Remove ssl_cert_inst()

It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <

Remove ssl_cert_inst()

It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

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Merge OPENSSL_NO_EC{DH,DSA} into OPENSSL_NO_EC

Suggested by John Foley <foleyj@cisco.com>.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove experimental 56bit export ciphers

These ciphers are removed:
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPO

Remove experimental 56bit export ciphers

These ciphers are removed:
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
They were defined in a long-expired IETF internet-draft:
draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

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dead code cleanup: #if 0 in ssl

I left many "#if 0" lines, usually because I thought we would
probably want to revisit them later, or because they provided
some useful internal docum

dead code cleanup: #if 0 in ssl

I left many "#if 0" lines, usually because I thought we would
probably want to revisit them later, or because they provided
some useful internal documentation tips.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

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Live code cleanup; #if 1 removal

A few minor cleanups to remove pre-processor "#if 1" stuff.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

clang on Linux x86_64 complains about unreachable code.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Remove support for opaque-prf

An expired IETF Internet-Draft (seven years old) that nobody
implements, and probably just as good as NSA DRBG work.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <

Remove support for opaque-prf

An expired IETF Internet-Draft (seven years old) that nobody
implements, and probably just as good as NSA DRBG work.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

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Dead code removal: Fortezza identifiers

Not interested in helping the NSA in the slightest.
And anyway, it was never implemented, #if'd out.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitt

Dead code removal: Fortezza identifiers

Not interested in helping the NSA in the slightest.
And anyway, it was never implemented, #if'd out.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

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Run util/openssl-format-source -v -c .

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

More indent fixes for STACK_OF

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

RT3548: Remove unsupported platforms

This last one for this ticket. Removes WIN16.
So long, MS_CALLBACK and MS_FAR. We won't miss you.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@op

RT3548: Remove unsupported platforms

This last one for this ticket. Removes WIN16.
So long, MS_CALLBACK and MS_FAR. We won't miss you.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

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Clear warnings/errors within KSSL_DEBUG code sections

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Clear warnings/errors within CIPHER_DEBUG code sections

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Add OPENSSL_NO_ECDH guards

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Remove SSLv2 support

The only support for SSLv2 left is receiving a SSLv2 compatible client hello.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Remove serverinfo checks.

Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the
serverinfo checks are no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Add support for Camellia HMAC-Based cipher suites from RFC6367

While RFC6367 focuses on Camellia-GCM cipher suites, it also adds a few
cipher suites that use SHA-2 based HMAC that can be

Add support for Camellia HMAC-Based cipher suites from RFC6367

While RFC6367 focuses on Camellia-GCM cipher suites, it also adds a few
cipher suites that use SHA-2 based HMAC that can be very easily
added.

Tested against gnutls 3.3.5

PR#3443

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

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Fix SRP authentication ciphersuites.

The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:

A certificate is not sent.
A ce

Fix SRP authentication ciphersuites.

The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:

A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

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Constification - mostly originally from Chromium.

Add SHA256 Camellia ciphersuites from RFC5932

PR#2800

SRP ciphersuite correction.

SRP ciphersuites do not have no authentication. They have authentication
based on SRP. Add new SRP authentication flag and cipher string.

Update strength_bits for 3DES.

Fix strength_bits to 112 for 3DES.

Security framework.

Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including
sensible defaults based on bits of security.

The "parameters" which can be selected inclu

Security framework.

Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including
sensible defaults based on bits of security.

The "parameters" which can be selected include: ciphersuites,
curves, key sizes, certificate signature algorithms, supported
signature algorithms, DH parameters, SSL/TLS version, session tickets
and compression.

In some cases prohibiting the use of a parameters will mean they are
not advertised to the peer: for example cipher suites and ECC curves.
In other cases it will abort the handshake: e.g DH parameters or the
peer key size.

Documentation to follow...

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Auto DH support.

Add auto DH parameter support. This is roughly equivalent to the
ECDH auto curve selection but for DH. An application can just call

SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 1);

Auto DH support.

Add auto DH parameter support. This is roughly equivalent to the
ECDH auto curve selection but for DH. An application can just call

SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 1);

and appropriate DH parameters will be used based on the size of the
server key.

Unlike ECDH there is no way a peer can indicate the range of DH parameters
it supports. Some peers cannot handle DH keys larger that 1024 bits for
example. In this case if you call:

SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 2);

Only 1024 bit DH parameters will be used.

If the server key is 7680 bits or more in size then 8192 bit DH parameters
will be used: these will be *very* slow.

The old export ciphersuites aren't supported but those are very
insecure anyway.

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