/* * Copyright 2022-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h" #include "../../ssl_local.h" #include "../record_local.h" #include "recmethod_local.h" static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen, int mactype, const EVP_MD *md, COMP_METHOD *comp) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx; EVP_PKEY *mac_key; int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0; if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION) return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx; rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (comp != NULL) { rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp); if (rl->compctx == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } } #endif /* * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip * setting up the MAC key. */ if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) { if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) { mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC", rl->propq, mackey, mackeylen); } else { /* * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating * a MAC key. */ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey, (int)mackeylen); } if (mac_key == NULL || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md), rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key, NULL) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); } if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL, enc) || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, (int)taglen, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0 || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } } else { if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } } /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0 && mackeylen != 0 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, (int)mackeylen, mackey) <= 0) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } /* * The cipher we actually ended up using in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX may be * different to that in ciph if we have an ENGINE in use */ if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ciph_ctx)) != NULL && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md)) { /* ERR_raise already called */ return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } /* Calculate the explicit IV length */ if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ciph_ctx); int eivlen = 0; if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ciph_ctx); if (eivlen < 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; } if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } rl->eivlen = (size_t)eivlen; } return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; } #define MAX_PADDING 256 /*- * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls RLAYERfatal on * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to * report a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record). * * Returns: * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD * decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed. * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised) */ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; int pad = 0, tmpr, provided; size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop; unsigned char padval; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; if (n_recs == 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx); if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } ds = rl->enc_ctx; if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_ctx != NULL)) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_ctx); if (sending) { int ivlen; /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl) && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc); else ivlen = 0; if (ivlen > 1) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input, ivlen, 0) <= 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } } if (!ossl_assert(enc != NULL)) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL); bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)); if (bs == 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); return 0; } if (n_recs > 1) { if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) { /* * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the * cipher doesn't support pipelining */ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return 0; } } for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) { unsigned char *seq; seq = rl->sequence; if (rl->isdtls) { unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; s2n(rl->epoch, p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); } else { memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) { /* RLAYERfatal already called */ return 0; } } buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8); buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version); buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); if (pad <= 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (sending) { reclen[ctr] += pad; recs[ctr].length += pad; } } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) { /* * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the * padding on the provider side. */ padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */ if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; reclen[ctr] += padnum; recs[ctr].length += padnum; } if (!sending) { if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) { /* Publicly invalid */ return 0; } } } if (n_recs > 1) { /* Set the output buffers */ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Set the input buffers */ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return 0; } } if (!rl->isdtls && rl->tlstree) { int decrement_seq = 0; /* * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation. * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function. * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation */ if (sending && !rl->use_etm) decrement_seq = 1; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, rl->sequence) <= 0) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (provided) { int outlen; /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */ if (n_recs > 1) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input, (unsigned int)reclen[0])) return 0; recs[0].length = outlen; /* * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over * any explicit IV */ if (!sending) { if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) { recs[0].data += bs; recs[0].input += bs; recs[0].orig_len -= bs; } /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */ if (macs != NULL) { OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; /* Get the MAC */ macs[0].alloced = 0; *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC, (void **)&macs[0].mac, macsize); *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) { /* Shouldn't normally happen */ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } } else { /* Legacy cipher */ tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, (unsigned int)reclen[0]); if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0 ? (tmpr < 0) : (tmpr == 0)) { /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ return 0; } if (!sending) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */ if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) { if (recs[ctr].length < bs) return 0; recs[ctr].data += bs; recs[ctr].input += bs; recs[ctr].length -= bs; recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs; } /* * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but * with a random MAC if padding is invalid */ if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length, recs[ctr].orig_len, recs[ctr].data, (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL, (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced : NULL, bs, pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize, (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0, rl->libctx)) return 0; } } } return 1; } static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { unsigned char *seq = rl->sequence; EVP_MD_CTX *hash; size_t md_size; EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; unsigned char header[13]; int t; int ret = 0; hash = rl->md_ctx; t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash); if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) return 0; md_size = t; if (rl->stream_mac) { mac_ctx = hash; } else { hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) { goto end; } mac_ctx = hmac; } if (!rl->isdtls && rl->tlstree && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) goto end; if (rl->isdtls) { unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; s2n(rl->epoch, p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); } else { memcpy(header, seq, 8); } header[8] = rec->type; header[9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8); header[10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version); header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); if (!sending && !rl->use_etm && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params; *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE, &rec->orig_len); *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx), tls_hmac_params)) goto end; } if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) goto end; OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n"); BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4); BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n"); BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4); } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); if (!rl->isdtls && !tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) { /* RLAYERfatal already called */ goto end; } OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n"); BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4); } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); ret = 1; end: EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return ret; } #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \ + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \ + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD) # else # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \ + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */ #else # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \ + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD) # else # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */ #endif /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */ int tls1_allocate_write_buffers(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates, size_t numtempl, size_t *prefix) { /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */ *prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; /* * In the prefix case we can allocate a much smaller buffer. Otherwise we * just allocate the default buffer size */ if (!tls_setup_write_buffer(rl, numtempl + *prefix, *prefix ? MAX_PREFIX_LEN : 0, 0)) { /* RLAYERfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */ int tls1_initialise_write_packets(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates, size_t numtempl, OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *prefixtempl, WPACKET *pkt, TLS_BUFFER *bufs, size_t *wpinited) { size_t align = 0; TLS_BUFFER *wb; size_t prefix; /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */ prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; if (prefix) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ prefixtempl->buf = NULL; prefixtempl->version = templates[0].version; prefixtempl->buflen = 0; prefixtempl->type = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; wb = &bufs[0]; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 align = (size_t)TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); #endif TLS_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), TLS_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } *wpinited = 1; if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return tls_initialise_write_packets_default(rl, templates, numtempl, NULL, pkt + prefix, bufs + prefix, wpinited); } /* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */ const struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = { tls1_set_crypto_state, tls1_cipher, tls1_mac, tls_default_set_protocol_version, tls_default_read_n, tls_get_more_records, tls_default_validate_record_header, tls_default_post_process_record, tls_get_max_records_multiblock, tls_write_records_multiblock, /* Defined in tls_multib.c */ tls1_allocate_write_buffers, tls1_initialise_write_packets, NULL, tls_prepare_record_header_default, NULL, tls_prepare_for_encryption_default, tls_post_encryption_processing_default, NULL }; const struct record_functions_st dtls_1_funcs = { tls1_set_crypto_state, tls1_cipher, tls1_mac, tls_default_set_protocol_version, tls_default_read_n, dtls_get_more_records, NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_write_records_default, /* * Don't use tls1_allocate_write_buffers since that handles empty fragment * records which aren't needed in DTLS. We just use the default allocation * instead. */ tls_allocate_write_buffers_default, /* Don't use tls1_initialise_write_packets for same reason as above */ tls_initialise_write_packets_default, NULL, dtls_prepare_record_header, NULL, tls_prepare_for_encryption_default, dtls_post_encryption_processing, NULL };