Searched refs:sequence (Results 76 – 90 of 90) sorted by relevance
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| /openssl/test/ |
| H A D | sslapitest.c | 1049 memcpy(crec_wseq_before, &clientsc->rlayer.wrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
1050 memcpy(srec_wseq_before, &serversc->rlayer.wrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
1051 memcpy(crec_rseq_before, &clientsc->rlayer.rrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
1052 memcpy(srec_rseq_before, &serversc->rlayer.rrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
1072 memcpy(crec_wseq_after, &clientsc->rlayer.wrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
1073 memcpy(srec_wseq_after, &serversc->rlayer.wrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
1074 memcpy(crec_rseq_after, &clientsc->rlayer.rrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
1075 memcpy(srec_rseq_after, &serversc->rlayer.rrl->sequence, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); in ping_pong_query()
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| /openssl/doc/man3/ |
| H A D | SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod | 241 The following code sequence realizes an example B<verify_callback> function
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| H A D | PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod | 409 It will simply be treated as a byte sequence.
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| H A D | SSL_CONF_cmd.pod | 684 however the call sequence is:
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| H A D | EVP_EncryptInit.pod | 1037 Bytes 0-7: The sequence number of the first record
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| /openssl/doc/designs/quic-design/ |
| H A D | quic-ackm.md | 273 * A sequence of packet number ranges [[start, end]...].
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| H A D | dgram-api.md | 404 Suppose the following sequence happens:
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| /openssl/apps/ |
| H A D | s_client.c | 2844 BIO_write(sbio, atyp->value.sequence->data, in s_client_main()
2845 atyp->value.sequence->length); in s_client_main()
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| /openssl/ssl/statem/ |
| H A D | statem_srvr.c | 3272 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length; in tls_process_cke_gost()
3273 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data; in tls_process_cke_gost()
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| /openssl/doc/man1/ |
| H A D | openssl-x509.pod.in | 434 Giving a single C</> will lead to an empty sequence of RDNs (a NULL-DN).
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| H A D | openssl-req.pod.in | 276 Giving a single C</> will lead to an empty sequence of RDNs (a NULL-DN).
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| H A D | openssl-ca.pod.in | 325 Giving a single C</> will lead to an empty sequence of RDNs (a NULL-DN).
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| /openssl/include/openssl/ |
| H A D | x509.h.in | 247 /* Netscape certificate sequence structure */
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| /openssl/crypto/objects/ |
| H A D | objects.txt | 970 !Cname netscape-cert-sequence
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| /openssl/ |
| H A D | CHANGES.md | 5994 test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected
6784 decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means
7985 decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means
8542 sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
9607 sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
11259 sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake.
11260 So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be
13132 RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of
15138 /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, querying stops
15772 * Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after
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