Coverity CID 1444958: Null pointer dereferences

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8888)

Coverity CID 1444963: Null pointer dereferences

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8888)

Replumbing: give the possibility for the provider to create a context

OSSL_provider_init() gets another output parameter, holding a pointer
to a provider side context. It's entirely up

Replumbing: give the possibility for the provider to create a context

OSSL_provider_init() gets another output parameter, holding a pointer
to a provider side context. It's entirely up to the provider to
define the context and what it's being used for. This pointer is
passed back to other provider functions, typically the provider global
get_params and set_params functions, and also the diverse algorithm
context creators, and of course, the teardown function.

With this, a provider can be instantiated more than once, or be
re-loaded as the case may be, while maintaining instance state.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8848)

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If key or iv is NULL set the respective length to 0

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull

If key or iv is NULL set the respective length to 0

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8794)

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Fix EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key()

Make sure we use the the correct key length in EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key().
Now that ciphers may come from providers we need to make sure we ask the
provi

Fix EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key()

Make sure we use the the correct key length in EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key().
Now that ciphers may come from providers we need to make sure we ask the
provider for the value if appropriate.

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8794)

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Make implementation of blocksize, iv_length and key_length mandatory

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Add a maximum output length to update and final calls

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Add iv length and key length params to the cipher init calls

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Implement AES CTR ciphers in the default provider

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Implement AES CFB ciphers in the default provider

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Implement AES OFB ciphers in the default provider

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Implement AES CBC ciphers in the default provider

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Add support in the default provider for 192/128 bit AES ECB

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

Implement support for AES-256-ECB in the default provider

We also lay the ground work for various of other the basic AES ciphers.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(

Implement support for AES-256-ECB in the default provider

We also lay the ground work for various of other the basic AES ciphers.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

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Make EVP_Encrypt*/EVP_Decrypt* and EVP_Cipher* provider aware

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)

EVP_*Update: ensure that input NULL with length 0 isn't passed

Even with custome ciphers, the combination in == NULL && inl == 0
should not be passed down to the backend cipher function.

EVP_*Update: ensure that input NULL with length 0 isn't passed

Even with custome ciphers, the combination in == NULL && inl == 0
should not be passed down to the backend cipher function. The reason
is that these are the values passed by EVP_*Final, and some of the
backend cipher functions do check for these to see if a "final" call
is made.

Fixes #8675

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8676)

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Prevent calling decryption in an encryption context and vice versa

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github

Prevent calling decryption in an encryption context and vice versa

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7852)

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Following the license change, modify the boilerplates in crypto/evp/

[skip ci]

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/

Following the license change, modify the boilerplates in crypto/evp/

[skip ci]

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7794)

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Use the private RNG for data that is not public

Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Fixes: #4641
G

Use the private RNG for data that is not public

Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Fixes: #4641
GH: #4665

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Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5689)

Don't use a ssl specific DRBG anymore

Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's r

Don't use a ssl specific DRBG anymore

Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's really from an other thread because the SSL object moved to an
other thread.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)

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Publish the RAND_DRBG API

Fixes #4403

This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL A

Publish the RAND_DRBG API

Fixes #4403

This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.

Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)

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Tell the ciphers which DRBG to use for generating random bytes.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #4672

Consistent formatting for sizeof(foo)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4872)

Only reset the ctx when a cipher is given

This restores the 1.0.2 behaviour

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
GH: #4

Only reset the ctx when a cipher is given

This restores the 1.0.2 behaviour

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
GH: #4613

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