144 {
1145 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1146
1147 return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other);
1148 }
1149
1150 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper;
rlayer_padding_wrapper(void * cbarg,int type,size_t len)1151 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg, int type, size_t len)
1152 {
1153 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1154 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1155
1156 return s->rlayer.record_padding_cb(ssl, type, len,
1157 s->rlayer.record_padding_arg);
1158 }
1159
1160 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = {
1161 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data },
1162 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper },
1163 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper },
1164 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper },
1165 OSSL_DISPATCH_END
1166 };
1167
ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD * meth,void * rlarg)1168 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1169 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth,
1170 void *rlarg)
1171 {
1172 s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod = meth;
1173 s->rlayer.rlarg = rlarg;
1174 }
1175
ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int direction,int level)1176 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1177 int direction,
1178 int level)
1179 {
1180 if (s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod != NULL)
1181 return s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod;
1182
1183 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
1184 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1185 return &ossl_dtls_record_method;
1186
1187 return &ossl_tls_record_method;
1188 }
1189
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1191 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1192 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1193 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0
1194 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)))
1195 return &ossl_ktls_record_method;
1196 #endif
1197
1198 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1199 return direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ ? s->rlayer.rrlmethod
1200 : s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1201 }
1202
ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int direction)1203 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int direction)
1204 {
1205 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *thismethod;
1206 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *thisrl;
1207
1208 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1209 thismethod = s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1210 thisrl = s->rlayer.rrl;
1211 } else {
1212 thismethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1213 thisrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
1214 }
1215
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1217 {
1218 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1219
1220 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) {
1221 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1222 SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1223 }
1224 }
1225 #endif
1226 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && thismethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
1227 thismethod->set_first_handshake(thisrl, 1);
1228
1229 if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && thismethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL)
1230 thismethod->set_max_pipelines(thisrl, s->max_pipelines);
1231
1232 return 1;
1233 }
1234
ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int version,int direction,int level,unsigned char * secret,size_t secretlen,unsigned char * key,size_t keylen,unsigned char * iv,size_t ivlen,unsigned char * mackey,size_t mackeylen,const EVP_CIPHER * ciph,size_t taglen,int mactype,const EVP_MD * md,const SSL_COMP * comp,const EVP_MD * kdfdigest)1235 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1236 int direction, int level,
1237 unsigned char *secret, size_t secretlen,
1238 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
1239 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
1240 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
1241 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen,
1242 int mactype, const EVP_MD *md,
1243 const SSL_COMP *comp, const EVP_MD *kdfdigest)
1244 {
1245 OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options;
1246 OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings;
1247 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD **thismethod;
1248 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **thisrl, *newrl = NULL;
1249 BIO *thisbio;
1250 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1251 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth;
1252 int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0;
1253 unsigned int maxfrag = (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE)
1254 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
1255 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1256 int use_early_data = 0;
1257 uint32_t max_early_data;
1258 COMP_METHOD *compm = (comp == NULL) ? NULL : comp->method;
1259
1260 meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, direction, level);
1261
1262 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1263 thismethod = &s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1264 thisrl = &s->rlayer.rrl;
1265 thisbio = s->rbio;
1266 } else {
1267 thismethod = &s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1268 thisrl = &s->rlayer.wrl;
1269 thisbio = s->wbio;
1270 }
1271
1272 if (meth == NULL)
1273 meth = *thismethod;
1274
1275 if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) {
1276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1277 return 0;
1278 }
1279
1280 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1281 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS,
1282 &s->options);
1283 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE,
1284 &s->mode);
1285 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1286 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN,
1287 &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len);
1288 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD,
1289 &s->rlayer.read_ahead);
1290 } else {
1291 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING,
1292 &s->rlayer.block_padding);
1293 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_HS_PADDING,
1294 &s->rlayer.hs_padding);
1295 }
1296 *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1297
1298 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1299 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1300 use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1301 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1302 stream_mac = 1;
1303
1304 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1305 tlstree = 1;
1306 } else {
1307 use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1308 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1309 stream_mac = 1;
1310
1311 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1312 tlstree = 1;
1313 }
1314
1315 if (use_etm)
1316 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM,
1317 &use_etm);
1318
1319 if (stream_mac)
1320 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC,
1321 &stream_mac);
1322
1323 if (tlstree)
1324 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE,
1325 &tlstree);
1326
1327 /*
1328 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1329 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1330 */
1331 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1332 && s->session != NULL
1333 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1334 maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1335
1336
1337 if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1338 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN,
1339 &maxfrag);
1340
1341 /*
1342 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1343 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1344 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1345 */
1346 if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1347 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1348 || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE);
1349 } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) {
1350 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY);
1351 }
1352 if (use_early_data) {
1353 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
1354
1355 if (max_early_data != 0)
1356 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA,
1357 &max_early_data);
1358 }
1359
1360 *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1361
1362 for (;;) {
1363 int rlret;
1364 BIO *prev = NULL;
1365 BIO *next = NULL;
1366 unsigned int epoch = 0;
1367 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch)];
1368 size_t i, j;
1369
1370 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1371 prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext;
1372 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1373 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1374 epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ); /* new epoch */
1375
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1377 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1378 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1379 else
1380 #endif
1381 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1382
1383 if (next == NULL) {
1384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 return 0;
1386 }
1387 s->rlayer.rrlnext = next;
1388 } else {
1389 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1390 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1391 epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); /* new epoch */
1392 }
1393
1394 /*
1395 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1396 * callbacks that we don't need.
1397 */
1398 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch); i++) {
1399 switch (rlayer_dispatch[i].function_id) {
1400 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK:
1401 if (s->msg_callback == NULL)
1402 continue;
1403 break;
1404 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING:
1405 if (s->rlayer.record_padding_cb == NULL)
1406 continue;
1407 break;
1408 default:
1409 break;
1410 }
1411 rlayer_dispatch_tmp[j++] = rlayer_dispatch[i];
1412 }
1413
1414 rlret = meth->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version,
1415 s->server, direction, level, epoch,
1416 secret, secretlen, key, keylen, iv,
1417 ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph, taglen,
1418 mactype, md, compm, kdfdigest, prev,
1419 thisbio, next, NULL, NULL, settings,
1420 options, rlayer_dispatch_tmp, s,
1421 s->rlayer.rlarg, &newrl);
1422 BIO_free(prev);
1423 switch (rlret) {
1424 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL:
1425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE);
1426 return 0;
1427
1428 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR:
1429 if (*thismethod != meth && *thismethod != NULL) {
1430 /*
1431 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1432 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1433 */
1434 meth = *thismethod;
1435 continue;
1436 }
1437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER);
1438 return 0;
1439
1440 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS:
1441 break;
1442
1443 default:
1444 /* Should not happen */
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1446 return 0;
1447 }
1448 break;
1449 }
1450
1451 /*
1452 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1453 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1454 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1455 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1456 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1457 */
1458 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1459 || direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1460 || pqueue_peek(s->d1->sent_messages) == NULL) {
1461 if (*thismethod != NULL && !(*thismethod)->free(*thisrl)) {
1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 return 0;
1464 }
1465 }
1466
1467 *thisrl = newrl;
1468 *thismethod = meth;
1469
1470 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s, direction);
1471 }
1472
ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int vers)1473 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers)
1474 {
1475 if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL)
1476 || !ossl_assert(s->rlayer.wrlmethod != NULL))
1477 return 0;
1478 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, s->version);
1479 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, s->version);
1480
1481 return 1;
1482 }
1483
