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6977e8ee |
| 04-Dec-2015 |
Kurt Roeckx |
Make SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() call SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() allows to set 1 EC curve and then tries to use it. On the other hand SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() allows y
Make SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() call SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() allows to set 1 EC curve and then tries to use it. On the other hand SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() allows you to set a list of curves, but only when SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() was called to turn it on. Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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6f78b9e8 |
| 04-Dec-2015 |
Kurt Roeckx |
Remove support for SSL_{CTX_}set_tmp_ecdh_callback(). This only gets used to set a specific curve without actually checking that the peer supports it or not and can therefor result in ha
Remove support for SSL_{CTX_}set_tmp_ecdh_callback(). This only gets used to set a specific curve without actually checking that the peer supports it or not and can therefor result in handshake failures that can be avoided by selecting a different cipher. Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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2a9b9654 |
| 24-Nov-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Updates to GOST2012 Various updates following feedback from the recent commit of the new GOST2012 code. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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6938c954 |
| 25-Nov-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Remove unused cert_verify_mac code Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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a60c151a |
| 22-Nov-2015 |
Pascal Cuoq |
ssl3_free(): Return if it wasn't created If somewhere in SSL_new() there is a memory allocation failure, ssl3_free() can get called with s->s3 still being NULL. Patch also provi
ssl3_free(): Return if it wasn't created If somewhere in SSL_new() there is a memory allocation failure, ssl3_free() can get called with s->s3 still being NULL. Patch also provided by Willy Tarreau <wtarreau@haproxy.com> Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
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e44380a9 |
| 17-Nov-2015 |
Dmitry Belyavsky |
Patch containing TLS implementation for GOST 2012 This patch contains the necessary changes to provide GOST 2012 ciphersuites in TLS. It requires the use of an external GOST 2012 engine.
Patch containing TLS implementation for GOST 2012 This patch contains the necessary changes to provide GOST 2012 ciphersuites in TLS. It requires the use of an external GOST 2012 engine. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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fa499246 |
| 18-Nov-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Make GOST ciphersuites require TLSv1 PR#4141 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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2b573382 |
| 13-Nov-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Don't alow TLS v1.0 ciphersuites for SSLv3 This disables some ciphersuites which aren't supported in SSL v3: specifically PSK ciphersuites which use SHA256 or SHA384 for the MAC.
Don't alow TLS v1.0 ciphersuites for SSLv3 This disables some ciphersuites which aren't supported in SSL v3: specifically PSK ciphersuites which use SHA256 or SHA384 for the MAC. Thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for identifying this issue. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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5e3d21fe |
| 13-Nov-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Use SSL_TLSV1 only if at least TLS v1.0 is needed. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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a71edf3b |
| 30-Oct-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Standardise our style for checking malloc failures if we have a malloc |x = OPENSSL_malloc(...)| sometimes we check |x| for NULL and sometimes we treat it as a boolean |if(!x) ...|. Stan
Standardise our style for checking malloc failures if we have a malloc |x = OPENSSL_malloc(...)| sometimes we check |x| for NULL and sometimes we treat it as a boolean |if(!x) ...|. Standardise the approach in libssl. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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90d9e49a |
| 05-Nov-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Use uint32_t and int32_t for SSL_CIPHER structure. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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024f543c |
| 22-Oct-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Move in_handshake into STATEM The SSL variable |in_handshake| seems misplaced. It would be better to have it in the STATEM structure. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Move in_handshake into STATEM The SSL variable |in_handshake| seems misplaced. It would be better to have it in the STATEM structure. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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c874def6 |
| 05-Oct-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Remove extraneous parens Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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fe3a3291 |
| 05-Oct-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Change statem prefix to ossl_statem Change various state machine functions to use the prefix ossl_statem instead. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich
Change statem prefix to ossl_statem Change various state machine functions to use the prefix ossl_statem instead. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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49ae7423 |
| 08-Sep-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Remove redundant code Clean up and remove lots of code that is now no longer needed due to the move to the new state machine. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Revie
Remove redundant code Clean up and remove lots of code that is now no longer needed due to the move to the new state machine. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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f8e0a557 |
| 29-Jul-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Add initial state machine rewrite code This is the first drop of the new state machine code. The rewrite has the following objectives: - Remove duplication of state code between
Add initial state machine rewrite code This is the first drop of the new state machine code. The rewrite has the following objectives: - Remove duplication of state code between client and server - Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS - Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location so that it is easier to validate - Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions - Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something else) - Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better understand each) - message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc - handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now - Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all the state changes local to a file This builds on previous state machine related work: - Surface CCS processing in the state machine - Version negotiation rewrite Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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9076bd25 |
| 11-Sep-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Make no-psk compile without warnings. PR#4035 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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c84f7f4a |
| 29-Sep-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Change the DEFAULT ciphersuites to exclude DES, RC4 and RC2 This patch updates the "DEFAULT" cipherstring to be "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL". COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT is now defined
Change the DEFAULT ciphersuites to exclude DES, RC4 and RC2 This patch updates the "DEFAULT" cipherstring to be "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL". COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT is now defined internally by a flag on each ciphersuite indicating whether it should be excluded from DEFAULT or not. This gives us control at an individual ciphersuite level as to exactly what is in DEFAULT and what is not. Finally all DES, RC4 and RC2 ciphersuites are added to COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT and hence removed from DEFAULT. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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b51bce94 |
| 25-Aug-2015 |
Rich Salz |
Add and use OPENSSL_zalloc There are many places (nearly 50) where we malloc and then memset. Add an OPENSSL_zalloc routine to encapsulate that. (Missed one conversion; thanks Richar
Add and use OPENSSL_zalloc There are many places (nearly 50) where we malloc and then memset. Add an OPENSSL_zalloc routine to encapsulate that. (Missed one conversion; thanks Richard) Also fixes GH328 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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176f85a2 |
| 31-Jul-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Add CCM ciphersuites from RFC6655 and RFC7251 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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ade44dcb |
| 04-Aug-2015 |
Rich Salz |
Remove Gost94 signature algorithm. This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest. Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice. Revie
Remove Gost94 signature algorithm. This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest. Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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fbfcb224 |
| 07-Aug-2015 |
Rich Salz |
RT3999: Remove sub-component version strings Especially since after the #ifdef cleanups this is not useful. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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657da85e |
| 11-May-2015 |
Matt Caswell |
Move TLS CCS processing into the state machine The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshak
Move TLS CCS processing into the state machine The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages. Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake. Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS. Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not visible to the state machine. Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine. This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit will handle DTLS. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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a784665e |
| 28-Jul-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
Free and cleanse pms on error Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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69a3a9f5 |
| 30-Jun-2015 |
Dr. Stephen Henson |
CAMELLIA PSK ciphersuites from RFC6367 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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